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In 1978 the Cornell Law Review published a Special Project de-
voted to Article Two commercial warranties.' Nine years have since
elapsed, and we have decided to update and reassess this important
area of the law. We have discovered that although judicial treat-
ment of many aspects of Article Two warranty law has remained sta-
ble, in some instances the courts' treatment has progressed and in
other instances it has become unclear. This Special Project is our
attempt to assemble these changes, interpret the progress, and sug-
gest new lines of analysis to clarify areas of conflict.
I
THE SCOPE OF THE WARRANTY SECTIONS
Article Two's commercial warranty provisions apply to a large,
but nonetheless limited, class of transactions. Article Two applies
only to "transactions in goods," 2 and the language of the various
1 Special Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions, 64 CORNELL L.
REV. 30 (1978).
2 U.C.C. § 2-102 (1977). (All Special Project citations to the Uniform Commercial
Code refer to the 1978 official text unless otherwise noted.) That section, which defines
the scope of Article Two, provides:
Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to transac-
tions in goods; it does not apply to any transaction which although in the
[Vol. 72:11591162
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warranty sections further limits their application to contracts for the
sale of goods.3
A. Sale-Service Hybrids
The traditional distinction between services and tangible goods
blurs in today's complex commercial world. 4 For purposes of Code
warranty law, characterization of the transaction depends on
whether the sale of the good or the performance of the service pre-
dominates. 5 "This determination turns on the nature of the transac-
form of an unconditional contract to sell or present sale is intended to
operate only as a security transaction nor does this Article impair or re-
peal any statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers or other specified
classes of buyers.
Id.
3 Id Section 2-314 explicitly states that "a warranty that the goods shall be mer-
chantable is implied in a contract for their sale." Id. § 2-314 (implied warranty of
merchantability). Sections 2-313 and 2-315 use the terms "seller" and "buyer." Id
§§ 2-313 (express warranties), 2-315 (implied warranty of fitness for particular pur-
pose).
Although distribution agreements involve more than sales of goods, most jurisdic-
tions treat them as governed by Article Two. See Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigera-
tion, Inc., 594 F.2d 129, 26 U.C.C. Rep. 301 (5th Cir.) (exclusive home appliance
distributorship), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979); Kirby v. Chrysler Corp., 554 F. Supp.
743, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 497 (D. Md. 1982) (automobile dealership); Quality Performance
Lines v. Yoho Automotive, Inc., 609 P.2d 1340, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 787 (Utah 1980) (auto-
motive parts distribution); Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Cattle Breeders of Can., Ltd. v. Y-Tex
Corp., 590 P.2d 1306, 26 U.C.C. Rep. 292 (Wyo. 1979) (exclusive bull semen dealership
contract). But see Vigano v. Wylain, Inc., 633 F.2d 522 (8th Cir. 1980) (applying Mis-
souri rule that U.C.C. does not cover distribution agreements).
4 Section 2-105 defines "goods" as follows:
(1) "Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured
goods) which are moveable at the time of identification to the contract for
sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment
securities (Article 8) and things in action. "Goods" also includes the un-
born young of animals and growing crops and other identified things at-
tached to realty as described in the section on goods to be severed from
realty (Section 2-107).
(2) Goods must be both existing and identified before any interest in
them can pass. Goods which are not both existing and identified are "fu-
ture" goods. A purported present sale of future goods or of any interest
therein operates as a contract to sell.
(3) There may be a sale of a part interest in existing identified
goods.
U.C.C. § 2-105.
5 See Sally Beauty Co. v. Nexxus Prods. Co., 801 F.2d 1001, 1005, 2 U.C.C. Rep.
2d 82, 89 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Texas applies the 'dominant factor' test to determine
whether the UCC applies to a given contract or transaction: was the essence of or domi-
nant factor in the formation of the contract the provision of goods or services?"); Fisher
v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 403 A.2d 1130, 26 U.C.C. Rep. 1128 (D.C. 1979) (blood
transfusions considered services); Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 381 Mass. 284, 290 n.9,
408 N.E.2d 1370, 1375 n.9, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 1121, 1128 n.9 (1980) ("The essential thrust
of the [franchise agreement] was an exchange of intangible rights, obligations and serv-
ices," not sale of goods.) Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Dalton, 665 S.W.2d 507, 511, 38
U.C.C. Rep. 428 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (Code inapplicable to roof repair because service
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tion, the intent of the parties as reflected in the agreement, and a
common-sense judgment of whether the buyer paid for goods or for
services." 6
To determine whether a transaction constitutes a sale of goods
a court must examine the entire transaction to find the essence of
the agreement. When the service component is only incidental to
the transaction, Article Two applies.7 For example, courts often
treat installation of a purchased good as incidental to the sale and
consequently apply Article Two warranties to both the good and the
installation.8 In Levin v. Hoffman Fuel Co.9 a New York court deter-
mined that a contract to supply heating oil was primarily a contract
aspect predominant); Potts v. W. Q. Richards Memorial Hosp., 558 S.W.2d 939, 946, 23
U.C.C. Rep. 360, 361 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (in case involving hospital supplying both
goods and services to patient, court "must decide whether the 'essence' of this transac-
tion was for goods or services"); see also Briscoe's Foodlands, Inc. v. Capital Assocs., 42
U.C.C. Rep. 1234, 1238 (Miss. 1986) (relationship between supplier of video monitoring
equipment and lessee was lender/secured party-debtor relationship such that supplier
"did not manufacture or sell the equipment and it was not sufficiently like a seller so as
to impose Article 2 warranties"). But seeJ. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-6, at 347 (2d ed. 1980) ("We doubt that
courts are deciding these cases on the basis of distinctions between sales and services.").
6 Special Project, supra note 1, at 35; see also Colorado Carpet Installation, Inc. v.
Palermo, 668 P.2d 1384, 1388-89, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 1516, 1522 (Colo. 1983) ("Useful
factors to consider in determining whether 'goods' or 'service' predominates include the
following: the contractual language used by the parties; whether the agreement involves
one overall price that includes both goods and labor or, instead, calls for separate and
discrete billings for goods on the one hand and labor on the other; the ratio that the cost
of goods bears to the overall contract price; and the nature and reasonableness of the
purchaser's contractual expectations of acquiring a property interest in goods .... ")
(citations omitted). But see Xerox Corp. v. Hawkes, 124 N.H. 610, 615, 475 A.2d 7, 9,
38 U.C.C. Rep. 159, 162 (1984) (Code applies to warranty provisions of service agree-
ments despite parties' intentions to create lease rather than sale).
7 Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 26 U.C.C. Rep.
1162 (2d Cir. 1979) (when service aspect predominates and sale is incidental, contract is
for service; sale of goods aspect predominated in computer hardware and software
transaction, so governed by Article Two); cf Zapatha, 381 Mass. at 290, 408 N.E.2d at
1375, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 1128 (when sale of goods is minor aspect of transaction, court is
"disinclined to import automatically all the provisions of the sales article into a relation-
ship involving a variety of subjects other than the sale of goods, merely because the
contract dealt in part with the sale of goods"); Allied Indus. Serv. Corp. v. Kasle Iron &
Metals, Inc., 62 Ohio App. 2d 144, 405 N.E.2d 307, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 439 (1977) (no
implied warranty because furnishing of goods only incidental to pollution control equip-
ment contract).
8 See, e.g., R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818, 35 U.C.C.
Rep. 477 (8th Cir. 1983) (Article Two applied because service aspect of aluminum siding
contract incidental to sale of goods); B & B Refrigeration & Air Conditioning Serv. v.
Haifley, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 635 (D.C. 1978) (thrust of contract to furnish and install home
air conditioning system was sale of goods, not installation, regardless of amount of labor
required); Sawyer v. Camp Dudley, 102 A.D.2d 914, 477 N.Y.S.2d 498, 38 U.C.C. Rep.
1287 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (service of screening sand and delivery incidental to sale of
sand and gravel).
9 94 A.D.2d 640, 462 N.Y.S.2d 195, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 181 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd, 60
N.Y.2d 665, 468 N.Y.S.2d 104, 455 N.E.2d 663 (1983); see also University of Pittsburgh v.
1164 [Vol. 72:1159
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for the sale of oil. Although important, the promised delivery ser-
vice was incidental to the sales contract, and thus the Code warran-
ties applied.
Similarly, Article Two may apply to goods sold in connection
with repair service if the sale aspect predominates the transaction.' 0
Thus, in T-Birds, Inc. v. Thoroughbred Helicopter Service, Inc. 11 the court
held that the Code did not apply to a helicopter repair contract be-
cause the service aspect, overhauling the helicopter engine,
predominated.12
In deciding whether to classify a transaction as a sale of goods
subject to Article Two courts should focus on the Code's underlying
principles. 13 The Code itself requires liberal construction to pro-
mote its underlying principles. 14 Consequently, courts examining
Equitable Gas Co., 5 Pa. D. & C. 3d 303, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 1131 (Ct. C.P. 1978) (warranty
implied under Code in sale of natural gas).
10 See, e.g., Northwestern Equip., Inc. v. Cudmore, 312 N.W.2d 347,33 U.C.C. Rep.
160 (N.D. 1981) (primary purpose of contract to repair bulldozer was service; sale of
parts incidental); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Dalton, 665 S.W.2d 507, 511, 38 U.C.C.
Rep. 428 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (repair of roof predominantly service under dominant
purpose test).
11 540 F. Supp. 548, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 13 (E.D. Ky. 1982).
12 Id. at 551, 34 U.C.C. Rep. at 14. The T-Birds court concluded that the case did
not involve a transaction in goods, but "involved a rendition of services in which a sale
of goods were [sic] incidental thereto." Id, 34 U.C.C. Rep. at 14.
13 Section 1-102 expresses some of those principles; it provides in part:
(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its
underlying purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
U.C.C. § 1-102(1)-(2). Professors White and Summers, after noting that this section
"does not exhaustively specify all the Code's underlying purposes," mention the addi-
tional purpose "that the law of commercial transactions be, so far as reasonable, liberal
and nontechnical" even to the extent of being "anti-technical." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 5, § 4, at 15-16.
14 U.C.C. § 1-102; see supra note 13. The official commentary to the section pro-
vides in part:
It is intended to make it possible for the law embodied in this Act to be
developed by the courts in the light of unforeseen and new circumstances
and practices. However, the proper construction of the Act requires that
its interpretation and application be limited to its reason.
Courts have... recognized the policies embodied in an act as appli-
cable in reason to subject-matter which was not expressly included in the
language of the act. They have done the same where reason and policy
so required, even where the subject-matter had been intentionally ex-
cluded from the act in general. They have implemented a statutory policy
with liberal and useful remedies not provided in the statutory text. They
have disregarded a statutory limitation of remedy where the reason of the
limitation did not apply. Nothing in this Act stands in the way of the con-
tinuance of such action by the courts.
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hybrid situations should consider factors such as simplification,
modernization, and clarification of commercial law.
B. Leases
As with goods and services, the distinction between sales and
leases is unclear. Courts have followed several approaches in han-
dling lease cases under the Code.
1. Judicial Deference to the Legislature
Several courts have strictly construed various Article Two pro-
visions to preclude extension of Code warranties to leases absent
express legislative authorization. 15 For example, in Baker v. Promark
Products West, Inc. 16 the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed a lower-
court finding that even in the absence of a good reason to restrict
the implied warranty of merchantability to sales, section 2-314's ref-
erence to contracts for sale controlled, and only the legislature
could expand its scope to include leases and bailments. 17 The
Supreme Court concluded that "the Tennessee legislature intended
that there exist in a products liability action a cause of action for
Id. comment I (citations omitted); see infra text accompanying note 35.
One commentator has suggested that courts should apply the Code's warranty pro-
vision by analogy to utility service contracts:
The problems arising between sellers and buyers in utility supply con-
tracts are similar to those encountered in other commercial relationships.
Problems of... warranty... may even be magnified, both because utility
products are necessary and potentially dangerous and because there is
great disparity of bargaining power between seller and buyer. Applying
the Code to the sale of utilities would serve the Code's policies of uni-
formity, expansion and modernization of commercial practices.
Mallor, Utility "Services" Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Are Public Utilities in for a Shock?,
56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 89, 97 (1980); see infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
15 See Briscoe's Foodland, Inc. v. Capital Assocs., 42 U.C.C. Rep. 1234, 1237 (Miss.
1986) (noting limiting language of sections 2-102 and 2-106, court determined transac-
tion did not fall under Article Two because title did not pass to lessee and transaction
was lease rather than sale); R. & W. Leasing v. Mosher, 195 Mont. 285, 290, 636 P.2d
832, 835, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 150, 151 (1981) (implied warranties inapplicable to leasing
agreement because limited to sales); Leake v. Meredith, 221 Va. 14, 17, 267 S.E.2d 93,
95, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 484, 487 (1980) ("If the General Assembly had intended the war-
ranty provisions of the Code to be applicable to leases, it could have changed the terms
of these provisions. Since the legislature chose not to do so, we conclude that [Vir-
ginia's § 2-315] is inapplicable to chattel leases."). But cf Briscoe's, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at
1241 (Robertson, J., concurring) ("when determining whether Article 2 applies by anal-
ogy to a lease, one question which should not be asked is 'Where is the title?' ").
16 692 S.W.2d 844, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 725 (Tenn. 1985).
17 See id. at 846, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 728 (paraphrasing lower court's reasoning). But
cf. H. Russell Taylor's Fire Prevention Serv. v. Coca Cola Bottling Corp., 99 Cal. App.
3d 711, 160 Cal. Rptr. 411, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 1312 (1979) (California law allows bailor to
elect to treat bailee's conversion of goods as fictional contract in sales resulting in appli-
cation of section 2-725).
1166 [Vol. 72:1159
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breach of warranty arising out of a lease transaction." 18 Thus, defer-
ence to the legislature served to expand warranties rather than to
restrict them.
Strict construction of the Code's statutory language may also
contravene the intent of the Code's drafters.' 9 Given section 1-
102's language that the Code "shall be liberally construed and ap-
plied to promote its underlying purposes and policies," 20 courts
should reject strict constructions whenever the result conflicts with
such purposes and policies.
2. Transactions in Goods
Some courts rely on section 2-102's provision that Article Two
"applies to transactions in goods" 21 in order to bring leases within
the scope of the warranty provisions. 22 For example, in Xerox Corp. v.
Hawkes23 the New Hampshire Supreme Court applied warranty pro-
visions to an equipment lease, reasoning that section 2-102 does not
refer to "sales," but rather to the broader concept of "transactions
in goods." 24 Under this approach, the phrase "transactions in
goods" encompasses leases as well as sales.25
3. Disguised Sales
Several courts look to the effect of the lease and deny warranty
protection to "true leases," but grant protection to leases they deem
"disguised sales."' 26 In determining whether the transaction consti-
tutes a disguised sale, courts consider "the intention of the parties
as determined by the [particular] facts of each case."' 27 Some courts
18 692 S.W.2d at 849, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 732 (emphasis added).
19 See U.C.C. § 1-102 comment 1; supra note 14.
20 U.C.C. § 1-102(1).
21 Id. § 2-102.
22 The phrase "transaction in goods" can have various meanings; in Wood v. Wil-
kinson, 425 So. 2d 1062, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 41 (Ala. 1982), the court considered the ex-
change of an airplane for real estate a transaction in goods.
23 124 N.H. 610, 475 A.2d 7, 38 U.C.C. Rep. 159 (1984).
24 Id. at 615, 475 A.2d at 9, 38 U.C.C. Rep. at 162.
25 See Knox v. North Am. Car Corp., 80 Ill. App. 3d 683, 696, 399 N.E.2d 1355,
1364, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 336, 350 (1980) (Rizzi, J., dissenting) ("any transaction in goods
meeting the requirements of § 2-315 should carry with it an implied warranty of fitness
regardless of whether the transaction is a sale or lease").
26 For discussion of the "true lease" theory, see Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs
Corp., 625 F.2d 1291, 1295, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 849, 854-55 (5th Cir. 1980).
27 All-States Leasing Co. v. Ochs, 600 P.2d 899, 904, 42 Or. App. 319, 323, 27
U.C.C. Rep. 808, 813 (1979); see also Uniflex, Inc. v. Olivetti Corp. of Am., 86 A.D.2d
538, 445 N.Y.S.2d 993, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 294 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (if lease for computer
is a "true" one, Code warranties will not apply); Burton Compressor Corp. v. Stateline
Forest Prods., Inc., 79 Or. App. 626, 628, 720 P.2d 386, 387, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 259, 260
(1986) ("Rental Purchase Agreement" for industrial air compressor not a "pure lease,"
but rather a contract for sale under which seller lessor reserved only a security interest).
1987] 1167
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rely on objective factors in making the characterization. According
to a Maine court, "Whether a lease is 'intended as security' is not a
matter of the parties' subjective intent, but rather of the objective
effects of the transaction." 28 The court added that "[t]he objective
effect of the contract, taken as a whole, was that 'upon compliance
with the terms of the lease, [lessee-buyer would] become ...the
owner of the property for no additional consideration.' "29
4. Reasoning by Analogy to the Code
Courts also apply Article Two's commercial warranty rules to
leases by analogy. 30 Under this approach, "The Code, as a general
legislative statement of public policy regarding commercial transac-
tions, becomes a premise for judicial reasoning."3 1 The policies
that support applying warranties to sales of goods usually apply with
28 Hannaford Bros., Co. v. State Tax Assessor, 487 A.2d 251, 254, 40 U.C.C. Rep.
374, 378 (Me. 1985) (using Code standards in tax case to determine whether transaction
was lease or sale).
29 Id., 40 U.C.C. Rep. at 378.
30 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 41. The official comments provide some sup-
port for this view:
The legal consequences are stated as following directly from the contract
and action taken under it without resorting to the idea of when property
or title passed or was to pass as being the determining factor. The pur-
pose is to avoid making practical issues between practical men turn upon
the location of an intangible something, the passing of which no man can
prove by evidence and to substitute for such abstractions proof of words
and actions of a tangible character.
U.C.C. § 2-101 comment; see also id. § 2-313 comment 2; infra note 31.
According to the concurring opinion in Briscoe's Foodland, Inc. v. Capital Assocs.,
42 U.C.C. Rep. 1234 (Miss. 1986), the courts should "incorporate into our law the 'by
analogy' approach to use of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code in equipment
leasing transactions ... but only to the extent that the lease is the functional equivalent
of a sale and the provisions of Article 2 otherwise fit." Id at 1239 (Robertson, J.,
concurring).
31 Special Project, supra note 1, at 41-42. Comment 2 to section 2-313 states:
Although this section is limited in its scope and direct purpose to warran-
ties made by the seller to the buyer as part of a contract for sale, the
warranty sections of this Article are not designed in any way to disturb
those lines of case law growth which have recognized that warranties
need not be confined either to sales contracts or to the direct parties to
such a contract. They may arise in other appropriate circumstances such
as in the case of bailments for hire, whether such bailment is itself the
main contract or is merely a supplying of containers under a contract for
the sale of their contents .... [T]he policies of this Act may offer useful
guidance in dealing with further cases as they arise.
U.C.C. § 2-213 comment 2; see also 3 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-
314:12, at 118-19 (1983) (use of reasoning by analogy to extend Code warranties to
lease transactions that in past would have been conducted as sales). But see Leake v.
Meredith, 221 Va. 14, 17, 267 S.E.2d 93, 95, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 484,486 (1980) (comments
"should not become devices for expanding the scope of Code sections where language
within the sections themselves defies such an expansive interpretation").
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equal force to leases.3 2 Moreover, commercial realities such as the
increased use of leases and the resemblance of many leases to sales
support an analogy approach.33 Courts use this approach to extend
Code warranties to nonsale transactions in goods.3 4
Of the approaches canvassed, the analogy method offers the
greatest potential for expanding the application of Code warranty
principles. The reasoning of the Code's drafters supports such
application:
The Act should be construed in accordance with its underly-
ing purposes and policies. The text of each section should be
read in the light of the purpose and policy of the rule or principle
32 See W. E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, 238 So. 2d 98, 100, 8 U.C.C.
Rep. 53, 56 (Fla. 1970):
The reasons for imposing the warranty of fitness in sales cases are
often present in lease transactions. Public policy demands that in this day
of expanding rental and leasing enterprises the consumer who leases be
given protection equivalent to the consumer who purchases.... [T]here
may be as much or more reliance on the competence or expertise of the
lessor than on the competence of the seller. The prospective lessee with
an immediate need is more apt to spend less time "shopping around" for
the most suitable chattel if he contemplates possession for a relatively
short time rather than permanent ownership. Just as in the sale of goods,
the lessee may have little opportunity or ability to detect a design or
other characteristic inherent in the leased chattel that might render it un-
suitable for a particular intended use. The lessor as well as the seller is
able to sustain or distribute as a cost of doing business the expense of
protecting himself against damages sustained by breach of this warranty.
See also Hertz Comm. Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing House, 59 Misc.
2d 226, 229, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392, 395, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 132, 135 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969) ("it
would be anomalous if this large body of commercial transactions involving leases were
subject to different rules of law than other commercial transactions which tend to the
identical economic result"), rev'd on other grounds, 64 Misc. 2d 910, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585
(N.Y. App. Term 1970).
33 Special Project, supra note 1, at 41-43.
34 See Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291, 1297, 30 U.C.C. Rep.
849, 858 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting in dicta that economic effect of computer lease same as
that of sale); Januse v. U-Haul Co., 399 So. 2d 402, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 1005 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981) (Code extended in Illinois by analogy so that warranties apply to equipment
lease for trucks with defective steering mechanism); All-States Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96
Idaho 873, 879, 538 P.2d 1177, 1183, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 933, 948 (1975) (By analogy in a
lease transaction, in order for such an implied warranty [of fitness for a particular pur-
pose] to arise, it must be shown that: (1) the lessor was made aware of the lessee's need,
(2) that the lessor recommended a product, and (3) that the lessee leased the product as
recommended.); Knox v. North Am. Car Corp., 80 Ill. App. 3d 683, 687, 399 N.E.2d
1355, 1358, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 336, 341 (1980) (Code not applicable to facts of case, but
"application of selected provisions of article 2 to leases by analogy is the most well-
reasoned approach"); Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 381 Mass. 284, 291, 408 N.E.2d 1370,
1375, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 1121, 1128 (1980) (in nonwarranty case, principles of Code apply
by analogy even if franchise agreements not otherwise covered by Code); cf. Briscoe's, 42
U.C.C. Rep. at 1239 (Robertson, J., concurring) (Article Two warranties inapplicable
"not because the instrument on its face is a lease agreement and not a contract of sale-
a fact to my mind of little consequence, but because the transaction in question is not
analogous to the concept of a sale as contemplated by UCC Article 2").
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in question, as also of the Act as a whole, and the application of
the language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the case
may be, in conformity with the purposes and policies involved. 3 5
The Code stresses substance over form3 6 and liberal constructions
that "promote its underlying purposes and policies."3 7 Conse-
quently, the philosophy of the Code all but demands use of the anal-
ogy method to fully implement its purposes. Moreover, courts can
best accommodate the needs of modem commercial transactions by
applying warranty protection in situations where the Code's princi-
ples apply, regardless of the transaction's form.
II
EXPRESS WARRA rEs-SECTION 2-313
A. The Quality Representation
Express warranties are representations made by a seller to a
buyer that relate to the quality or performance of the product sold.
The seller must deliver goods that conform to his representations
unless he proves that those representations did not create an en-
forceable express warranty:38
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller
to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes
part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirma-
tion or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of
the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the
whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or
model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty
that the seller use formal words such as "warrant" or
"guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a
warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the
goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's
35 U.C.C. § 1-102 comment 1; seeJ. WHrTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 4, at 18
("The comment to 1-102 [directs] that Code provisions be extended by analogy when
their rationale justifies this.").
36 SeeJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 4, at 15.
37 U.C.C. § 1-102(1); see also Note, The Uniform Commercial Code as a Premise forJudicial
Reasoning, -65 COLUM. L. REV. 880 (1965) (discussing use of reasoning by analogy in
context of Code).
38 See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 72:11591170
1987] ARTICLE TWO WARRANTIES 1171
opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a
warranty.3 9
Section 2-313 enumerates two necessary components of an ex-
press warranty. First, the seller's representations must include
either an affirmation of fact or promise relating to the goods, a de-
scription of the goods, or a sample or model of the goods.40 Sec-
ond, the affirmation or promise, the description, or the sample or
model must be part of the basis of the bargain.
The first component describes the various forms of an express
warranty. An affirmation of fact or promise relating to the product
represents the most common way to create an express warranty.
Sellers make these warranties by advertisement,4 1 brochure,4 2 writ-
ten sales contract,43 owner's manual, 44 repairs logbook,45 or oral
representation. 46 Affirmations of fact or promises generally relate
to the good's quality.47
Descriptions also create express warranties. Like affirmations
39 U.C.C. § 2-313.
40 Special Project, supra note 1, at 45-50. The phrase "seller's representations" re-
fers collectively to the three categories listed in the Code.
41 See, e.g., McKnelly v. Sperry Corp., 642 F.2d 1101, 1106, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 1533,
1538 (8th Cir. 1981) (advertisement stated product was "general purpose winch"); Yost
v. Millhouse, 373 N.W.2d 826, 829, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 1623, 1626 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(advertisement stated horse was registered); Pake v. Byrd, 55 N.C. App. 551, 552-53,
286 S.E.2d 588, 589, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 835, 836-37 (1982) (advertisement that tractor was
in "good condition"); McGregor v. Dimou, 101 Misc. 2d 756, 760, 422 N.Y.S.2d 806,
810, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 66, 70-71 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979) (advertisement that car was in "very
good condition").
42 See, e.g., Automated Controls, Inc. v. MIC Enters., Inc., 27 U.C.C. Rep. 661, 669
(D. Neb. 1978), aft'd, 559 F.2d 288, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 677 (8th Cir. 1979) (brochure repre-
sented seller's expertise in product manufacture); Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n v. En-
virotech Corp., 524 F. Supp. 1152, 1156, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 965, 971 (D. Colo. 1981)
(brochure stated that product would meet any industrial application); Keith v.
Buchanan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 21-22, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392, 396-97, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 386,
391-92 (1985) (brochure represented boat as "seaworthy" and "well equipped").
43 See, e.g., Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n, 524 F. Supp. at 1156-57, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 971-
72 (sales contract warranted performance of product); Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Laird,
432 So. 2d 1259, 1261-62, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 437, 440 (Ala. 1983) (warranty included in
sales agreement).
44 See, e.g., Cuthbertson v. Clark Equip. Co., 448 A.2d 315, 321, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 71,
74-75 (Me. 1982) (statements in owner's manual affirming quality of good could be affir-
mation of fact but not found express warranty here because not relied on by buyer).
45 See, e.g., Limited Flying Club, Inc. v. Wood, 632 F.2d 51, 56, 29 U.C.C. Rep.
1497, 1502-03 (8th Cir. 1980) (repair and inspection history of aircraft given in
logbook).
46 See, e.g., Leininger v. Sola, 314 N.W.2d 39, 43-44, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 191, 197-98
(N.D. 1981) (statement that cows purchased were pregnant); Society Nat'l Bank v.
Pemberton, 63 Ohio Misc. 26, 27-31, 409 N.E.2d 1073, 1075-77, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 76, 78-
80 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1979) (statement on truck's ability to perform); Miller v. Hubbard-
Wray Co., 52 Or. App. 897, 901-03, 630 P.2d 880, 882-83, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 1378, 1382-
84 (1981) (statement that baler was only two years old and was used only one year).
47 See supra notes 41-46.
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of fact, descriptions may exist in brochures, 48 advertisements, 49
owner's manuals, 50 and sales agreements. 51 Additionally, they may
exist in letters52 and invoices. 53 Furthermore, unlike affirmations of
fact, the buyer can create an express warranty by providing specifi-
cations to which the goods must conform. 54 Descriptions generally
tend to focus on the product's physical attributes.55
Finally, section 2-313 allows samples or models presented to
the buyer to form express warranties. The official commentary dis-
tinguishes a sample from a model: "This section includes both a
'sample' actually drawn from the bulk of goods which is the subject
matter of the sale, and a 'model' which is offered for inspection
when the subject matter is not at hand and which has not been
drawn from the bulk of the goods." 56 For example, in Amtel, Inc. v.
Arnold Industries, Inc. 57 the. seller produced threaded steel cones as a
component for the buyer's log-splitting machine. The buyer ap-
proved a test-run batch and ordered 1,500 cones. The court stated
that the case "involve[d] a 'model,' rather than a 'sample,' for when
the cones in the 'test run' were produced, the bulk of the goods
ultimately sold had not yet even been created." 58 However, a sam-
48 See, e.g., AFA Corp. v. Phoenix Closures, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 224, 228-29, 30
U.C.C. Rep. 81, 85-86 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (bulletins distributed by seller gave product spec-
ifications); Keith v. Buchanan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 22, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392, 397, 42
U.C.C. Rep. 386, 391 (1985) (brochure described boat as "picture of sure-footed sea-
worthiness"); Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. v. Conley, 372 So. 2d 965, 968, 26 U.C.C.
Rep. 860, 862-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (certificate described diamond's features).
49 See, e.g., Jensen v. Seigel Mobile Homes Group, 105 Idaho 189, 195, 668 P.2d 65,
71 35 U.C.C. Rep. 804, 814 (1983) (advertising material made numerous descriptions of
mobile home's features).
50 See, e.g., Cuthbertson v. Clark Equip. Co., 448 A.2d 315, 321, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 71,
74-75 (Me. 1982) (owner's manual description of goods creating express warranty).
51 See, e.g., In re Barney Schogel, Inc., 34 U.C.C. Rep. 29, 46 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(sales agreement gave specifications of product).
52 See, e.g., Motley v. Fluid Power of Memphis, Inc., 640 S.W.2d 222, 224-25, 35
U.C.C. Rep. 1141, 1143-44 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (letter describing operation of cloth-
ing press machine).
53 See, e.g., Superior Wire & Paper Prods., Ltd. v. Talcott Tool & Mach., Inc., 184
Conn. 10, 18-19, 441 A.2d 43, 47-48, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 101, 107-08 (1981) (invoice giving
product's specifications generally creates express warranty but when invoice contains
conflicting descriptions warranty's existence is jury question).
54 See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 777 F.2d 405, 411-12,
42 U.C.C. Rep. 1, 10-11 (8th Cir. 1985) (buyer's proposed technical specifications
adopted by seller in contract created express warranty); see also R. NORDSTROM, LAW OF
SALES § 71, at 222 (1970).
55 For more detailed discussion of descriptions under section 2-313, see Special
Project, supra note 1, at 46-49.
56 U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 6.
57 31 U.C.C. Rep. 48 (D. Conn. 1980).
58 Id. at 56; see also AFA Corp. v. Phoenix Closures, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 224, 228, 30
U.C.C. Rep. 81, 85-88 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (lining materials for bottle caps supplied to buyer
was sample); Automated Controls, Inc. v. MIC Enters., Inc., 27 U.C.C. Rep. 661, 669 (D.
Neb. 1978), aff'd, 559 F.2d 288, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 677 (8th Cir. 1979) (in-house test of
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ple drawn from the bulk of the goods sold "must be regarded as
describing values of the goods contracted for unless it is accompa-
nied by an unmistakable denial of such responsibility," while "the
mercantile presumption that [a model] . . . has become a literal de-
scription of the subject matter is not so strong." 59 Samples, there-
fore, create an express warranty more easily than models. 60
B. The Basis of the Bargain
Section 2-313's second component prescribes when an effective
representation becomes an express warranty. It requires that a
seller's representations become "part of the basis of the bargain"'
to create an express warranty. Section 2-313 and the official com-
ments fail to define this requirement, leaving courts without a spe-
cific standard to apply in breach-of-express-warranty cases. 62 Courts
have fashioned a number of tests to respond to this ambiguous re-
quirement.63 This section first discusses the various interpretations
of the basis-of-the-bargain requirement, devoting particular atten-
tion to those tests purporting to incorporate the commentary's "no
particular reliance" provision.64 Next, this section presents its own
interpretation of the basis-of-the-bargain requirement. Finally, it
proposes a standard for applying the requirement in express war-
ranty cases. The discussion incorporates the goals of section 2-313,
which are to ease the buyer's burden of proof in establishing an ex-
press warranty claim 65 and to protect the buyer's expectations cre-
ated by the seller's statements. 66
1. Reliance and the Basis-of-the-Bargain Test
Section 2-313 replaced the Uniform Sales Act's express require-
ment that the buyer prove actual reliance on the seller's representa-
electronic control system demonstrated to buyer deemed a sample); Indust-Ri-Chem
Laboratory, Inc. v. Par-Pak Co., 602 S.W.2d 282, 289, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 794, 803 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1980) (steel pans lined with particular lining would be sample under section 2-
313).
59 U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 6.
60 For more on samples and models, see Special Project, supra note 1, at 49-50.
61 U.C.C. § 2-313(1).
62 Although the official comments do not give a precise definition for the basis-of-
the-bargain requirement, they do provide courts with a loose framework to begin con-
structing a workable test for determining if a seller's representations create an express
warranty. See infra notes 139-142 and accompanying text.
63 These tests generally turn on whether a buyer must rely on the seller's represen-
tations when purchasing a good for those representations to create an express warranty.
See infra notes 67-112 and accompanying text.
64 See U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 3.
65 See infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
66 See infra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
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tions67 with the basis-of-the-bargain test. 68 Courts are divided on
the nature of the reliance requirement under section 2-313.69 Some
courts interpret the basis-of-the-bargain clause as shifting to the
seller the burden of proving the buyer's reliance. Others reject a
reliance requirement but substitute an awareness or inducement
standard.
a. Shifting the Burden of Proving Reliance. Although the law re-
mains unsettled in this area, most courts cite the official commentary
when addressing the buyer reliance issue.70 The relevant provision
states: "In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller
about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the de-
scription of those goods; hence no particular reliance on such state-
ments need be show in order to weave them into the fabric of the
agreement. 71 Some courts 72 and commentators 73 interpret the
commentary to shift the burden of proof so that the seller must
67 Section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act provided:
Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the
goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation
or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer
purchases the goods relying thereon. No affirmation of the value of the
goods, nor any statement purporting to be a statement of the seller's
opinion only shall be construed as a warranty.
UNIF. SALES AcT § 12 (1906), reprinted in I. MARISH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SALES
758 (1930); see Special Project, supra note 1, at 50-51.
68 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 50.
69 Id. at 51-55.
70 See, e.g., Downie v. Abex Corp., 741 F.2d 1235, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 427 (10th Cir.
1984); Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Laird, 432 So. 2d 1259, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 437 (Ala. 1983);
Keith v. Buchanan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 386 (1985);
Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Pico, 99 Nev. 15, 656 P.2d 849, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 380 (1983);
Gladden v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 83 N.J. 320, 416 A.2d 394, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 369
(1980); Indust-Ri-Chem Laboratory, Inc. v. Par-Pak Co., Inc., 602 S.W.2d 282, 29
U.C.C. Rep. 794 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). But see Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic
Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 429 (11th Cir. 1983); Thursby v. Reyn-
olds Metals Co., 466 So. 2d 245, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 1625 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Wendt
v. Beardmore Suburban Chevrolet, Inc., 219 Neb. 775, 366 N.W.2d 424, 40 U.C.C. Rep.
1659 (1985). These latter cases inexplicably held that under section 2-313 the buyer
must still prove reliance on the seller's representations to satisfy the basis-of-the-bargain
requirement.
71 U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 3.
72 See Pack & Process, Inc. v. Celotex Corp., 503 A.2d 646, 659, 42 U.C.C. Rep.
462, 470-73 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985) (reaching same result without expressly mentioning
comment 3); Indust-Ri-Chem Laboratory, Inc., 602 S.W.2d at 294, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 810-
11. The Pack & Process, Inc. court did not cite comment 3 in its short discussion of ex-
press warranties, but simply stated that section 2-313 shifts the burden of proof to the
seller. 503 A.2d at 659, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 472.
73 See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 9-4, at 334-35; Boyd, Representing
Consumers-The Uniform Commercial Code and Beyond, 9 ARIz. L. REv. 372, 385 (1968).
Professors White and Summers do not conclusively adopt a precise interpretation of
comment 3's no reliance provision, but state that the burden shifting theory is arguably
sound.
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prove that the buyer did not rely on the seller's affirmations of fact.
This construction rests primarily on comment 3's statement that
"any fact which is to take such affirmations, once made, out of the
agreement requires clear affirmative proof."74
In Indust-Ri-Chem Laboratory, Inc. v. Par-Pak Co.75 the court
adopted this interpretation by ruling that a seller, who introduced
proof of the buyer's lack of reliance, was entitled to a jury instruc-
tion on reliance. 76 After declaring that the U.C.C. does not require
an affirmative reliance test,7 7 the court confronted the difficult prob-
lem of a buyer who knew that the seller's representations were
false. 78 The court reasoned that such a "representation cannot be a
part of the basis of the bargain" and therefore, "in some instances a
jury instruction on lack of reliance may be germane to the basis of the
bargain issue."'79 The court concluded that the instruction must
place the burden of proving the buyer's lack of reliance on the
seller.80
The court's reasoning in Indust-Ri-Chem contains several flaws.
The most obvious is that, even though purporting to reject a reli-
ance requirement, 8' the court nonetheless retained it by allowing
the seller to escape liability upon proof that the buyer failed to
rely.82 The nonrelying buyer still risks losing his claim if the seller
can adequately show a lack of reliance.83 Therefore, the buyer must
have relied to succeed on his warranty claim.
One commentator has suggested that the Indust-Ri-Chem court
confused itself with its illustration of a buyer who knows that a
seller's representation is untrue.84 The court assumed that the only
rationale for taking the representation out of the basis of the bar-
gain was a lack of reliance. 85 A buyer who knows a seller's state-
ments are either untrue or mistaken, however, does not expect the
goods to conform to these statements. 86 Such statements never
enter into the agreement between the two parties, not because the
buyer failed to rely, but "because the buyer's knowledge forecloses
74 U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 3.
75 602 S.W.2d 282, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 794 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
76 Id. at 293-94, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 810-11.
77 Id. at 293, 29 U.G.C. Rep. at 809.
78 See infra notes 166-78 and accompanying text.
79 602 S.W.2d at 293, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 810 (emphasis added).
80 Id. at 294, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 811.
81 Id. at 293, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 809.
82 Id. at 294, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 811.
83 Id. at 293-94, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 810.
84 See Murray, "Basis of the Bargain": Transcending Classical Concepts, 66 MINN. L. REV.
283, 294-95 (1982).
85 602 S.W.2d at 293-94, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 810.
86 Murray, supra note 84, at 295.
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any such expectation."8 7 The Indust-Ri-Chem court's reliance analy-
sis needlessly creates the possibility that other classes of buyers may
have their warranty protection curtailed.
Finally, the Indust-Ri-Chem court erroneously concluded that
comment 3's "clear affirmative proof"8 8 requirement for removing
a seller's representation from the agreement meant proof that the
buyer failed to rely. Because the previous line in comment 3 states
that "no particular reliance on such statements need be shown,"'8 9
the court's finding that lack of reliance will remove those statements
from the agreement seems implausible. Rather, the "affirmative
proof" clause requires the seller to show that the buyer could not
have understood the representations to be within the context of the
bargain. Proof that the buyer knew the seller's representations were
false or mistaken90 or that the seller had effectively withdrawn his
statements from the bargain 91 would satisfy this standard.92
b. The Consideration Test. Other courts interpreting section 2-
313's comment 3 require that the buyer at least consider the seller's
representations prior to the purchase.93 Some courts apply the con-
sideration standard objectively, requiring only that the buyer be
aware of the seller's representations prior to completing the sale. In
Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Laird, 94 for example, the seller acknowledged
making an express warranty, but argued that it was not part of the
basis of the bargain because the warranty was delivered after the
sale. The court, however, noted that the buyer "knew about the ex-
press warranty prior to the delivery ... as it was discussed in the
sales agreement; furthermore .... [the buyer] was familiar with the
type of warranty given on such machines." 95 The court distin-
87 Id. A buyer who does not expect goods to conform to the seller's statements
cannot reasonably rely on them. However, looking at a buyer's expectations is better
than looking for a lack of reliance.
88 U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 3.
89 Id.
90 See Price Bros. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 649 F.2d 416, 422-23, 31 U.C.C.
Rep. 469, 474-75 (6th Cir. 1981) (buyer's expertise and familiarity with product pre-
cluded seller's statements concerning product's quality from creating express warranty).
91 See McGhee v. GMC Truck & Coach Division, 98 Mich. App. 495, 500, 296
N.W.2d 286, 289, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 121, 125 (1980) (buyer, an experienced truck
mechanic, understood that no warranties were given on tractor's running parts).
92 R. NORDSTROM, supra note 54, § 68, at 211-12.
93 See Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Laird, 432 So. 2d 1259, 1261, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 437,
440 (Ala. 1983); Keith v. Buchanan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 23, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392, 398, 42
U.C.C. Rep. 386, 393 (1985); Perfetti v. McGhan Medical, 99 N.M. 645, 652, 662 P.2d
646, 653, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 1472, 1477 (1983); see also infra notes 94-106 and accompany-
ing text.
94 432 So. 2d 1259, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 437 (Ala. 1983).
95 Id. at 1261, 36 U.C.C. Rep. at 440 (distinguishing Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurty,
284 Ala. 283, 224 So. 2d 638, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 608 (1969)).
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guished this case from one in which a warranty was found invalid
because the buyer did not discuss it until after delivery.96 Although
the court in Massey-Ferguson did not explicitly require that the buyer
know of the warranty's existence, it implied that the buyer must
have such knowledge to bring a claim under section 2-313.
An awareness standard, however, conflicts with comment 3's
elimination of reliance. Comment 3 states that a seller's affirma-
tions of fact "are regarded as part of the description of those
goods." 97 The comment's language eliminates reliance by presum-
ing that all affirmations of fact create express warranties. Because
the buyer need not rely on the seller's representation, he should not
need to know that such a representation exists. Comment 3 directs
the inquiry of whether an express warranty was made away from the
buyer's awareness of a representation' and towards a factual exami-
nation of the seller's representations. 98 A seller who creates an ex-
press warranty by an affirmation of fact, description, or sample or
model, therefore, should not escape: liability simply because the
buyer fortuitously failed either to hear the representation or to see a
brochure or advertisement describing the product.99 Once the
seller injects the express warranty into the bargain, comment 3 cre-
ates a presumption that the buyer has relied on the warranty.100
Courts should allow sellers to rebut this presumption only by show-
ing that the buyer could not have understood these representations
to be an express warranty. 10 1
Some courts apply the consideration standard subjectively, re-
quiring that the seller's representations at least partially induced the
buyer's purchase. In Keith v. Buchanan 102 the court explained in de-
tail its interpretation of section 2-313's basis-of-the-bargain test. Af-
ter finding that the buyer need not show reliance on the seller's
representations, the court stated:
The change of the language in Section 2-313 of the California
Uniform Commercial Code modifies ... the degree of reliance...
in express warranties under the code. The representation need
only be part of the basis of the bargain, or merely a factor or con-
96 Id., 36 U.G.C. Rep. at 440.
97 U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 3; see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
98 R. NORDSTROM, supra note 54, § 68, at 208-10.
99 Professor Nordstrom supported this proposition by arguing that the term bar-
gain, as used in section 2-313, encompasses a much broader range of activity and time
than the traditional contract law notion of the term. R' NORDSTROM, supra note 54, § 67,
at 206.
100 Murray, supra note 84, at 210.
101 R. NORDSTROM, supra note 54, § 68, at 210 ("The words used by the seller must
be read in the way in which the buyer should reasonably have understood them.").
102 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392,,42 U.C.C. Rep. 386 (1985).
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sideration inducing the buyer to enter into the bargain.10 3
Similarly, in Perfetti v. McGhan Medicall0 4 the court found that
representations made by the seller appearing on the product itself
did not become part of the basis of the bargain because the repre-
sentations did not enter into the buyer's decision to use the good. 0 5
The court held that the buyer's testimony "that he normally used
[the seller's] implants and 'had no reason to use anyone else's'"
established that the representation failed to induce the purchase in
any way. Consequently, it did not become part of the basis of the
bargain. 10 6
The requirement that the seller's representations induce, at
least in part, the buyer's entrance into the bargain has two defects in
light of section 2-313. First, an inducement standard cannot be rec-
onciled with the language of comment 3. If a representation in-
duced a buyer to purchase a product, he relied on that
representation in making his decision. To reiterate, comment 3 spe-
cifically states that "no particular reliance on such statements need
be shown."' 0 7 This provision eliminates both the need for buyer
reliance and the need for the buyer to know that the representation
existed.' 0 8 If the buyer need not even know that the representation
exists, then he certainly does not have to be induced by the seller's
representations.
The second problem with the inducement standard is its failure
to accomplish section 2-313's goal of easing the buyer's burden of
proof. Section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act required buyers to
prove "both that the affirmation or promise induced them to
purchase the goods, and that they relied upon the statement in
purchasing the goods."' 0 9 Section 2-313 relieved the buyer from the
103 Id. at 23, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 398, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 393.
104 99 N.M. 645, 662 P.2d 646, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 1472 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M.
644, 662 P.2d 645 (1983).
105 The plaintiff in this case sued the manufacturer of a breast prosthesis after the
product deflated inside her body. Id at 647, 662 P.2d at 648, 35 U.C.C. Rep. at 1473-74.
The court first found that the plaintiff's surgeon acted as her agent in the use of the
prosthesis and thus any express warranty made to the surgeon inured to the plaintiff's
benefit. Id. at 650-51, 662 P.2d at 651-52, 35 U.C.C. Rep. at 1475. The buyer, there-
fore, is the surgeon who decided to use the defendant's product.
106 Id. at 652, 662 P.2d at 653, 35 U.G.C. Rep. at 1477.
107 U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 3.
108 R. NORDSTROM, supra note 54, § 68, at 208-09. Professor Nordstrom stated that
courts that allow representations unknown to the buyer to create an express warranty
reach a result consistent with the Code. He argued, "The court's task is to determine
whether that injury was caused by a defect in the product, and any statements made by
the seller designed to induce the public to buy his product are relevant in making this
determination." Id. at 209. Nordstrom would thus shift the inquiry of inducement by
the seller's statements from the individual buyer at issue, to the public at large.
109 Murray, supra note 84, at 285.
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burden of proving that he relied on the seller's statement by remov-
ing the term "reliance" and replacing it with a requirement that the
seller's representation become part of the basis of the bargain.110
Comment 3 shifted the burden of proof to the seller: "any fact
which is to take such affirmations, once made, out of the agreement
requires clear affirmative proof."11 ' "Under this clause, the buyer
must prove that the seller made a statement of fact relating to the
goods. It is presumed that such a statement became part of the
'agreement.'"1 12 Section 2-313, therefore, requires the buyer to
show only that the seller made a representation concerning the
product. A buyer should not have to show to what extent, if any, the
representations entered into his decision to purchase.
Thus, a consideration standard defeats section 2-313's goal of
easing the buyer's burden of proving that the seller's representation
created an express warranty. By requiring the buyer to prove that
he considered the seller's representations in purchasing, courts es-
sentially require the buyer to prove that he relied on the representa-
tion. Section 2-313's elimination of reliance, however, should
eliminate the need for the buyer to even be aware that the represen-
tation existed.
2. The No-Reliance Approach
Although the cases examined above interpreted comment 3,
they failed to clarify adequately' 1 3 the basis-of-the-bargain provision
and devise a proper test for applying it.114 To propose a standard, a
definition of the phrase "part of the basis of the bargain"' 15 as used
in section 2-313 is necessary. The drafters of the Code intended the
phrase to mean an inclusion of the seller's representations in the
110 Id. at 286.
Ill U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 3.
112 Murray, supra note 84, at 287.
113 See supra notes 72-106 and accompanying text.
114 Keith v. Buchanan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 386
(1985), demonstrates this failure to define the phrase:
The shift in language clearly changes the degree to which it must be
shown that the seller's representation affected the buyer's decision to
enter into the agreement .... A warranty statement is deemed to be part
of the basis of the bargain and to have been relied upon as one of the
inducements for the purchase of the product. In other words, the buyer's
demonstration of reliance on an express warranty is "not a prerequisite
for breach of warranty, as long as the express warranty involved became
part of the bargain."
Id. at 23, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 397, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 392 (citingJ. WHiTE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 5, § 9-4, at 332-39).
The Keith court stated only that reliance is unnecessary if the warranty becomes part
of the bargain. The court failed to explain how it would determine whether the buyer
has met this requirement.
115 U.C.C. § 2-313.
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"commercial relationship"'' 16 between the buyer and the seller. A
seller's representations thus create an express warranty whenever
they enter the buyer's and seller's commercial relationship.
This definition is based primarily on that of a "bargain" as used
in section 2-313.
A "bargain" is not something that occurs at a particular moment
in time, and is forever fixed as to its content; instead, it describes
the commercial relationship between the parties in regard to this
product .... The Code's word is "bargain"-a process which can
extend beyond the moment in time that the offeree utters the
magic words, "I accept."' "17
The Code's usage of "bargain," then, eschews its traditional con-
tract law meaning as an event that comes "into existence at some
specific point in time."' "18 Instead, it takes on a broader scope that
covers the entire span of the parties' commercial relationship. This
relationship can begin before the buyer contacts the seller 1 9 or af-
ter the sale's completion. 120
Section 2-313's basis-of-the-bargain provision is an objective
requirement under which a court should merely determine whether
the seller provided a quality representation about the product. The
buyer should not have to prove that he purchased with any knowl-
edge of, or reliance on, the seller's representations. Comment 3
demonstrates the drafters' intent to eliminate completely the need
for reliance on or consideration of the seller's representations by
the buyer. 121 An express warranty exists if the seller used words of
affirmation or description or displayed a sample or model relating to
the product purchased. 122 Once the buyer shows this, the seller is
liable should the product not conform to his representations.
Comment 7 further supports this expansive interpretation of
section 2-313 by ratifying the existence of post-sale warranties. Be-
cause comment 7 provides that the "precise time" when the seller
116 R. NORDSTROM, supra note 54, § 67, at 206. The language used herein to de-
scribe "the basis of the bargain" comes primarily from Nordstrom's treatise on sales. See
id. §§ 66-68. Nordstrom clearly rejected a reliance requirement under section 2-313, id.
§ 68, at 208, and broadly construed the section in order to ease the buyer's ability to
establish an express warranty. Id. § 67, at 206-07. Nordstrom, however, did not ex-
pressly extend his analysis to provide that all quality representations made by the seller
are presumptively express warranties until the seller proves otherwise. See infra notes
137-42 and accompanying text.
117 R. NORDSTROM, supra note 54, § 67, at 206-07.
118 Id. at 206.
119 J. WI iT & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 9-4, at 335-36.
120 R. NORDSTROM, supra note 54, § 67, at 206-07.
121 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
122 Murray, supra note 84, at 287.
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makes a product representation is irrelevant, 123 post-sale represen-
tations may create warranties. Courts cannot possibly require a
buyer to rely on those representations made after the sale's
completion.124
Comment 7 assumes that post-sale representations create ex-
press warranties: "If language is used after the closing of the deal
... the warranty becomes a modification, and need not be supported
by consideration if it is otherwise reasonable and in order."125 Pro-
fessor Nordstrom has argued that the modification requires no con-
sideration because "it is reasonable to assume that a buyer would
agree to an expansion of his warranty protection."' 126
Some courts, however, do not allow post-sale representations
to become express warranties because the buyer did not rely on the
statements made. 127 In Global Truck & Equipment Co., Inc. v. Palmer
Machine Works, Inc. 128 the buyer received a sales brochure describing
the purchased product's features after he entered into the contract.
The court found that the brochure could not create an express war-
ranty, stating, "If the buyer is not aware of the affirmation of fact
and there is no evidence of any reliance on such affirmation, then it
would seem that the mutual assent requirement 29 is not met such
123 "The precise time when words of description or affirmation are made or samples
are shown is not material. The sole question is whether the language or samples or
models are fairly to be regarded as part of the contract." U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 7.
124 The following example illustrates the deliverance of a post-sale express warranty:
A man enters a hardware store and selects a can of paint remover from the shelf.
Upon paying for his selection at the counter, the cashier states: "This paint remover is
the best made. It is guaranteed to remove paint without damaging the object's surface."
The man returns home and properly applies the product to his car only to find that the
paint remover contains a highly corrosive agent that badly damages the metal surface.
The clerk's statements created an express warranty because under our expansive
notion of a bargain, see supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text, they "are part of the
entire bargain even though they did not induce the contract." R. NORDSTROM, supra note
54, § 67, at 207.
125 U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 7 (emphasis added).
126 R. NORDSTROM, supra note 54, § 67, at 207. Nordstrom's argument that the
buyer would not object to an expansion of his warranty protection also applies to
presale representations not known by the buyer until after the sale. (E.g., sales literature
included within the product's package which was sealed at the time of the sale.)
127 See Global Truck & Equip. Co. v. Palmer Mach. Works, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 641,42
U.C.C. Rep. 1250 (N.D. Miss. 1986); Anderson v. Heron Eng. Co., 198 Colo. 391, 394,
604 P.2d 674, 676 (1979). But see Klein v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 773 F.2d 1421, 1424-
25, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 1233, 1237 (4th Cir. 1985) (salesman's post-sale representations
created valid express warranty because purchase was conditioned on subsequent inspec-
tion of property by the salesman); Downie v. Abex Corp., 741 F.2d 1235, 1240-41, 39
U.C.C. Rep. 427, 434-35 (10th Cir. 1984) (jury may find post-sale representations to be
part of basis of bargain if representations were relied on).
128 628 F. Supp. 641, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 1250 (N.D. Miss. 1986).
129 The Global Truck court required mutual assent because it viewed a bargain under
section 2-313 as a contractual relationship between the buyer and the seller. A prerequi-
site for a valid contract, mutual assent means that each party is aware of the contract's
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that a binding modification does not exist."' 30 By finding that no
warranty existed because the buyer failed to rely, the court com-
pletely disregarded both comments 3 and 7 in reaching its decision.
Courts that continue to require reliance as a prerequisite for meet-
ing the basis-of-the-bargain test unjustifiably refuse to allow a post-
sale representation to create a warranty.
One commentator has argued that courts should enforce these
post-sale representations to protect the buyer's "reasonable expec-
tations that a seller's statements create, regardless of when those
statements were made or when the buyer learned of them."' 131 This
analysis also applies to those presale representations that the buyer
does not learn of until after completing the purchase. 132 If a seller
includes an owner's manual or other product description with the
purchase, then "[t]he buyer will feel oppressed and unfairly sur-
prised if the goods do not contain the features represented in the
sales literature."'' 3 3 Protecting the buyer's reasonable expectations
about the product's quality and the truth of the seller's statements,
therefore, justifies upholding unrelied-upon express warranties.
The example of advertising illustrates further that reliance on
representations should not be required for them to fall under sec-
tion 2-313. A seller advertises in order to induce the public, rather
than one specific buyer, to purchase his product. Because the seller
is able to represent his product's quality to all potential buyers, he
should bear the cost of any product defect. The law should protect
the public whenever the product does not properly perform, 134 even
if a particular buyer did not rely on the advertisement in his-
purchase. This protective function makes the relationship between
the individual buyer and the mass-media seller more fair because it
requires the seller to stand by any public statements he has made
about his product. The law, therefore, would deter a seller from
overrepresenting to the public the virtues of his product.
This approach imposes a limited form of strict liability on the
seller. -3 5 Imposing a strict liability standard on the seller's repre-
sentations would allow courts to avoid the difficult evidentiary task
of determining whether the product's malfunction corresponded to
the buyer's reason for purchase. A strict liability approach would
terms or modifications and agrees to include those terms into the contract. See U.C.C.
§§ 1-201(3), 2-204(1).
130 628 F. Supp. at 652, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 1262 (footnote added).
131 Murray, supra note 84, at 318.
132 Id. at 321-23.
133 Id. at 322 (footnotes omitted).
134 R. NORDSTROM, supra note 54, § 67, at 209.
135 The seller can still escape liability if he can show "clear affirmative proof" that
the statement was his opinion or that the buyer knew the representation was false.
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effectively deter a seller from overrepresenting his product and rais-
ing false expectations in the buying public.
The seller should also bear the burden of a defect because,
generally, he increases the price of the product to offset the risk he
bears for providing an express warranty. This risk is the potential
liability the seller may incur should the product not perform as
promised by the express warranty. Knowing that some of the prod-
ucts sold will subsequently become defective, the seller recoups this
cost by increasing the product's price to the entire buying public.
Therefore, even if the buyer is unaware of the warranty he has paid
for it by simply purchasing the product.' 36
3. Proposal
Section 2-313, in light of comments 3 and 7, does not require
the buyer to rely on, consider, or even know about a seller's repre-
sentations. A court should therefore decide if an express warranty
exists by examining only the seller's representations to see whether
they constituted either an affirmation of fact or "merely [an affirma-
tion] of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be
merely the seller's opinion."' 137 Under this test, the buyer need
prove only that the seller made representations relating to the prod-
uct. The seller then has the burden of proving that the buyer could
not have understood his representations to be an express
warranty. 138
Comments 4 and 8 to section 2-313 also support this test.'3 9
Comment 4 states that "the whole purpose of the law of warranty is
to determine what it is that the seller has in essence agreed to
sell."'140 As one commentator has noted, "it is interesting that the
comment emphasizes the search for what 'the seller has in essence
agreed to sell,' and not what the buyer has agreed to buy."' 141 This
statement suggests that a court's inquiry should focus on the seller's
conduct, i.e., whether he made representations relating to the prod-
uct's quality, and not on the physical product purchased by the
buyer.
Comment 8 states that "all of the statements of the seller...
136 R. NORDSTROM, sUpra note 54, § 68, at 212; see also Special Project, supra note 1, at
56.
137 U.C.C. § 2-313(2).
138 The seller can meet this burden by showing either that his representations
amounted only to his opinions on the product's value or that the buyer knew that his
representations were false.
139 See supra notes 97-101 & 107-12 and accompanying text (discussion of comment
3); notes 123-26 and accompanying text (discussion of comment 7).
140 U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 4.
141 Murray, supra note 84, at 290.
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[are a part of the basis of the bargain] unless good reason is shown
to the contrary."' 142 The court's inquiry, therefore, should objec-
tively focus on the affirmations of fact, descriptions, or samples or
models included by the seller in the scope of the bargain to deter-
mine if those representations expressly warranted the product sold.
C. Negating an Express Warranty
The previous section proposed an expansive definition for sec-
tion 2-313's basis-of-the-bargain requirement. This section sug-
gests how a seller, once he creates an express warranty by his
representations, can avoid liability by rebutting the warranty's
existence.
Court generally allow two groups of factors to rebut the exist-
ence of an express warranty. The first group looks at the seller's
representations directly to see whether they are affirmations of fact
or simply opinions as to the products's value.' 43 The second group
looks at the circumstances surrounding the bargain to determine
whether the buyer knew that the seller's representations could not
have warranted the product.' 44
The 1978 Special Project called this the "reasonableness of reli-
ance" 145 issue and stated that an express warranty will not exist "un-
less the buyer would be justified in relying upon it."146 We prefer to
ask whether the buyer could have reasonably understood the seller's
representations to create an express warranty. Under this approach,
a court does not run the risk of inadvertently incorporating a reli-
ance requirement into its analysis. Instead, a court will only focus on
the representations made and the context of their delivery.
1. Opinions or "Puffing"
Section 2-313(2) acknowledges that not every statement by a
seller relating to a product will become part of the basis of the bar-
gain. It states that "an affirmation merely of the value of the goods
or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or com-
mendation of the goods does not create a warranty."' 47 A seller,
therefore, must show that a reasonable buyer would have construed
142 U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 8.
143 See infra notes 147-65 and accompanying text.
144 See infra notes 166-78 and accompanying text.
145 Although the 1978 Special Project used the term "reliance," it rejected reliance
as a factor for courts to consider under section 2-313. It used the word simply as a
shorthand for the conclusion that the basis-of-the-bargain requirement "is one of rea-
sonable, constructive expectation based on the context of the sale and assuming the
buyer's awareness of the seller's affirmations." Special Project, supra note 1, at 56.
146 Special Project, supra note 1, at 59.
147 U.C.C. § 2-313(2).
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his representations merely as the seller's opinion concerning the
product, not as an express warranty.
The official commentary supplements section 2-313(2):
Concerning affirmations of value or a seller's opinion or commen-
dation under subsection (2), the basic question remains the same:
What statements of the seller have in the circumstances and in
objective judgment become part of the basis of the bargain? As
indicated above, all of the statements of the seller do so unless
good reason is shown to the contrary. 148
In determining whether a seller's representation is merely an opin-
ion, courts should apply an objective standard. They should look
only at the statements made and not at the knowledge of the parties
when deciding whether the statements created an express war-
ranty. 149 Juries should distinguish between a warranty and an opin-
ion solely on the nature of the seller's statements. The 1978 Special
Project addressed four elements that point toward construing a
seller's representations as an opinion rather than an affirmation of
fact: specificity, hedging, experimental goods, and buyer
knowledge.' 50
Specificity addresses the clarity of the seller's representations.
Courts generally will not regard imprecise or vague seller represen-
tations that do not convey "a positive averment of fact describing a
product's capabilities"' 51 as creating an express warranty.' 52
Hedging refers to a seller's equivocal statements that demon-
148 U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 8.
149 For a discussion of buyer knowledge, see infra notes 166-78 and accompanying
text.
150 For a detailed explanation of these elements, see Special Project, supra note 1, at
61-67.
151 Royal Business Mach., Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 42, 30 U.C.C. Rep.
462, 468 (7th Cir. 1980).
152 See id., 30 U.C.C. Rep. at 468 ("high quality," "frequency of repair very low,"
and "substantial profit" all viewed as seller's opinion); Roxalana Hills, Ltd. v. Masonite
Corp., 627 F. Supp. 1194, 1200, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 1330, 1334 (S.D.W. Va. 1986) (state-
ment that product is "specifically formulated to provide durability and weatherability"
an opinion); Thursby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 466 So. 2d 245, 249, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 1625,
1627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) ("state of the art" and "fail-safe" are opinions); Hannon
v. Original Gunite Aquatech Pools, Inc., 385 Mass. 813, 822-23, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 840,
848 (1982) (statement that product is "designed and constructed to the highest quality
specifications" seller's opinion). But see Wiseman v. Wolfe's Terre Haute Auto Auction,
Inc., 459 N.E.2d 736, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 1486 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) ("road-ready" created
express warranty for truck's performance); McGregor v. Dimou, 101 Misc. 2d 756, 422
N.Y.S.2d 806, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 66 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979) (advertisement that car in "good
condition" an express warranty"); Slyman v. Pickwick Farms, 15 Ohio App. 3d 25, 472
N.E.2d 380, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 1630 (1984) (statement made over loudspeaker by vet-
erinarian at auction that horse's "nasal cavities are normal and in no way is the animal's
breathing affected" created express warranty); Taylor v. Alfama, 145 Vt. 4, 481 A.2d
1059, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 1235 (1984) (advertisement that car in "mint condition" with "re-
built engine" created express warranty).
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strate his unwillingness to commit fully to the product's quality. In
Perfetti v. McGhan Medical 153 a mammary prosthesis manufacturer in-
cluded a flyer in the product's packaging which read: "McGhan
Medical Corporation is aware of the potential for leakage in inflat-
able implants over an undefined time period. Considering the
chemical and physical properties of the material used in the manu-
facture of the inflatable implants, deflation is not expected. How-
ever, long term results cannot be guaranteed by the
manufacturer."' 154 The buyer argued that the last line warranted the
product's short-term lifespan by negative implication. The court
stated, "Whatever the meaning of 'long term', the affirmation also
negates less than a long-term result; it is affirmatively stated that
leakage can occur over an undefined period of time." 155 By not
making a commitment as to the product's lifespan, the seller effec-
tively limited its liability.
Representations relating to unproven or untested products do
not create an express warranty.' 56 Consequently, the experimental
goods factor allows a seller to escape liability for a product's defect.
The 1978 Special Project correctly stressed that a product's novelty
should not definitively determine whether a warranty attaches to the
seller's representations. 157
The final element that helps distinguish between an affirmation
of fact and a mere opinion is buyer knowledge. One court has
stated:
The decisive test for whether a given representation is a warranty
or merely an expression of the seller's opinion is whether the
seller asserts a fact of which the buyer is ignorant or merely states
an opinion or judgment on a matter of which the seller has no
special knowledge and on which the buyer may be expected also
to have an opinion and to exercise his judgment.15 8
This test is not particularly helpful in making the distinction be-
tween fact and opinion, however, because it does not focus on the
153 99 N.M. 645, 662 P.2d 646, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 1472 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M.
644, 662 P.2d 645 (1983).
154 Id. at 651, 662 P.2d at 652, 35 U.C.C. Rep. at 1476 (emphasis deleted).
155 Id. at 652, 662 P.2d at 653, 35 U.C.C. Rep. at 1477 (emphasis deleted).
156 Research uncovered no new cases involving experimental goods.
157 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 65 (novelty should be one element in a gen-
eral reasonableness requirement).
158 Royal Business Mach., Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 41, 30 U.C.C. Rep.
462, 467 (7th Cir. 1980); see also Overstreet v. Norden Laboratories, Inc., 669 F.2d 1286,
1290-91, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 174, 180 (6th Cir. 1982); Thursby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 466
So. 2d 245, 250, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 1625, 1628 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Peterson v. North
Am. Plant Breeders, 218 Neb. 258, 262-63, 354 N.W.2d 625, 630, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 1637,
1642 (1984); Valley Datsun v. Martinez, 578 S.W.2d 485, 490, 26 U.C.C. Rep. 331, 333
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
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statements actually made. Instead, it looks to the knowledge of the
parties. Under this test, any statement made to an ignorant buyer
becomes an express warranty simply because the buyer is ignorant.
Conversely, the test allows a seller with little knowledge to make
specific statements about the product without creating an express
warranty. The test fails because it does not consider whether a rea-
sonable buyer could understand the statements to create an express
warranty on their face. Concededly, buyer knowledge can preclude a
warranty from attaching to a clear affirmation of fact. 159 This does
not necessarily lead to the conclusion, however, that all statements
made to ignorant buyers are warranties and all statements made by
ignorant sellers are not.
In Keith v. Buchanan 16 0 a California appeals court attempted to
ease the buyer's efforts to show that the seller made an affirmation
of fact rather than an opinion:
Recent decisions have evidenced a trend toward narrowing the
scope of representations which are considered opinion .... result-
ing in an expansion of the liability that flows from broad state-
ments of manufacturers or retailers as to the quality of their
products .... It has even been suggested 'that in an age of con-
sumerism all seller's statements, except the most blatant sales
pitch, may give rise to an express warranty.' ",161
The Keith court adopted comment 8 to section 2-313162 as the stan-
dard to distinguish between fact and opinion. Comment 8 provides
that all seller's representations will presumptively become part of
the basis of the bargain unless the seller can prove otherwise. The
drafters of section 2-313 intended comment 8 to create this broad
presumption to ease the buyer's burden in establishing an express
warranty. 163 Comments 3 and 7 each have the effect of broadening
the scope of representations that create an express warranty and
easing the buyer's burden of establishing a warranty's existence. 164
The Keith court correctly applied comment 8, holding that
"[s]tatements made by a seller during the course of negotiation over
a contract are presumptively affirmations of fact unless it can be
demonstrated that the buyer could only have reasonably considered
the statement as a statement of the seller's opinion."' 65
159 See infra notes 166-78 and accompanying text.
160 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 386 (1985).
161 Id. at 21, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 396, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 390 (citing I E. ALDERMAN & B.
DOLE, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 89 (2d ed. 1983)).
162 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
163 See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
164 See supra notes 97-101, 107-12 & 123-26 and accompanying text.
165 Keith, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 21, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 396, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 391.
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2. Buyer Knowledge
A seller can also rebut the presumption that his representations
became part of the basis of the bargain by showing that the buyer
knew that the representations were either untrue or probably un-
true. This would naturally preclude him from understanding that
an express warranty was created. The 1978 Special Project dealt
with buyer knowledge in its discussion of a seller's opinion.' 66 An
examination of the buyer's knowledge, however, requires a court to
focus on the circumstances surrounding the bargain rather than the
representations made. Because the court must examine the knowl-
edge possessed by the individual buyer in question, this inquiry re-
quires a subjective standard; the standard applicable to sellers'
opinions, however, is objective. 167
A seller can show that the buyer knew the untruthfulness of the
representations by proving that the buyer inspected the goods
before purchasing them and discovering patent defects. 168 The
Keith court found that although the buyer had experts inspect a
boat, the warranty of seaworthiness was not waived because no in-
water testing took place. 169 "[A]n examination or inspection by the
buyer of the goods does not necessarily discharge the seller from an
express warranty if the defect was not actually discovered and
waived."' 170 Because the inspection was limited, the buyer could not
have discovered the boat's unseaworthiness.
The seller can also establish that the buyer knew of the falsity of
his representations by showing either that the buyer had knowledge
about the product before entering the bargain 171 or that the buyer
acquired such knowledge during the couse of the parties' commer-
cial relationship. 172 In Price Brothers Co. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 173
for example, the seller erroneously represented that the compo-
166 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 66-67.
167 See supra text accompanying note 149.
168 See Keith, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 28, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 398, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 393-94;
Jensen v. Seigel Mobile Homes Group, 105 Idaho 189, 194-95, 668 P.2d 65, 70-71, 35
U.C.C. Rep. 804, 813-14 (1983).
169 Keith, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 24, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 398, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 393-94.
170 Id., 220 Cal. Rptr. at 398, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 393.
171 See Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 1101,
37 U.C.C. Rep. 429, 439 (11 th Cir. 1983) (buyer's general experience with copiers not
enough for knowledge of specific copier at issue); Carson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 6 Kan.
App. 2d 776, 786, 635 P.2d 1248, 1256, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 834, 844-45 (1981) (farmer's
knowledge about pesticide prevented seller's affirmation fromlbecoming part of basis of
bargain); Scaringe v. Holstein, 103 A.D.2d 880, 880, 477 N.Y.S.2d 903, 904, 38 U.C.C.
Rep. 1595, 1595 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (buyer's knowledge of car's transmission defect
prevented newspaper ad stating excellent condition from creating warranty).
172 See Royal Business Mach., Inc. v. Lorranie Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 43-44, 30 U.C.C.
Rep. 462, 471-72 (1980).
173 649 F.2d 416, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 469 (6th Cir. 1981).
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nents ordered by the buyer would meet the specifications listed in
the buyer's purchase order. The court held that the seller's errone-
ous assurances that the components would conform to the purchase
order's specifications did not create an express warranty because
"Price Brothers' experts should have recognized this error as either
'puffing' or falsehood." 1 74
In both the inspection and prior knowledge cases, the good
faith standard of section 1-203 prevents the buyer "from remaining
silent in the face of known overstatements of performance by [the
seller] and then asserting that those falsehoods were a basis of the
bargain."' 175 A buyer who knows the seller's representations are un-
true has an obligation under section 1-203 to inform the seller of his
overstatement. Under these circumstances a buyer cannot plausibly
claim that he understood the seller's representations to create an
express warranty.
Representations do not become part of the basis of the bargain
if the seller can show that he withdrew them before completing the
bargain. 176 In McGhee v. GMC Truck & Coach Division 177 a Michigan
appeals court found that the seller explicitly withdrew any represen-
tations made concerning the quality of the truck purchases in the
sales contract. "They so structured the terms of the sale as to lay
the risk of hidden mechanical defects on the plaintiff, who admit-
tedly understood this to be the case."' 178 Thus, the buyer could not
establish that the seller's statement regarding the truck's good con-
dition became part of the basis of the bargain.
174 Id. at 423, 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 474-75. The court's use of the phrase "should have
recognized" should not be confused with an objective standard for measuring buyer
knowledge. The court discussed the buyer's representative's personal familiarity with
the product at issue: "The expertise of Price Brothers' representatives, and their famili-
arity with the requirements of Price Brothers' pipe wrapping machine enabled them to
make an independent assessment of the adequacy of the proposed components for the
tasks assigned to them." Id., 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 475. The court used the phrase "should
have known" not to invoke a reasonable man standard, but to hold these buyers' to a
standard commensurate with their established knowledge of the product. The court
looked only at the knowledge of the buyer in question.
175 Id., 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 475.
176 A seller's withdrawal of a representation should not be confused with a dis-
claimer. For a discussion of express-warranty disclaimers, see infra notes 576-605 and
accompanying text. A seller withdraws a representation by informing the buyer that a
specific statement made about the product is no longer included in their bargain. This
withdrawal occurs before the bargain's completion. Each party agrees to the representa-
tion's removal. The buyer, therefore, knows not to expect the product to conform to the
representation withdrawn. See R. NORDSTROM, supra note 54, § 68, at 211.
177 98 Mich. App. 495, 296 N.W.2d 286, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 121 (1980).
178 Id. at 504, 296 N.W.2d at 291, 30 U.C.C. Rep. at 125. The sales contract stated
in part: "[T]here are no express warranties and no representations, promises or state-
ments have been made by said seller in respect of said property unless endorsed hereon
or incorporated herein by reference hereon ...." Id. at 499-500, 296 N.W.2d at 289, 30
U.C.C. Rep. at 124.
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The basis-of-the-bargain requirement provides the buyer with a
great deal of latitude in establishing the creation of an express war-
ranty. The buyer need only prove that the seller made representa-
tions relating to the product. 179 The seller can escape liability only
by showing that he merely stated his opinion as to the product's
value or that the buyer's knowledge concerning the product pre-
cluded the representation from becoming part of the basis of the
bargain. Section 2-313's policy goals of easing the buyer's burden
of proving an express warranty' 80 and protecting the buyer's expec-
tations in the product as represented 18 1 justify this framework.
III
IMPLIED WARRANTIES
Implied warranties, now a common element of the commercial
environment, 18 2 are codified in Code sections 2-314 and 2-315.183
"An implied warranty 'is a curious hybrid, born of the illicit inter-
course of tort and contract'-a contractual term promising quality
but imposed by law rather than agreement."' 8 4 This section of the
Special Project examines the current status of implied warranties
and recommends a number of changes or clarifications in existing
doctrine.
There are several justifications for imposing warranties on the
sale of goods.' 8 5 In this section we focus on the rationale that buy-
ers ought to be able reasonably to rely on knowledgeable sellers.
Courts have paid less attention to this policy in section 2-314 cases
than they have in section 2-315 cases; nevertheless, we propose to
show that in both contexts the policy not only furthers desireable
179 See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
180 See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
181 See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
182 The focus of the Special Project is on warranties arising from transactions be-
tween businesses. However, because implied warranties arising from consumer transac-
tions also illuminate code policies, we will examine both kinds of transactions.
For the history of implied warranties, see W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 95A, 679-81 (5th ed. 1984) [here-
inafter W. KEETON].
183 U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315.
184 Special Project, supra note 1, at 68 (footnote omitted) (quoting W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 95, at 636 (4th ed. 1971)).
185 Justifications include: "(a) public policy which requires that the party which puts
goods into the stream of commerce should bear the risk of harm caused by defective
goods, rather than the person injured by it; (b) the fact that one party has induced the
reliance of the consumer on his skill and knowledge; (c) the fact that the former is in a
better position to control the antecedents which affect the quality of the product; and (d)
the fact that he is better able to distribute the loss." Note, The Extension of Warranty
Protection to Lease Transactions, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 127, 140-41 (1968).
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goals, but also serves to reconcile otherwise seemingly divergent
results.
A. The Implied Warranty of Merchantability-Section 2-314
Section 2-314 codifies the implied warranty of merchant-
ability.18 6 It provides in part: "Unless excluded or modified (Sec-
tion 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is
implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind."' 8 7
We propose that the way to understand the merchantability
warranty, and thereby to resolve the gray areas of the law, is to ex-
amine the policies and theories underlying the Code and to use
them to interpret new or unclear situations. The implied warranty
of merchantability was "designed to protect the buyer of goods
from bearing the burden of loss where merchandise . . . does not
conform to the normal commercial standards."' 188 Its underlying
theory is that by marketing goods a merchant makes certain implicit
representations about their merchantability. In making a purchase,
the buyer relies upon those representations. 8 9 This reliance is justi-
fied because, as Prosser explained, "The seller has asserted,
whether expressly or by his conduct, that the goods are of a particu-
lar kind, quality or character, and the buyer has purchased in reli-
ance upon that assertion."190  The implied warranty of
merchantability is thus an expression of the "reliance" concept un-
derlying much of warranty law and can be seen as protecting the
expectations that reasonably arise when a merchant of a particular
good sells that good. 191
186 In the words of Professors White and Summers, the implied warranty of
merchantability is "by far the most important" of the Code warranties. J. WHrrE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 9-6, at 343.
187 U.C.C. § 2-314. For a discussion of section 2-316, see infra notes 606-707 and
accompanying text.
188 Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 377 F.2d 846, 849, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 164, 167
(3rd Cir. 1967). "The entire purpose behind the implied warranty sections of the Code
is to hold the seller responsible when inferior goods are passed along to the unsuspect-
ing buyer." Id. at 850, 4 U.C.C. Rep. at 168.
189 This is an objective conception of reliance-the seller's conduct has opened the
way for a buyer to rely on the product; the buyer need not explicitly have done so. "The
maker, by placing the goods upon the market represents to the public that they are
suitable and safe for use, and by packaging, advertising, or otherwise, he does every-
thing he can to induce that belief. He intends and expects that the product will be
purchased and used in reliance upon this assurance of safety, and it is in fact so
purchased and used." W. PROSSER, supra note 184, § 97, at 651.
190 Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117, 122
(1943).
191 Reliance is used in an objective sense. We are not proposing that subjective
reliance by the buyer is a consideration in a general merchantability case. SeeJ. WHrrE &
R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 9-6 (reliance by buyer on seller's representation not neces-
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In examining section 2-314, we first consider the condition that
the seller be a "merchant with respect to goods of that kind." Later,
we will turn to the question of whether the merchant has sold
"goods."
1. The Merchant Requirement-Section 2-314(1)
a. Definition of Merchant. Section 2-104(1) defines "merchant"
as
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occu-
pation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to
the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom
such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of
an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation
holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill. 192
Although section 2-104(1) defines merchant as encompassing those
with special knowledge or skill both of business practices and of the
kind of goods involved, section 2-314(1) conditions liability on the
seller being "a merchant with respect to goods of that kind."' 193
Merchants with respect to goods of a particular kind should possess
special knowledge about the goods, 194 which they are likely to have
sary under § 2-314). Rather, we focus on objective reliance arising solely out of the im-
plicit expectations promoted by a merchant selling goods.
192 U.C.C. § 2-104(1).
193 Id. § 2-314(1).
194 The term "merchant" as defined here roots in the "law merchant" con-
cept of a professional in business. The professional status under the defi-
nition may be based upon specialized knowledge as to the goods,
specialized knowledge as to business practices, or specialized knowledge
as to both and which kind of specialized knowledge may be sufficient to
establish merchant status is indicated by the nature of the provisions.
... For purposes of these sections almost every person in business
would, therefore, be deemed to be a "merchant" under the language
"who... by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices . . .involved in the transaction. . ." since the
practices involved in the transaction are non-specialized business prac-
tices such as answering mail. In this type of provision, banks or even
universities, for example, well may be "merchants ....
On the other hand, in Section 2-314 on the warranty of
merchantability, such warranty is implied only "if the seller is a merchant
with respect to goods of that kind."
Id. § 2-104 comment 2. One court recently provided the following description of
"merchant":
Plaintiffs George Alpert and Lee Wolfman are partners and owners of
Georgian Hill Arabians, which trains, breeds and sells Arabian horses for
profit. Prior to the transaction involved in this lawsuit, Georgian Hill
Arabians had consigned seven or eight mares for sale at auctions and had
sold shares in a breeding stallion. George Alpert, through Georgian Hill
Arabians, holds himself out as having knowledge and skill peculiar to the
purebred Arabian horse business. Georgian Hill Arabians also employs
agents who hold themselves out as having such knowledge and skill.
Alpert v. Thomas, 643 F. Supp. 1406, 1409, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 99, 102-03 (D. Vt. 1986).
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due to their handling of them. Buyers may naturally expect such a
merchant to have special knowledge and thus tend justifiably to rely
on the seller.
Accordingly, the limitation of section 2-314 to "merchants with
respect to goods of that kind" suggests that warranties be imposed
based on the respective knowledge and reliance of the parties in-
volved.1 95 The seller's expertise with respect to the goods provides
justification for holding the seller liable for the quality and perform-
ance of the goods he sells. 196 Thus, the more a seller knows, the
more justifiable it is to consider him a merchant of the goods of that
kind for section 2-314 purposes.' 97 We suggest that courts adopt
the following test for a merchant: As a general rule, merchant status
is a function of the frequency of sales and the knowledge of the
seller with respect to the goods in question. Under this test, a
highly knowledgeable seller could be deemed a merchant even with
few sales; conversely, a seller with relatively frequent sales, but who
obviously lacked all knowledge of the product, would less likely be
deemed a merchant.
b. Isolated Sale of Goods. The official commentary to section 2-
314 states, "A person making an isolated sale of goods is not a
'merchant' within the meaning of the full scope of this section and,
thus, no warranty of merchantability would apply."' 198 Such a seller
195 The buyer's knowledge may also be relevant to whether an implied warranty
arises. See Wingo v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 389, 391 (W.D. Va. 1986)
(Implied warranty of merchantability can be defeated if seller "can prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the buyer's knowledge of the defective quality of the goods
was extensive enough for the buyer to truly appreciate the hazards of the goods.");
Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552, 567, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 450,455 (W.D. Va.
1984) (employer's actual knowledge of dangerous nature of product defeats employee's
claim against seller for breach of implied warranty), aff'd sub nom. Beale v. Hardy, 769
F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985).
196 This is analogous to common law tort principles imposing liability on the person
possessing knowledge of a hazard because he has a greater chance to protect against its
dangers. The more knowledge a merchant has of a particular good, the more capable
she is of foreseeing problems with it. For discussion of warnings and implied warranties,
see infra notes 297-302 and accompanying text. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 388-401 (1977);J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 508-09 (2d ed.
1981).
197 See infra notes 198-203 & 247-49 and accompanying text.
198 U.C.C. § 2-314 comment 3. The comment further explains that the seller's
"knowledge of any defects not apparent on inspection would, however, without need for
express agreement and in keeping with the underlying reason of the present section and
the provisions of good faith, impose an obligation that known material but hidden de-
fects be fully disclosed." Id. Indeed, lack of disclosure brings a nonmerchant into the
merchant category, resulting in imposition of the implied warranty of merchantability.
In the case of a fire board selling an old pumper truck, a New York court stated,
section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code would seem inapplicable
for the reason that it speaks of a 'merchant with respect to goods of that
kind' which defendant clearly is not. However, should it be demonstrated
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should not be deemed a merchant because he will not have special
knowledge or skill with regard to the good, and because a buyer
presumably is less likely to rely upon one who seldom deals in the
good and who possesses less knowledge of it.199
We suggest, however, that isolated sellers should not be conclu-
sively excluded from the implied warranty of merchantability. Iso-
lated sellers should be included in the warranty of merchantability if
they are experts or hold themselves out as experts in the sale of the
goods. As the 1978 Special Project pointed out, "Refusing to find a
warranty in an isolated sale may create the anomalous result of plac-
ing greater liability on a retailer who knows nothing about the goods
than on a seller with substantial expertise as to the goods and upon
whose reputation a buyer could more reasonably rely."' 200 McGregor
v. Dimou20 1 illustrates this anomaly. McGregor involved the sale of a
used car by a body and fender specialist. Despite the seller's knowl-
edge, acquired by virtue of his specialty, the court deemed the seller
a nonmerchant because the sale was an isolated transaction.20 2 The
decision failed to follow the underlying policy of an implied war-
ranty of merchantability because such a person holds himself out to
the public as an expert in the type of goods that he subsequently
sold-even if the actual sale is isolated. We contend that section 2-
314 suggests that a seller with specialized knowledge should be lia-
ble as a merchant because it would be reasonable for a buyer to rely
on such a seller regardless of the fact that the sale may have been
isolated.
The 1978 Special Project argued that with an "isolated sale"
there should be a rebuttable presumption that the seller is a non-
merchant;203 a buyer could rebut the presumption by showing that
the seller has held himself out as knowledgeable or skillful with
respect to the goods sold. We endorse this proposition. Several
courts, however, still appear to treat the nonmerchant status of
isolated sellers as conclusive rather than as a rebuttable
that defendant or its representatives knew of any defects, not apparent on
inspection, and failed to disclose them, such conduct would bring de-
fendant within the precincts of that section.
Village of Chatham v. Board of Fire Comm'rs, 90 A.D.2d 860, 861, 456 N.Y.S.2d 494,
496, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 1533, 1534 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (citations omitted).
199 Although comment 3 to section 2-314 supports this rationale, it presumes that
such a seller of an isolated good neither deals in, nor by the seller's occupation repre-
sents that he has special knowledge or skill with respect to, the goods sold. This pre-
sumption is not always correct, yet courts often apply the "isolated sale" exemption
regardless of whether such skill or knowledge exists.
200 Special Project, supra note 1, at 72 n.177.
201 101 Misc. 2d 756, 422 N.Y.S.2d 806, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 66 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979).
202 Id. at 760, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 809, 28 U.C.C. Rep. at 70.
203 Special Project, supra note 1, at 71.
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presumption. 204
Courts have applied the general concept of "merchant" to cases
involving isolated sales and related concepts in a variety of ways. A
merchant of one type of good generally will not be held to be a
merchant of another type of good in which he does not usually
trade. In such a situation, the issue will be whether the seller's in-
volvement with the second good is sufficient to justify merchant sta-
tus in the second good.
Vince v. Broome20 5 involved a seller whose primary business was
construction and who occasionally sold farm products at auction. A
Mississippi court concluded that he was also a merchant of the farm
products. 20 6 The court held that the seller's volume justified this
204 See, e.g., All States Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96 Idaho 873, 880, 538 P.2d 1177, 1184,
17 U.C.C. Rep. 933, 942 (1975) ("It is true that prior to the execution of the lease in
issue, appellant handled between forty to fifty transactions over a period of six to eight
months, concerning the same Budg-O-Matic Car Wash System that is the subject of this
dispute. However, this in our mind does not make All-States Leasing a 'merchant' for
purposes of the Code."); McGregor, 101 Misc. 2d at 760,422 N.Y.S.2d at 809, 28 U.C.C.
Rep. at 69 (sale of car by specialist in collision repair held to be an isolated sale by a
nonmerchant); Foley v. Dayton Bank & Trust, 696 S.W.2d 356, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 92
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) (bank not merchant of used truck). But see Donald v. City Nat'l
Bank, 295 Ala. 320, 329 So. 2d 92, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 891 (1976) (bank sued on sale of
repossessed boat); Bass, 96 Idaho at 881, 538 P.2d at 1185, 17 U.C.C. Rep. at 943 (Shep-
ard, J., dissenting) (In disagreeing with the majority's holding that the lessor was not a
merchant, the dissenting judge argued: "I cannot agree that the appellant who
purchased and thereafter leased large numbers of car wash systems was not 'a person
who deals in goods of the kind.' Although the appellant here did not build or manufac-
ture such equipment, neither do most retailers."); Bennett v. Jansma, 329 N.W.2d 134,
35 U.C.C. Rep. 432 (S.D. 1983) (court considered frequency of sale, employment of
intermediary, skill and knowledge in determining whether farmer was a merchant); see
also Foley, 696 S.W.2d at 357, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 94 (providing some basis for holding the
bank a merchant of repossessed cars although not a merchant of the repossessed trucks
involved in the case).
205 443 So. 2d 23, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 1498 (Miss. 1983).
206 The court explained: "We are compelled to note that some farming operations
are worth millions of dollars. These farmers are engaged in multicommercial transac-
tions and are generally considered to be agribusiness persons. It would stretch the im-
agination to conclude that all these operations were exempt from coverage under the
Commercial Code." Id. at 25, 37 U.C.C. Rep. at 1501. But see Pierson v. Arnst, 534 F.
Supp. 360, 362, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 457, 460 (D. Mont. 1982) ("It is inconceivable that the
drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code intended to place the average farmer, who
merely grows his yearly crop and sells it to the local elevator, etc., on equal footing with
the professional commodities dealer whose sole business is the buying and selling of
farm commodities.").
Livestock and farm products are big business. See Grossman, Choice of Law in Inter-
state Livestock Sales: Nonuniform Warranty Provisions Under the UCC, 30 S.D.L. REV. 214, 215
(1985). Although the implied warranties generally would apply in such cases, "at least
twenty-five states have amended their laws to exclude implied warranties in the sale of
livestock under certain conditions." Id. at 216. For example, twenty-five states have
excluded implied warranties on the health of livestock. Id. at 229 n.100. For a general
discussion of livestock as "goods," see Note, Commercial Law-Implied Warranty of
Merchantability--Sale of Goods by Farmers May Give Rise to Implied Warranty of Merchantability,
54 Miss. L.J. 175 (1984).
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conclusion, despite its relative insignificance to his overall
business .207
Banks that routinely repossess and sell cars or other goods may
be similar to the seller in Vince, yet courts have generally refused to
apply the same analysis to them. Courts have commonly held that
banks are not merchants of these repossessed cars. 208 Although
banks presumably function primarily as financial institutions, a given
bank could conceivably repossess cars frequently enough for the
buyer to refute the presumption of the bank's nonmerchant sta-
tus. 20 9 Certain types of "isolated sales," however, are clearly cov-
ered by the warranty of merchantability. For instance, the "isolated
sale" exemption does not exonerate a seller in a new business who
should have the relevant knowledge, despite the fact that only one
item had been sold. 10 Accordingly, an importer's first shipment of
207 Vince, 443 So. 2d at 28, 37 U.C.C. Rep. at 1504.
208 See, e.g., Joyce v. Combank/Longwood, 405 So. 2d 1358, 32'U.C.C. Rep. 1118
(Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (bank that sold five repossessed automobiles in a year did not
hold itself out as having any special knowledge or skill and was therefore not a
merchant); Foley v. Daton Bank & Trust, 696 S.W.2d 356, 359, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 92, 95
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) ("[lIt is clear that the defendants ... are not merchants within the
meaning of the statute.").
209 The central question, of course, is whether the bank has the requisite knowledge
about automobiles. Precisely what knowledge suffices to require a particular seller to
comply with the implied warranty of merchantability cannot be specified as a formula,
but must be handled on a case-by-case basis. A Florida court, for example, held that
merchant status requires, in addition to frequency of sale, a professional status as to the
particular kinds of goods in question, which even those banks that frequently deal in
used cars did not have. Joyce, 405 So. 2d 1358, 1359, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 1118, 1119; see infra
note 212.
Similarly, courts have typically held that financial lessors are not merchants. See,
e.g., Agristor Leasing v. Meuli, 634 F. Supp. 1208, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 1102 (D. Kan. 1986)
(lessor whose contact with good is solely for the purpose of providing it to lessee has
limited knowledge of the good which generally would be acquired by the lessor accord-
ing to the lessee's wishes); Miller Auto Leasing Co. v. Weinstein, 189 NJ. Super. 543,
461 A.2d 174, 36 U.C.G. Rep. 786 (1983) (financier lessor not liable under the implied
warranty of merchantability), aff'd, 193 NJ. Super. 328, 473 A.2d 996, cert. denied, 97 NJ.
676, 483 A.2d 192 (1984).
Contrasted to the situation of the merchant of a specific good making an isolated
sale of a different product is that of the retailer of many types of goods who adds addi-
tional items to his inventory. Such a seller is presumably a merchant with respect to all
the various goods with which he deals. See, e.g., McQuiston v. K-Mart Corp., 796 F.2d
1346, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 1115 (11th Cir. 1986) (cookiejar in K-Mart); Schuessler v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 12 U.C.C. Rep. 1050 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (soda bottle in retail
store). Even in cases such as McQuiston, where the warranty did not apply for other
reasons, there is no question as to the general retailer's merchant status. Thus, if a
wholesaler of office supplies adds office furniture to its inventory, it will be presumed to
be a merchant with respect to both desk chairs and paper clips.
210 See Alpert v. Thomas, 643 F. Supp. 1406, 1416,2 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 99, 113 (D. Vt.
1986) (regardless of number of previous sales, seller is a merchant because he "holds
himself out as having knowledge and skills peculiar to the practices and goods involved
in the Arabian horse business").
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a particular type of goods comes within the implied warranty. 211
We suggest that individualized treatment of these cases is ap-
propriate. Courts should apply a rebuttable presumption of non-
merchant status instead of a conclusive rule. Certainly a bank that
professes to hold no knowledge whatsoever of the cars with which it
deals, but which is simply converting repossessed collateral into
capital, should not be deemed a merchant under our test.212 This
does not mean, however, that banks can never be merchants. A
court should deem a bank a merchant when it would be reasonable
for a buyer of repossessed collateral to rely on the bank's special
knowledge of the collateral because of its advertising, its volume of
sales, or some other relevant factor. In these situations, the seller's
knowledge is the crucial factor, for the extent of the seller's knowl-
edge determines whether the buyer would be reasonable in relying
on that knowledge.
The criteria for merchant status should therefore turn on both
the seller's "professional" status (encompassing knowledge of the
product) and the frequency of sales. Thus, the more often a person
sells a particular product the greater the possibility that he would be
deemed a merchant of that particular good. 213 Buyers are more
likely to assume that sellers who frequently deal in certain goods
possess such knowledge; they are therefore more likely to rely upon
such a seller. This fits our thesis well, as the more contact a person
has with a product, the more knowledge and skill he should develop.
2. Scope of "Goods" Under Section 2-314
Once a court determines that the seller is a merchant, its focus
shifts to whether there has been a sale of "goods." What constitutes
a "good" under the Code?214 The simple answer is that a good is a
tangible item; difficulty arises when courts need to apply the basic
principles developed for traditional goods to services and other
nontraditional goods.
a. Services as Goods. Courts disagree as to whether the sale of a
service will give rise to an implied warranty of merchantability. 215
211 See, e.g., Geo. Byers Sons, Inc. v. East Europe Import Export, Inc., 488 F. Supp.
574, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 1293 (D. Md. 1980) (importer's first shipment of motorcycles).
212 SeeJoyce, 405 So. 2d at 1359, 32 U.C.C. Rep. at 1120 (Plaintiff-buyer "testified
that he was better qualified to determine the condition of the car than was defendant's
employee who negotiated the sale. It appears without dispute that the bank had no
'professional status as to the particular [kind] of goods.' ") (brackets in original).
213 The new business merchant is a logical exception, where knowledge should be
imputed to the new dealer. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 2-37 and accompanying text.
215 The 1978 Project suggested a "nexus test" to determine whether a transaction
should be covered by warranties. "Where a sale would not be made but for the accompa-
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Generally, the more the transaction at issue resembles a traditional
sale of a good, the more likely the court will hold that the transac-
tion is covered by an implied warranty. Thus, hybrid transactions,
in which a tangible item is delivered to the buyer along with a ser-
vice, tend to fall more readily within the warranties than do sales of
pure services.
For example, repair services often do not give rise to an implied
warranty of merchantability,2 1 6 even when a major part is conveyed
to the service buyer as part of the repair.217 Generally, the inquiry is
whether the transaction more closely resembles a sale of a repair
service or a pure sale of the part. Some courts call this inquiry the
"predominant purpose test."2 18
The installation of goods is another form of a hybrid sale. Like
the repair of parts, installations involve both a service and a convey-
ance of a tangible product. Arguably, an installation resembles a
pure sale more closely than does a repair because, with the installa-
tion, a good is clearly being "sold." Perhaps for this reason, courts
are more willing to find an implied warranty arising from an installa-
tion than from a repair.2 19 Yet, distinguishing between a "repair"
nying services, a sufficient nexus exists to justify applying Code warranties to both com-
ponents of the transaction. Similarly, a nexus exists where the service is necessary to the
enjoyment of the goods." Special Project, supra note 1, at 38. Although this solution
seems rational and workable, courts have not uniformly followed it. See supra notes 4-14
and accompanying text.
216 See Swenson Trucking & Excavating, Inc. v. Truckweld Equipment Co., 604 P.2d
1113, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 336 (Alaska 1980) (repairs on equipment bought from another
seller not covered by implied warranties).
217 See, e.g., Gee v. Chattahoochee Tractor Sales, Inc., 172 Ga. App. 351, 323 S.E.2d
176, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 30 (1984) (part installed during repair is part of the service of
repairing and therefore not a "good" for implied warranty purposes); Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. Dalton, 665 S.W.2d 507, 38 U.C.C. Rep. 428 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983)
("dominant purpose test" applied to repair and installation of roof resulting in classifi-
cation of transaction as service); see also Mack Fin. Corp. v. Harnett Transfer, Inc., 42
N.C. App. 116, 121, 256 S.E.2d 491,495, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 8, 10-11 (1979) ("The fact that
various parts are also required to properly repair and service the truck is merely inciden-
tal to the repair contract .... ").
218 See, e.g., Mennonite Deaconess Home & Hosp. v. Gates Eng'g Co., 219 Neb. 303,
308, 363 N.W.2d 155, 160,40 U.C.C. Rep. 396,402 (1985) ("The test for inclusion in or
exclusion from the sales provisions is not whether the contracts are mixed but, granting
that they are mixed, whether their predominant factor, their thrust, their purpose, rea-
sonably stated, is the rendition of service, with goods incidentally involved," or vise
versa); Meeks v. Bell, 710 S.W.2d 789, 795, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 1118, 1122 (Tex. Civ. App.
1986) (implied warranty applies to mixed sales-service contract if "predominant pur-
pose" of transaction was sale of a good), rev'd on other grounds, 725 S.W.2d 179 (Tex.
1987). But see Gee, 172 Ga. App. at 353, 323 S.E.2d at 178, 40 U.C.C. Rep. at 32 (stating
that repairs are not covered sales without inquiring into predominant purpose of
transaction).
219 See, e.g., Bailey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 690 P.2d 1280, 1282,40 U.C.C. Rep.
90, 92-93 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (seller who "incidentally renders services in the installa-
tion" of the goods sold, and who knows of buyer's intended use and of buyer's reliance
on his skill and judgment, is held to implied warranty of merchantability); Alennonite
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contract and a "purchase with installation" contract is often difficult.
Thus, the disparate treatment accorded these situations by the
courts is unsettling. Consider the following two scenarios:
(1) Buyer, not knowing what is wrong with his car, goes to a
service station to have the car repaired. Buyer says to the
seller, "Fix my car." As it turns out, all that is wrong with
the car is a flat tire. The service station replaces the tire.
Because the buyer purchased repair service, the transac-
tion does not involve a good, and the implied warranty
would not apply.220
(2) Buyer, knowing that her tire is flat, goes to a service sta-
tion to buy a new tire she says to the seller, "Sell me a
tire." The seller removes the flat tire and mounts the
new one. Because the buyer went to the service station to
purchase the tire, the transaction involved a good, and
the implied warranty would apply.22'
Such results are surely preposterous: The buyer not knowing
the nature of his car's problems is excluded from warranty protec-
tion while the more knowledgeable buyer receives the warranty.
Clearly the less knowledgeable buyer is in as much (or, indeed,
greater) need of the implied warranty. Because the transactions are
virtually identical, we propose that courts should apply the same
warranty standards in both scenarios.
Pure services, those transactions in which only a service is pro-
vided without any accompanying tangible good usually do not give
rise to an implied warranty of merchantability under section 2-314
even if the seller holds himself out as having knowledge or skill pe-
culiar to the service involved in the transaction. Regardless of the
skill or knowledge of the seller, a service is simply not a good.2 22
The concept of services as goods may, however, be gaining ac-
Deaconess, 219 Neb. at 309, 363 N.W.2d at 161, 40 U.C.C. Rep. at 403 (installation of
roof was "incidental" to its purchase). But see Gee, 172 Ga. App. at 353, 323 S.E.2d at
178, 40 U.C.C. Rep. at 32 ("although a 'repairer' may include new parts in the repair of
a vehicle engine, the primary purpose of the contract is to 'repair' the vehicle, and is not
the 'sale' of any component part of the engine").
220 See Gee, 173 Ga. App. at 353, 323 S.E.2d at 178, 40 U.C.C. Rep. at 32.
221 SeeMeeks, 710 S.W.2d 789, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 1118. For a similar analysis involv-
ing section 2-315, see Skelton v. Druid City Hospital Bd., 459 So. 2d 818, 821-22, 39
U.C.C. Rep. 369, 377 (Ala. 1984).
222 See, e.g., De Valerio v. Vic Tanny Int'l, 140 Mich. App. 176, 180, 363 N.W.2d 447,
449, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 836 (1984) (use of equipment spa not covered by implied warranty
of merchantability because the contract is for service and not for sale of goods); Mennon-
ite Deaconess, 219 Neb. at 307, 363 N.W.2d at 160, 40 U.C.C. Rep. at 402 ("If the transac-
tion was really a contract for services and not a sale of goods, the provisions of article 2
of the Uniform Commercial Code do not apply."); see also supra notes 4-14 and accompa-
nying text (service-sales hybrids).
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ceptance. 223 The Alabama Supreme Court provided support for
this position in Skelton v. Druid City Hospital Board.224 The Skelton
court held that a hospital could be liable under section 2-315's war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose when a surgical needle
broke inside of a patient. 225 The court rejected the hospital's con-
tention that surgery -constitutes solely a provision of services not
covered under the U.C.C.226 Instead, the court viewed the surgical
procedure as a hybrid transaction to which the Code applied, 227
stating that "[the hospital] can make no serious contention that
Skelton did not pay for the use of the suturing needle, or that pa-
tients generally do not buy supplies and pay charges for equipment
used in the course of their treatment." 228 The Court explicitly
noted that the plaintiff went to the hospital "seeking services and
products necessary to those services." 229 Although the court ac-
knowledged that the suturing needles were re-used, and thus not
sold to the patient, it held that this did not preclude the U.C.C.'s
application. The court noted that Article Two applies to transac-
tions in goods, and not just to sales.230 Although the hospital did
not sell the suturing needle to the patient, it did, in a sense, lease its
use.23 1 This lease constituted a transaction in goods, covered under
Article Two; the analysis applies equally well to section 2-314.232
Although the Skelton court's reasoning applies to hybrid service
transactions, in practical effect it arguably subjects virtually all ser-
vice transactions to Article Two's implied warranties, for these serv-
ices may be characterized as Skelton-type hybrid transactions.
Although we agree with the result in Skelton, we believe that the
court's reasoning could result "in hairsplitting over contracts in
223 See Mallor, supra note 14, at 89-90 (noting that although courts have traditionally
characterized supplying utilities to consumers as a service, "[i]n recent years, a growing
number of courts have either characterized utility supply contracts as sales of goods, or
have considered such contracts to be sufficiently analogous to sales of goods to justify
the application of a the Uniform Commercial Code principles.") (footnote omitted).
224 459 So. 2d 818, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 369 (Ala. 1984).
225 Id. at 823, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 378.
226 Id. at 821, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 373.
227 Id. at 822, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 374. Prior courts had used the "essence of transac-
tion" test to determine that a hospital's provision of medical care is a service and there-
fore not a good under article 2. See, e.g., Potts v. W. Q. Richards Memorial Hosp., 558
S.W.2d 939, 946, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 360, 361 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) ("Texas follows the
majority rule that the essence of a hospital stay is the furnishing of the institution's heal-
ing services which may include incidental sales of medicines and the like.").
228 Skelton, 459 So. 2d at 821, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 373 (emphasis in original).
229 Id. at 822, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 375.
230 Id. at 821, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 373-74.
231 Id., 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 373.
232 Id., 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 373-74. For a discussion of whether leases are included
within the U.C.C. under "transaction in goods" theory, see supra notes 21-25 and ac-
companying text.
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which the goods and services elements are not realistically separa-
ble." 233 As an alternative, we recommend applying the Code to
services by analogy.23 4 "Under this 'analogical approach,' Code
principles are given broad application to problems analogous to
those contemplated by the drafters of the Code." 23 5
We suggest that courts should analogize services to goods
where the buyer's reliance on the service provider resembles a
buyer's reliance on a merchant when purchasing a good. Persons
competent to perform repairs or installations probably meet and
perhaps exceed the knowledge criteria for status as a merchant; con-
ceivably, exceptions analogous to those applicable for merchants of
pure goods would apply in appropriate circumstances. As services
become more pervasive in commercial dealings, the protections
arising from transactions in classic goods should expand to include
them.
b. Technological Products as Goods. The development of com-
puter technology has also challenged the traditional concept of what
constitutes a good under Article Two. 23 6 Although courts have uni-
formly regarded computer hardware as within the classic definition
of "goods," their treatment of computer software has been less con-
sistent. One commentator has suggested that the inconsistency
stems from the intangible nature of software: "Computer software
... is an intangible collection of ideas, even though it must be kept
and transferred on a tangible medium. Traditional sales law was
developed to deal with tangible goods, not intangibles. ' 23 7 The
commentator suggested two reasons why the implied warranty of
233 Mallor, supra note 14, at 93.
234 As Professors White and Summers have stated:
[W]e suspect that the sale-service dichotomy is merely a verbal formula in
which results are expressed, results which courts reach upon analysis of a
wide variety of factors. We would urge courts to identify these factors
more candidly. We would also remind courts who do wish to impose war-
ranty liability in nonsale cases that they can do so by analogy without indulg-
ing the fiction that the transaction at hand is a true sale of goods.
J. Wnrrm & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 9-6, at 349 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted);
see also Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 38 Mich. App. 325, 196
N.W.2d 316, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 977 (1972) (applying implied warranties to electricity by
analogy). But see Special Project, Recent Developments in Commercial Law, 11 RuT.-CAM. LJ.
527, 679-688 (1980).
235 Mallor, supra note 14, at 93.
236 "The explosive growth of the computer industry has outdistanced efforts to
adapt legal theories to govern computer-related disputes." Comment, The Warranty of
Merchantability and Computer Software Contracts: A Square Peg Won't Fit in a Round Hole, 59
WASH. L. REv. 511, 511 (1984). For a description of various computer terms, see
Holmes, Applications of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code to Computer System Acquisi-
tions, 9 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. LJ. 1, 4-6 (1982).
237 Comment, supra note 236, at 511 (footnotes omitted).
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merchantability should not attach to computer software. First, the
inherent diversity of such collections of ideas makes developing a
minimum standard of merchantability almost impossible.23 8 Sec-
ond, because a software purchaser generally obtains a mere license
to use the software, and not full rights of ownership, there has not
been a sale.2 39 We disagree. Instead, we recommend that courts
apply traditional standards of merchantability. First, we believe that
when a merchant is particularly concerned about the
merchantability of the product, he should so inform the buyer who
will be purchasing and relying upon it. Second, we believe that
courts should look past the formality of the computer software li-
cense and equate the transaction to a sale. 240
The purchasers of computer goods, like buyers of services, are
likely to rely on the seller's superior knowledge and are thus entitled
to warranty protection. This protection should not be denied by
strict construction of either "goods" or "sales."
c. Used Goods. The implied warranty of merchantability applies
to used as well as to new goods.24' Whether implied warranties ap-
ply depends on the expectations appropriate to the type of good.2 42
The good's used condition therefore influences the standard of
merchantability by which the good is judged. 243 Although used
238 Id. at 521-23.
239 Id. at 518-20.
240 Passage of full rights of ownership is not necessarily a requirement for imposi-
tion of warranties. See U.C.C. § 2-105(3). Passage of title is not necessary either. See
infra note 258.
241 See, e.g., Lee v. Peterson, 110 Idaho 601, 716 P.2d 1373, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 85 (Ct.
App. 1986) (used photocopier that failed to function properly for over one month
breached warranty of merchantability); Dickerson v. Mountain View Equip. Co., 109
Idaho 711, 710 P.2d 621, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 114 (Ct. App. 1985); Perry v. Lawson Ford
Tractor Co., 613 P.2d 458, 463, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 75, 80 (Okla. 1980) ("the provisions of
§ 2-314(1) were clearly intended to apply to all sales of goods by a merchant who deals in
them .... ) (emphasis in original). But see Southerland v. Northeast Datsun, Inc., 659
S.W.2d 889, 38 U.C.C. Rep. 78 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (no implied warranty attaches
when buyer purchases goods he knows are used).
242 "A contract for the sale of second-hand goods.., involves only such obligation
as is appropriate to such goods .... " U.C.C. § 2-314 comment 3.
243 Dickerson, 109 Idaho at 711, 710 P.2d at 625, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 120 ("[T]he new
or used character [of a product] is a factor in determining its standard of
merchantability.").
The Code is silent as to whether section 2-315 applies to used goods. One com-
mentator has suggested that this omission, in light of the explicit coverage under com-
ment 3 to section 2-315, could be intentional according to the statutory interpretation
maxim inclosio unius est exclusio alterius. However, recent case law has chosen instead to
interpret section 2-315 to apply to second hand goods. Comment, Uniform Commercial
Code-Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose-Applicability to the Sale of Secondhand
Goods, 6 WHITER L. REV. 499 (1984). There appears to be no theoretical reason for the
courts to draw a distinction between used goods and new goods for section 2-315
purposes.
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goods are not generally expected to be in mint condition, they nev-
ertheless must meet a basic standard of merchantability. For exam-
ple, used cars are expected to be in reasonably safe condition and
substantially free from defects that would render them inoper-
able.244 Notably, used goods are less likely to give rise to an implied
warranty of merchantability because often the seller will not be con-
sidered a merchant. 245 For example, the sale of a used good will
frequently fall within the isolated sale exception of section 2-314.246
Consistent with our notion that courts should base liability on
factors of reliance and knowledge, we believe that the likelihood
that a seller will be subject to Article Two implied warranties should
be a function of the knowledge he possesses and the buyer's reliance
upon him. When the seller is a merchant dealing in used goods,
such as a used car dealer, the implied warranties should clearly ap-
ply. Problems may arise when a seller of used goods is not clearly a
merchant because the sales are only incidental to his regular busi-
ness.2 47 We believe that where the seller has special knowledge of
the used goods, such as a metropolitan transit authority selling its
used trolleys for scrap, there should be an implied warranty of
merchantability arising out of the sale.248 However, when the seller
has no specialized knowledge there should be no implied
244 See Thomas v. Ruddell Lease-Sales, Inc., 43 Wash. App. 208, 716 P.2d 911, 1
U.C.C. Rep. 2d 394 (1986).
245 SeeJoyce v. Combank/Longwood, 405 So. 2d 1358, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 1118 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (bank selling repossessed cars not merchant); Bernstein v. Sher-
man, 130 Misc. 2d 741, 497 N.Y.S.2d 298, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 375 (N.Y. Jus. Ct. 1986)
(private seller of used car not a merchant); see also Guess v. Lorenz, 612 S.W.2d 831, 30
U.C.C. Rep. 1529 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (same). For a discussion of the merchant re-
quirement, see supra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
246 See, e.g., Perry v. Rockwell Graphic Sys., 42 U.C.C. Rep. 409 (D. Mass. 1982)
(selling equipment no longer needed does not make seller a merchant); Guess, 612
S.W.2d 831, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 1529 (used car sale); Allen v. Nicole, Inc., 172 N.J. Super.
442, 412 A.2d 824, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 982 (1980) (seller not merchant in isolated sale of
amusement ride); Bernstein, 130 Misc. 2d 741, 497 N.Y.S.2d 298, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 375
(prior owners' sale of car); McGregorv. Dimou, 101 Misc. 2d 756, 422 N.Y.S.2d 806,28
U.C.C. Rep. 66 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979) (seller not merchant in isolated sale of used car even
though seller was body and fender specialist and had sold other used cars); see also supra
notes 198-213 and accompanying text.
247 See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
248 See Ferragamo v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 395 Mass. 581, 481 N.E.2d
477, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 304 (1985). In Ferragamo the Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority (MBTA) argued that its primary business was provision of transportation and
that the sale of its old trolley cars was "incidental" as a matter of law. The court dis-
agreed and, reversing the lower court's decision, considered the MBTA a merchant of
used trolley cars. The court based the decision on the following facts: the MBTA sold
almost all of its old trolley cars for scrap; it solicited bids for the cars; the trolleys had
been operated and repaired by its employees for 25 years; and it had originally designed
the cars. Id. at 585-89, 481 N.E.2d at 480-82, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 308-11. The court
therefore concluded that the MBTA was highly experienced and knowledgeable with
respect to the goods.
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warranty. 24 9
3. A "Contract for Sale" Under Section 2-314
Under section 2-314(1), "a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale." Courts have
interpreted "contract for their sale" broadly, focusing not upon the
formal transfer of title from buyer to seller, but rather on whether a
commercial relationship exists between a merchant and another
party. 250 As a result, leases, loans, and other transactions not in-
volving transfer of title may give rise to an implied warranty of
merchantability.
a. Incomplete Sales. Some courts have broadened "contract for
sale" to create an implied warranty to a retail purchaser before he
has actually bought the goods. A common factual pattern involves a
customer picking up an item off a shelf in a self-service store and
manifesting an intent to purchase the item-by putting food in a
grocery basket to carry it to the checkout counter, for example.
Some courts have reasoned that placing goods on a shelf in a self-
service store for customer inspection and selection constitutes an
offer to sell such goods at the stated price, and the customer's act of
taking possession of the goods with intent to pay for them consti-
tutes a reasonable mode of acceptance, so as to form a "contract for
sale." 25 ' Likewise, a restaurant that serves a glass of wine to a pa-
tron can be held liable under an implied warranty theory for injuries
sustained when the glass breaks in the patron's hand.2 52 Courts have
based this rule squarely on section 2-314, which expressly provides
that "the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either
on the premises or elsewhere is a sale." 25 3
b. Loans. Implied warranties do not apply when goods are
loaned. For example, school officials were not responsible for inju-
ries resulting from a defective athletic helmet because they did not
249 See Perry v. Rockwell Graphics Sys., Inc., 42 U.C.C. Rep. 409 (D. Mass. 1985).
250 See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 9-6, at 344.
251 See Barker v. Allied Supermarket, 596 P.2d 870, 26 U.C.C. Rep. 597 (Okla. 1979)
(taking possession of softdrink bottle with intent to purchase constituted contract for
sale.); see also Note, Barker v. Allied Supermarket: An Expanded Interpretation of the UCC's
"Contract for Sale," 33 Sw. LJ. 1294, 1295 (1980) (suggesting that the trend is to find an
implied warranty of merchantability in these circumstances).
252 See, e.g., Shaffer v. Victoria Station, Inc., 91 Wash. 2d 295, 588 P.2d 233, 25
U.C.C. Rep. 427 (1978).
253 Id. at 297, 588 P.2d at 234, 25 U.C.C. Rep. at 428. Notably, one court has re-
fused to find an implied warranty when a browsing customer picked up ajar that injured
her hand because the customer had not formed an intent to purchase. McQuiston v. K-
Mart Corp., 796 F.2d 1346, 1 U.G.C. Rep. 2d 1115 (11th Cir. 1986).
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sell it, but loaned it to the subsequently injured student.254 Simi-
larly, a car dealer was not liable for injuries sustained by a prospec-
tive buyer test-driving the vehicle. 255
We believe, however, that implied warranties should arise from
loans in some circumstances. Courts should distinguish between
gratuitous loans and loans integral to a sales transaction-a bail-
ment for mutual benefit. In the former case, it is proper to exclude
loaned goods from implied warranty coverage because such a trans-
action clearly falls outside of section 2-106's definition of a sale. In
the latter case, however, the bailment may "be considered so closely
allied to selling as to become a sale."'256
We propose a rebuttable presumption that loans are not cov-
ered by implied warranties. A party could rebut this presumption by
showing that the bailment was part of an anticipated commercial
transaction. For example, under this test, school officials loaning
athletic gear in a noncommercial setting would not be liable.257
However, a car dealer who loans a car to a potential customer in
anticipation of a sale to that customer should be held to the implied
warranty of merchantability assuming that the other requirements
for the implied warranty were met.
c. Lease Transactions. Arguably, a lease resembles a contract for
sale even more than does a loan.258 Courts that find the Code appli-
cable to leases do so in one of three ways. 259 If the leases are "dis-
guised sales," courts may hold that they are in fact a "sale" for
254 See Hemphill v. Sayers, 552 F. Supp. 685, 35 U.C.G. Rep. 758 (D. Ill. 1982).
255 See Mason v. General Motors Corp., 397 Mass. 183, 189, 490 N.E.2d 437,441,42
U.C.C. Rep. 1553, 1558 (1986) ("There is no statutory language, however, that reason-
ably may be construed as either creating or sanctioning the judicial creation of a war-
ranty in connection with a bailment of the kind that occurred in this case.").
256 Id. at 196 n.3, 409 N.E.2d at 445 n.3, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 1561 n.3 (Liacos, J.,
dissenting).
257 We do not address the question of whether the school officials would be liable
for a breach of duty to the students on any theory other than implied warranty.
258 See All-States Leasing Co. v. Ochs, 42 Or. App. 319, 600 P.2d 899, 27 U.G.C.
Rep. 808 (1979). In discussing Oregon's version of section 2-314, the court stated:
The more difficult question is whether the implied warranty of
merchantability, which by the express terms of ORS 72.3140 is applicable
to the sale of goods, also applies to the lease of goods. We observe that
the U.C.C. is more concerned with the rights and obligations which at-
tach to a transaction which has certain characteristics and with respect to
which the parties have certain intentions, than it is with the form in which
the transaction is cast.
Id. at 334, 600 P.2d at 909, 27 U.C.C. Rep. at 820 (footnote omitted); see supra notes 16-
37 and accompanying text.
259 See supra notes 16-37 and accompanying text. Additionally, there is a fourth
method-legislative action. Maryland, for example, adds a fourth subsection to section
2-314 providing that "Subsections (1) and (2) of this section apply to a lease of goods
and a bailment for hire of goods that pass through the physical possession of and are
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purposes of the Code. 260 Other courts use the "transaction in
goods" language of section 2-102 to justify extending warranty pro-
tection to leases. 26' Finally, some courts simply incorporate leases
into the goods language by analogy.26 2
We suggest that a more consistent application of the underlying
policies of the Code would condition the existence of an implied
warranty arising from a lease on the amount of reliance and knowl-
edge involved, and the resemblance of the transaction to a sale of
goods. Often those policies lead to the use of the analogy method
to expand the Code's applications to such transactions as services,
leases, loans, and infrequent and incomplete sales.
4. The Standards of Merchantability-Section 2-314(2)
Assuming that an implied warranty of merchantability applies
under section 2-314(1), section 2-314(2) sets forth the standards of
merchantability:
Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as to
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract descrip-
tion; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within
the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units
involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agree-
ment may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.26 3
Violation of any one of these standards constitutes a breach of the
maintained by the lessor, sublessor, or bailor." MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-314(4)
(Supp. 1986).
260 See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
261 See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
262 See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
Generally, the rights and obligations defined by the lease and the seller's knowledge
determine whether the lease gives rise to implied warranties. See Freeman v. Hubco
Leasing, Inc., 253 Ga. 698, 703 n.6, 324 S.E.2d 462, 468 n.6, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 408, 414
n.6 (1985) (lease that provided that the lesee shall purchase the leased goods at the
termination of the lease is a "contract for sale" and thus is covered by the U.C.C.); Knox
v. North Am. Car Corp., 80 Il1. App. 3d 683, 399 N.E.2d 1355, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 336
(1980) (repair provisions render lease a sale under section 2-315); Ochs, 42 Or. App.
319, 600 P.2d 899, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 808 (doctor who leased a computer relied on his own
knowledge and not the lessor's who had no expertise in the field). Generally, the more
the lease resembles a sale, the more likely the lessor will be liable.
263 U.C.C. § 2-314(2).
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implied warranty of merchantability. Although comment 6 to sec-
tion 2-314 implies that this list is not exhaustive, 264 courts tend not
to impose additional standards. 265 For the most part, courts use a
reasonableness standard to determine whether section 2-314(2)'s
requirements have been met.266
a. Pass Without Objection in the Trade. Section 2-314(2)(a) re-
quires that goods "pass without objection in the trade." This sec-
tion simply requires that goods meet whatever standard or custom
prevails in the trade for goods of the kind.267 A few examples illus-
trate the application of this section.
With consumer goods, the courts have interpreted the standard
to encompass public expectations of the product. In Thomas v. Rud-
dell Lease-Sales, Inc. 26 8 the buyer purchased a used Corvette, which,
unbeknownst to him, had been wrecked and repaired prior to the
sale.269 According to the court, the public generally rejects
wrecked, although subsequently repaired, Corvettes and therefore
found that such a Corvette fails to pass without objection in the
trade.270
With commercial transactions, courts often link the ordinary
purpose of the goods to the expectations in the trade. For instance,
one court found that seeds that had a general reputation in the trade
for being disease-free did not pass without objection if they were
highly contaminated with bacteria.271 Likewise, a court held that
wine containing "Fresno mold" does not pass without objection in
the trade, and therefore the seller of the wine breached the implied
264 Subsection (2) does not purport to exhaust the meaning of "merchanta-
ble" nor to negate any of its attributes not specifically mentioned in the
text of the statute, but arising by usage of trade or through case law. The
language used is "must be at least such as . . ." and the intention is to
leave open other possible attributes of merchantability.
Id. § 2-314 comment 6.
265 Instead of creating new standards, courts may expand those listed in section 2-
314 to cover unforseen situations. However, our research has not disclosed any such
new standards.
266 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 75.
267 The question when the warranty is imposed turns basically on the mean-
ing of the terms of the agreement as recognized in the trade. Goods de-
livered under an agreement made by a merchant in a given line of trade
must be of a quality comparable to that generally acceptable in the line of
trade under the description or other designation of the goods used in the
agreement.
U.C.C. § 2-314 comment 2.
268 43 Wash. App. 208, 716 P.2d 911, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 394 (1986).
269 Id. at 209-10, 716 P.2d at 912-13, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d at 395-96.
270 Id. at 214, 716 P.2d at 915, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d at 390.
271 Latimer v. William Mueller & Son, Inc., 149. Mich. App. 620, 632-34, 386 N.W.2d
618, 623-24, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 1128, 1134-35 (1986).
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warranty of merchantability. 272
b. Fair Average Quality (Fungible Goods). Section 2-314(2)(b)
provides that to be merchantable, fungible goods must be of "fair
average quality" within the contract description. "Fungible" means
goods "of which any unit is, by nature or usage of trade, the
equivalent of any other like unit." 273 The commentary to section 2-
314 states:
"Fair average".., means goods centering around the middle belt
of quality, not the least or the worst that can be understood in the
particular trade by the designation, but such as can pass "without
objection." Of course a fair percentage of the least is permissible
but the goods are not "fair average" if they are all of the least or
worst quality possible under the description.274
Subsection 2-314(2)(b) is often used in connection with subsec-
tion 2-314(2) (a)275 because "[b]oth refer.., to the standards of that
line of the trade which fits the transaction and the seller's busi-
ness." 276 As with subsection (2)(a), few cases specifically address
this area. Those cases that do involve one subsection usually involve
the other as well. 277
c. Fit for Ordinary Purposes. Subsection (2)(c) provides that
goods must be "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods
are used." This subsection embodies a fundamental concept of sec-
tion 2-314-that goods be reasonably fit for their usual, intended
purpose. 278 To meet this standard goods must be reasonably safe
when put to their ordinary use 279 and reasonably capable of per-
272 Delano Growers' Coop. Winery v. Supreme Wine Co., 393 Mass. 666, 672, 473
N.E.2d 1066, 1070, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 93, 98 (1985).
273 U.C.C. § 1-201(17).
274 Id. § 2-314 comment 7. Fair average is a term directly appropriate to agricultural
bulk products. Id.
275 Although an item failing to meet any one of the six standards is not merchanta-
ble, comment 7 to section 2-314 advises that subsections (2)(a) and (b) "are to be read
together." Id.
276 Id.
277 See, e.g., Maybank v. S.S. Kresge Co., 46 N.C. App. 687, 266 S.E.2d 409, 29
U.C.C. Rep. 69 (1980), modified on other grounds and aft'd, 302 N.C. 129, 273 S.E.2d 681,
30 U.C.C. Rep. 985 (1981); Latimer v. William Mueller & Son, Inc., 149 Mich. App. 620,
386 N.W.2d 618, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 1128 (1986); Special Project, supra note 1, at 77-78.
278 Comment 8 to section 2-314 characterizes paragraph (c) as "a fundamental con-
cept" of that section.
279 See, e.g., Maybank, 46 N.C. App. at 692, 266 S.E.2d at 412, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 73
("A flashcube which does not work properly and which causes.., unexpected harm...
is not merchantable."); Taterka v. Ford Motor Co., 86 Wis. 2d 140, 271 N.W.2d 653, 25
U.C.C. Rep. 680 (1978) (car is unmerchantable if it has single defect causing substantial
safety hazard).
Food and drink are covered by this paragraph as well. See U.C.C. § 2-314 comment
5. For cases discussing the application of section 2-314, see Shaffer v. Victoria Station,
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forming their ordinary functions.28 0 A product's ordinary purpose
is one which is reasonably foreseeable to the merchant.2 81 The
merchant will not be held liable for harm caused by deliberate mis-
use of the goods totally unrelated to any normal or intended use.28 2
The fitness for ordinary purpose requirement applies to goods sold
for resale as well as to those sold to the customer.283
Plaintiffs have attempted to expand the application of subsec-
tion (2)(c) by injecting a notice of freedom from hazard into the con-
cept of ordinary purpose. For example, in Rhodes v. R.G.
Industries284 a buyer argued that a handgun which had caused the
death of a child was not merchantable because the ordinary purpose
Inc., 91 Wash. 2d 295, 297, 588 P.2d 233, 235, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 427, 429 (1978) (Where
customer in a restaurant was injured by a glass of wine that shattered, the court stated,
"[p]laintiff alleges the drink sold-wine in a glass-was unfit and has, therefore, stated a
cause of action."); Orlando v. Herco, Inc., 351 Pa. Super. 144, 505 A.2d 308, 42 U.C.C.
Rep. 1624 (1986) (food merchant may present evidence pertaining to purchase, storage,
and inspection of ingredients used to prepare food. to show that the food was merchant-
able and fit for human consumption).
A merchant also may be liable for breach of an implied warranty under section 2-
314(2)(c) if a product causes some kind of allergic reaction in a substantial number of
people. Compare Tiderman v. Fleetwood Homes, 102 Wash. 2d 334, 339, 684 P.2d 1302,
1305, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 442, 445 (1984) (buyer could recover for hypersensitive allergic
reaction to formaldehyde in mobile home interior because "formaldehyde [is] harmful to
some extent to a reasonably forseeble and appreciable percentage of users") (emphasis in
original) with Griggs v. Combe, Inc., 456 So. 2d 790, 793, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 446, 449 (Ala.
1984) (Plaintiff could not recover for severe reaction to benzocaine because the plaintiff
was "the only person who ha[d] suffered this kind of injury in the long history of use of
the drug in question.").
280 See Salcetti v. Tuck, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 679 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1979) (puppy sold with
distemper not fit for ordinary purpose); Welch v. Fitzgerald-Hicks Dodge, Inc., 121 N.H.
358, 430 A.2d 144, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 1336 (1981) (reversing directed verdict for defend-
ant because continuing "shimmy" in car could justify jury finding that car was not fit for
ordinary purpose); Perry v. Lawson Ford Tractor Co., 613 P.2d 458, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 75
(Okla. 1980) (frequent breakdown of combine rendered 'it unfit for ordinary purpose).
281 See, e.g., Global Truck & Equip. Co. v. Palmer Mach. Works, Inc., 628 F. Supp.
641, 649-50, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 1250, 1259 (N.D. Miss. 1986) (dumptruck that overturned
when used to haul clay not used for ordinary purpose because manufacturer could not
reasonably have foreseen that truck would be used for other than its intended purpose
of hauling washed rock); Allen v. Chance Mfg., 398 Mass. 32, 34, 494 N.E.2d 1324,
1326, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 1124, 1126 (1986) (in personal injury claim asserting a breach of
the implied warranty of merchantability plaintiff "must prove that at the time of his in-
jury he was using the product in a manner that the defendant.., reasonably could have
foreseen").
282 Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 487 (Ist Cir. 1980)
(deciding manufacturer did not need to design beer bottle to withstand deliberate mis-
use by throwing bottle against telephone pole); see also infra notes 295-302 and accompa-
nying text (related discussion of necessary warnings and labels).
283 "[P]rotection, under this aspect of the warranty; of the person buying for resale
to the ultimate consumer is equally necessary, and merchantable goods must therefore
be 'honestly' resalable in the normal course of business because they are what they pur-
port to be." U.C.C. § 2-314 comment 8.
284 173 Ga. App. 51, 325 S.E.2d 465, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 1668 (1984).
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of a handgun is self-protection as opposed to killing children. 28 5
The court refused to accept this characterization of a gun's ordinary
purpose, however, reasoning that a gun's purpose is to fire when the
trigger is pulled. 286 Because the gun in Rhodes had so fired, the
Court held that it was merchantable. 287
Plaintiffs have had some success in including in a product's or-
dinary purpose the notion that the product must function without
causing damage. For example, in Streich v. Hilton-Davis288 a buyer
purchased a potato-sprout suppressant designed to facilitate the
winter storage of seed potatoes. 289 Although the suppressant did
facilitate the storage of the buyer's seed potatoes by preventing
them from sprouting, "the seed potatoes treated with [the suppres-
sant] showed delayed and erratic emergence, multiple sprouting, a
heavy tuber set resulting in small potatoes, and reduced yield." 290
The defendant argued that the potato sprout suppressant had ful-
filled its ordinary purpose of preventing potato seeds from sprout-
ing, and that the altered growth pattern of the plaintiff's potatoes
was merely an unfortunate side effect.29 1 The court held for the
plaintiff, however, stating that "[s]urely goods are not merchanta-
ble, if in their ordinary use, the goods cause damage to the property
to which they are applied or harm to the person using them." 292
Arguably, the reasoning in Streich, if taken to its logical extreme,
would impose liability on the handgun merchant in Rhodes. The
handgun would be unfit for its ordinary purpose because its ordi-
nary use had caused the death of a child. Although we support the
result in Streich, its reasoning should not extend to cases such as
Rhodes because there is a difference between harm resulting from
improper use of a product and harm resulting from a malfunction-
ing product. Purchasers of guns and other goods intended to be
285 Id. at 51, 325 S.E.2d at 446, 40 U.C.C. Rep. at 1669.
286 Id. at 52, 325 S.E.2d at 467,40 U.C.G. Rep. at 1669-70 ("IT]he evidence showed
that the gun performed exactly as was expected: when the hammer was cocked and the
trigger was pulled, it fired.").
287 Id., 325 S.E.2d at 467, 40 U.G.C. Rep. at 1669-70; see also First Nat'l Bank v.
Regent Sports Corp., 619 F. Supp. 820, 42 U.G.G. Rep. 419 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (dart
thrown by child at infant merchantable because it did not malfunction and warnings
were given), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 803 F.2d 1431, 2 U.G.C. Rep. 2d 458 (7th Cir.
1986); Love v. Zales Corp., 689 S.W.2d 282, 284, 41 U.C.G. Rep. 69 (Tex. Ct. App.
1985) (affirming summary judgment for defendant in action to recover for breach of
warranty on shotgun used as murder weapon because "[t]here was nothing wrong with
the shotgun").
288 692 P.2d 440, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 109 (Mont. 1984).
289 Id. at 442, 40 U.G.C. Rep. at 109-10 ("The [sprout suppressant] is expected to
keep the treated seed potatoes from sprouting until after they are taken from storage,
aerated, and planted.").
290 Id., 40 U.C.C. Rep. at 110.
291 Id. at 448, 440 U.C.C. Rep. at 111.
292 Id., 440 U.C.C. Rep. at 111.
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hazardous should be aware of the danger inherent in the improper
use of the product, and should be responsible for any damage from
such misuse. By contrast, where, as in Streich, damage results from a
product's malfunction, the merchant should be held liable. In such a
case the buyer should be able to rely on the proper functioning of
the product.
d. Run of Even Kind, Quality, and Quantity. Subsection (2)(d)
provides that goods must "run, within the variations permitted by
the agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity within each unit
and among all units involved." This paragraph adds "precautionary
language... as a reminder of the frequent usages of trade which
permit substantial variations both with and without an allowance or
an obligation to replace the varying units." 293 The 1978 Special
Project noted that no reported cases raised the issue of uniform-
ity. 294 We have found no noteworthy cases since 1978.
e. Adequately Contained, Packaged, and Labeled. Subsection (2) (e)
requires that goods must be "adequately contained, packaged, and
labeled as the agreement may require" to be merchantable. "Ade-
quate packaging generally entails protection of the goods or per-
sons using the goods from harm." 295  Therefore, whether a
particular label or package is adequate will depend upon the charac-
teristics of the goods involved in the transaction.296 Inadequate
warnings may render a good unmerchantable. 297 For example, a
truck may be unmerchantable because of a failure to warn of the
danger resulting from underinflated tires when the truck is over-
loaded. 298 Similarly, a failure to warn of the risks attending the use
of prescription drugs can render the drugs unmerchantable. 299
Whether a buyer or seller knows of a product's potential dan-
293 U.C.C. § 2-314 comment 9.
294 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 81.
295 Id.; see also Shaffer v. Victoria Station, Inc., 91 Wash. 2d 295, 588 P.2d 233, 25
U.C.C. Rep. 427 (1978) (glass as wine container).
296 See U.C.C. § 2-314 comment 10; see also Special Project, supra note 1, at 82.
297 For a general discussion of the duty to warn, see Comment, The Duty to Warn
Within the Implied Warranty of Merchantability: Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 41 OMO ST.
L.J. 747 (1980).
298 Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Mass. App. 346, 376 N.E.2d 143, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 94
(1978).
299 See Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379, 380, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 440,
443 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (Holding that a manufacturer of prescription contraceptives has a
duty to warn users of risks and potential side effects because "oral contraceptives are
distinguished from other prescription drugs by the zealous marketing practices used by
... manufacturers."). Often drug manufacturers may fulfill their duty to warn by advis-
ing the prescribing physicians, not the public, of potential risks. Dunkin v. Syntex Labo-
ratories, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 304 (W.D. Tenn. 1977) (where a
prescription drug is sold by a drug manufacturer that has warned the medical commu-
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gers helps determine the necessity of a warning. The seller who
knows of a product's hazards can protect against harm by warning
the buyer. Indeed, it is likely that the buyer will have relied upon
the seller's superior knowledge and expertise for such warnings.
According to this analysis, the seller's failure to warn renders the
goods unsafe and therefore unmerchantable. Conversely, when a
buyer knows of the hazard he need not rely on the seller's warnings;
therefore, a warranty need not arise.300
Because the adequacy of warnings is a question of fact,30 ' the
cases in this area fail to produce clear criteria for determining how
explicit a warning must be. Therefore, sellers often must choose
between risking liability because they have provided inadequate
warnings and discouraging customers by providing excessive
warnings. 30 2
f. Conform to Representations on Container or Label. Subsection
(2)(f), the last of section 2-314's specified standards for
merchantability, requires that goods "conform to the promises or
affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any." This
standard applies "wherever there is a label or container on which
representations are made, even though the original contract, either
by express terms or usage of trade, may not have required either the
labelling or the representation."3 03 Courts tend to rely on this pro-
vision less frequently than on section 2-314's other standards due to
nity of specific risks associated with using the drug, the warranty of merchantability is
not breached where a particular user suffers the warned-of adverse side effects).
300 See Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552, 567, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 450,455
(W.D. Va. 1984) ("When a skilled purchaser... knows or reasonably should be ex-
pected to know of the dangerous propensities or characteristics of a product, no implied
warranty of merchantability arises.").
301 See Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476, 485, 253 S.E.2d 344, 350, 26
U.C.C. Rep. 20, 29 ("Whether the product in question, when viewed as a whole (includ-
ing contents, packaging, labeling and warnings) was merchantable is ajury question not
susceptible of summary adjudication."), cert. denied, 297 N.C. 612, 257 S.E.2d 219
(1979).
302 This dilemma is not solely the result of the U.C.G. provisions; general tort prin-
ciples may produce the same effect. Yet, the duty to warn under an implied warranty
does differ from the duty under tort law. See Bly v. Otis Elevator Co., 713 F.2d 1040,
1045, 36 U.G.C. Rep. 1569, 1576 (4th Cir. 1983) ("[The duty to warn under an implied
warranty theory focuses upon whether the lack of warning renders the product unrea-
sonably dangerous; in contrast, a manufacturer will be liable in negligence for a failure
to warn if its conduct is unreasonable.") (footnote omitted). Additionally, the implied
warranty duty to warn exists only at the time the good leaves the manufacturer, while
under tort principles the duty is continuous. Id. at 1046, 36 U.C.C. Rep. at 1577; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 301(2)(b) (1965).
303 U.C.C. § 2-314 comment 10. "This follows from the general obligation of good
faith which requires that a buyer should not be placed in the position of reselling or
using goods delivered under false representations appearing on the package or
container." Id.
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the overlap between it and section 2-313's express warranty.30 4'
When the product fails to meet the representations of its label, the
presence of the express warranty will often render the existence of
an implied warranty of merchantability irrelevant.305
The 1978 Special Project speculated that, under certain circum-
stances, conformity with label standards might "possess greater in-
dependent significance" than express warranties alone:30 6
"Suppose a farmer buys an insecticide to spray on his wheat crop.
He later notices a label on the package indicating fitness for corn as
well as wheat. Pleasantly surprised the farmer sprays his corn crop,
which promptly dies."30 7 Even though there may be no express
warranty,30 8 the implied warranty of merchantability could apply.
Although court decisions have not expressly adopted the 1978 Spe-
cial Project's contention that this standard of merchantability has
potentially independent significance,309 the theory still holds. In the
above example, the seller explicitly expressed his knowledge in the
form of the label specifications of insecticide use. The label con-
veyed to the buyer the seller's understanding of the unique qualities
of the good. The buyer justifiably relied on such representations.
Although such reliance does not justify finding an express warranty,
it represents a good example of reliance on an implied warranty.
B. The Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose-
Section 2-315
The Code provides for an implied warranty of fitness for a par-
ticular purpose:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to
know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and
that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select
or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified
under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be
fit for such purpose.310
304 See U.C.C. § 2-313; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
305 See supra notes 38-142 and accompanying text.
306 Special Project, supra note 1, at 83.
307 Id.
308 See supra notes 61-136 and accompanying text.
309 Apparently courts have not had the opportunity to address the issue. See Fisch-
bach & Moore Int'l Corp. v. Crane Barge R-14, 476 F. Supp. 282, 287, 27 U.C.C. Rep.
961, 968 (D. Md. 1979) ("The record reflects no warranty between plaintiffs and Gen-
eral Electric relating to the weight of the transformers other than that which may have
arisen as a result of the stencilling by General Electric of weight information on the side
of the various units. Where an affirmation of fact is made on a product or its container,
an implied warranty arises that the product will conform to the representations."), aff'd,
632 F.2d 1123, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 1165 (4th Cir. 1980).
310 U.C.C. § 2-315.
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The commentary to this provision notes:
A "particular purpose" differs from the ordinary purpose for
which the goods are used in that it envisages a specific use by the
buyer which is peculiar to the nature of his business whereas the
ordinary purposes for which goods are used are those envisaged
in the concept of merchantability and go to uses which are cus-
tomarily made of the goods in question. 31'
Courts have characterized this distinction in various ways.
In section 2-315, the relationship between the warranty and the
presence of reliance and knowledge is particularly apparent. Ac-
cording to Professors White and Summers, there are three prerequi-
sites to imposition of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose. Notably, all three relate directly either to the seller's
knowledge of the buyer's purpose or to the buyer's reliance on the
sellers knowledge:
(1) The seller must have reason to know the buyer's particular
purpose.
(2) The seller must have reason to know that the buyer is relying
on the seller's skill or judgment to furnish appropriate goods.
(3) The buyer must, in fact, rely upon the seller's skill or
judgment.3 12
1. Seller's Knowledge of Buyer's Purpose
Where the buyer has explicitly informed the seller of the partic-
ular purpose for which the buyer requires the goods, it is clear that
the seller had "reason to know" of the buyer's particular pur-
pose . 13 When the seller reasonably should know about reliance or
purpose, such knowledge will be imputed to him, regardless of
whether he actually does have such knowledge.3 14
The commentary to section 2-315 explains:
Under this section the buyer need not bring home to the seller
actual knowledge of the particular purpose for which the goods
are intended or of his reliance on the seller's skill and judgment, if
the circumstances are such that the seller has reason to realize the
311 Id. comment 2. Courts have characterized this distinction in various ways. See,
e.g., Agristor Leasing v. Meuli, 634 F. Supp. 1208, 1220, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 1102, 1112,
(D. Kan. 1986) ("particular purpose . . . means an unusual, nonordinary purpose");
Perry v. Rockwell Graphics Sys., Inc., 42 U.C.C. Rep. 409 (D. Mass. 1985) (no fitness
warranty when use not "special").
312 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 9-9, at 358 (footnote omitted).
313 See, e.g., AFA Corp. v. Phoenix Closures, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 224, 30 U.C.C. Rep.
81 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (manufacturer of bottle caps told liner supplier how bottle cap liners
were to be used). We do not here consider the various proof problems which could
arise from oral exchanges.
314 See, e.g., Cohen v. Hathaway, 595 F. Supp. 579, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 857 (D. Mass.
1984) (seller had reason to know of buyer's intended use for boat).
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purpose intended or that the reliance exists. 3 15
The seller will only be presumed to have knowledge of the particu-
lar purpose when such a presumption is reasonable under the cir-
cumstances.3 16 For instance, a seller was not presumed to have
knowledge of the buyer's need for a fireproof baseball jacket that
would not ignite when doused with petroleum. 31 7 Similarly, no im-
plied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose attached when a
buyer provided product specifications to the seller without inform-
ing the seller of the product's intended use.318 In the extreme case,
where the buyer refuses to disclose his particular purpose to the
seller, the argument for the imposition of implied warranties cer-
tainly fails.3 19 On the whole, using common sense in the application
of the knowledge-of-purpose and reason-to-know requirements for
the imposition of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose seems to be the rule, which we endorse wholeheartedly.
2. Reliance
The buyer's reliance in fact and the seller's reason to know of
this reliance are related elements of the implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose. 320 To determine whether the buyer relied
on the seller to provide suitable goods, courts often examine the
comparative expertise of the buyer .and seller.3 2 1 Although the
315 U.C.C. § 2-315 comment 1.
316 See, e.g., Hiskey v. City of Seattle, 44 Wash. App. 110, 720 P.2d 867, 1 U.C.C.
Rep. 2d 1127 (no implied warranty arose when buyer specified the thickness of rigging
cable without explaining purpose to seller), review denied, 107 Wash. 2d 1001 (1986);
Global Truck & Equip. Co. v. Palmer Mach. Works, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 641, 42 U.C.C.
Rep. 1250 (N.D. Miss. 1986) (defendant did not breach section 2-315 when buyer used
product for purpose other that that which defendant had been told).
317 Keirs v. Weber Nat'l Stores, 352 Pa. Super 111, 507 A.2d 406, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d
387 (1986).
318 See, e.g., Hiskey, 44 Wash. App. 110, 720 P.2d 867, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 1127 (no
warranty when leasee specified thickness of rigging cable without informing lessor of his
intent to use cable to hoist ten-ton truss.); cf infra note 326 and accompanying text.
319 See, e.g., Standard Structural Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 597 F. Supp.
164, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 1245 (D. Conn. 1984) (no implied warranty for particular purpose
arises when buyer refuses to disclose purpose of component part because of secret
design).
320 In 1978 we suggested that these two elements "are two sides of an evidentiary
coin." Special Project, supra note 1, at 89. "At trial, the buyer will introduce circum-
stances of the transaction to convince the court and jury that he actually relied upon the
seller; the same circumstances probably gave the seller reason to know of the buyer's
reliance." Id.; see also Medcom, Inc. v. C. Arthur Weaver Co., 232 Va. 80, 343 S.E.2d
243, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 126 (1986) (allowing buyer to present evidence of its reliance in
fact and of seller's knowledge of buyer's reliance).
321 Special Project, supra note 1, at 92; see Dotts v. Bennett, 382 N.W.2d 85, 42
U.C.C. Rep. 1273 (Iowa 1986) (buyer who was lifetime farmer did not rely on expertise
of merchant-farmer); All-States Leasing Co. v. Ochs, 42 Or. App. 319, 600 P.2d 899, 27
U.C.C. Rep. 808 (1979) (doctor leased computer based on his own prior knowledge
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buyer must have actually relied on the seller, courts often exhibit a
willingness to find the buyer's reliance by inference. 322
Skelton v. Druid City Hospital Board323 provides an example of a
buyer's inferred reliance on the seller. Patients, especially uncon-
scious ones during surgery, must rely on the skill and expertise of
the seller. Hospitals foster this reliance by holding themselves out
to the public as having special knowledge regarding the provision of
medical services, and therefore are necessarily cognizant of the
buyer's reliance. 324 Accordingly, hospitals implicitly warrant that
they will furnish patients with goods for use in the provision of med-
ical services that are fit for the intended purpose of medical care,
giving rise to an implied warranty of fitness for the particular
purpose.325
Several factors may lead a factfinder to conclude that a buyer
did not actually rely on the seller. For example, when a buyer pro-
vides product specifications to the seller, the factfinder may con-
clude that buyer reliance is lacking, thus preventing the creation of
the implied warranty of fitness. 326 A buyer's examination of the
goods3 2 7 and his knowledge and expertise in the area328 also serve
from lessor who had no expertise in the field). Leased goods may be covered by section
2-315 as well as section 2-314. See Knox v. North Am. Car Corp., 80 Ill. App. 3d 683,
399 N.E.2d 1355, 28 U.C.C. 336 (1980) (lease with certain repair provisions).
322 But see Khan v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 711 S.W.2d 310, 319, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d
1114 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (suggesting reliance not necessary element of breach of war-
ranty claim under section 2-315 because section 2-315 is alternative to strict liability in
tort).
323 459 So. 2d 818, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 369 (Ala. 1984); see supra notes 224-31 and ac-
companying text.
324 459 So. 2d at 823, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 376; see also Knox v. North Am. Car Corp.,
80 Ill. App. 3d 683, 399 N.E.2d 1355, 1359, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 336, 342 (1980) (Where
lease arrangement placed duties of maintenance and repair upon the lessor, plaintiff-
lessee, "even more so than in a sale situation[,] relied upon [lessor's] undertaking to
provide a boxcar which was safe and suitable for the purpose contemplated by the par-
ties to the lease. Such an undertaking on the part of the defendant lessor gives rise to a
contractual implied warranty of fitness analogous to that applicable under § 2-315.").
325 459 So. 2d at 823, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 377.
326 See, e.g., Shell v. Union Oil Co., 489 So. 2d 569, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 692 (Ala. 1986)
(plaintiff's employer set specifications for product containing a carcinogen); Keith v.
Buchanan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 386 (1985) (no
reliance on seller where buyer of sailing yacht had extensive experience with sailboats,
provided specifications to seller, examined many vessels, surveyed advertisements, and
received much advice from experienced friends); Hiskey v. City of Seattle, 44 Wash.
App. 110, 720 P.2d 867, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 1127, review denied, 107 Wash. 2d 1001 (1986)
(no reliance where buyer specified thickness of leased rigging cable without explaining
intended purpose to seller).
Only precise specifications suffice to extinguish buyer reliance. See, e.g., Global
Truck and Equip. Co. v. Palmer Mach. Works, 628 F. Supp. 641, 650, 42 U.C.C. Rep.
1250, 1260 (N.D. Miss. 1986) (truck specifications too general to defeat warranty of
fitness; warranty failed on other grounds).
327 See U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 8; see also Henry Heide, Inc. v. WRH Prods. Co., 766
F.2d 105,41 U.C.C. Rep. 419 (3d Cir. 1985) (any implied warranties on plastic tray used
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to defeat a finding of reliance. Finally, misuse of the product may
prevent application of the implied warranty of fitness. 329
3. Overlap with Other Warranties
The implied warranties of the Code at times overlap with each
other330 and with the other Article Two warranties. 331 As we stated
in candy making waived by buyers having tested samples where defect would surface
during reasonable testing).
328 See supra notes 195 & 321 and accompanying text; cf Dunkin v. Syntex Labs, 443
F. Supp. 121, 126, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 304, 308 (W.D. Tenn. 1977) ("A similar analysis [to
that used in the implied warranty of merchantability discussion] leads to the same con-
clusion as to the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Where a drug
manufacturer sells a drug designed for a specific purpose ... and warns the medical
profession of possible side effects in some users, the warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose is not breached where one of those side effects occurs.").
329 Global Truck & Equip. Co., 628 F. Supp. at 651, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 1260 ("[Iun
designing the product, Palmer had a right to rely on Global's assertion that the trailers
were to be used to haul washed rock .... [As the trailers were not used for that pur-
pose,] the court [held] that any breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose was the result of the ultimate purchaser's use of the product for other than the
stated particular purpose and that allowing recovery under section [] 2-315 would be
improper."); see also Keirs v. Weber Nat'l Stores, 352 Pa. Super. 111, 507 A.2d 406, 1
U.C.C. Rep. 2d 387 (1986) (dousing baseball jacket in petroleum deemed "abnormal"
use).
330 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 95. Comment 2 to section 2-315 acknowl-
edges that a contract may give rise to more than one warranty: "A contact may of course
include both a warranty of merchantability and one of fitness for a particular purpose."
But see Agristor Leasing v. Meuli, 634 F. Supp. 1208, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 1102 (D. Kan.
1986) (distinguishing between ordinary and particular purposes); supra note 311 and
accompanying text.
331 See Lupa v. Jock's, 131 Misc. 2d 536, 500 N.Y.S.2d 962, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 724
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1986) (existence of manufacturer's express warranty over refrigerator did
not displace local merchant's implied warranty of merchantability).
In addition to those fact patterns where multiple warranties theoretically apply,
plaintiffs may simply claim that the various warranties all apply to the facts. A current
case in point, as evidenced by the complaint:
Deborah Jean Surber, a Little Rock lass
(A devoted chocolate addict, alas)
Trotted down to her friendly Alco store
Her Hershey supply to restore.
Now Hershey's, a company in Pennsylvania
Sells candy worldwide (even in Transylvania)
And way down south in Ar-Kansas
(In the Alco Stores, headquartered in Kansas)
There wiggled on the shelves some Hershey's candy.
Deborah shrieked in horror and practically fainted
She had no idea that the candy was tainted
After all, there were the company guarantees
Of expressed and implied merchantabilities
And offitness for the particular purpose
To-wit, to eat it, for which she'd purchased it.
But somehow Hershey in stirring this batch
(Or maybe it was Alco on its shelves, alas)
Thought ghosts and goblins were not sufficient
On this Halloween they would be negligent
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in 1978, "several decisions implicitly condone the merging of the
two warranties."3 32 The overlap occurs where courts find a breach
of the implied warranty of a particular purpose and the intended
purpose is one of ordinary use.333 As we proposed in 1978, this
overlap often suits the policies of the Code.
The policies underlying the fitness warranty apply regardless
of the buyer's purpose for the goods. Aware of the buyer's pur-
pose and reliance, the seller selecting the goods tacitly represents
their particular suitability. Such a tacit representation may exist
even where the buyer's purpose happens to be ordinary. More-
over, the presence of the fitness elements often suggests a dispar-
ity of bargaining power. Section 2-315 seeks to relieve buyers
from the oppression such disparity might engender. The pres-
ence of bargaining disparity does not depend upon the nature of
the buyer's purpose for the goods. Hence to advance fully the
policies underlying the implied warranty of fitness, courts should
not require that the aggrieved buyer's purpose be other than
ordinary. 334
This is not to say that the separate warranties do not have their indi-
vidual uses. We believe, however, that when the seller is aware of
the buyer's specific purpose for the good, whether it be ordinary or
unusual, the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
should apply, assuming that the reliance requirement has been satis-
fied. When the seller does not possess, nor has reason to possess,
knowledge of the buyer's purpose, the standards of the implied war-
ranty of merchantability should suffice. We believe it is no more
difficult to apply more than one kind of warranty to a particular
transaction than it is to apply more than one standard of
merchantability to a single transaction. We continue to advocate
such a move as consistent with the underlying policies of the Code
and recommend that it be followed.
C. Supplemental Implied Warranties-Section 2-314(3)
Section 2-314(3) provides: "Unless excluded or modified ...
By adding all those squirming worms and maggots
(Well-maybe not so many, just a few to gag us.)
Jackson, Pulaski Circuit Court Complaint, reprinted in Stop Him Before He Rhymes Again,
Arkansas Gazette, Nov. 3, 1986, at 12A, col. 1 (emphasis added).
332 Special Project, supra note 1, at 96.
333 See Streich v. Hilton-Davies, 692 P.2d 440, 448, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 109, 112 (Mont.
1984) (Sprout suppressant used for its ordinary purpose of suppressing sprouts
breached the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose; because the seller
knew of the particular, though ordinary, purpose, the buyer had "brought himself within
the statutory language with respect to implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose... for which the goods [were] required.").
334 Special Project, supra note 1, at 99-100 (footnotes omitted).
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other implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage
of trade. '335 Comment 12 to section 2-314 explains that the pur-
pose of "[s]ubsection (3) is to make explicit that usage of trade and
course of dealing can create warranties and that they are implied
rather than express warranties. '3 3 6
The effect of the supplemental course-of-dealing or usage-of-
trade warranty has been minimal at best.33 7 As before, buyers sel-
dom attempt to use this warranty.3 38 In 1978, we suggested that at
least four reasons why this is so:
1. "[T]here may be no relevant course of dealing or usage of
trade to create a supplemental warranty." '33 9
2. The buyer's case falls easily within one of the other warran-
ties, and therefore he "need not resort" to supplemental
warranties.340
3. "IT]he seller may have effectively disclaimed all implied war-
ranties under section 2-316(3)."341
4. The buyer may have "confuse[d] this genus of implied war-
ranty with the implied warranty of merchantability because of
their shared location in section 2-314."'342
In spite of this neglect, a section 2-314(3) warranty could serve a
plaintiff as a last resort when all else has failed.
D. Conclusions
Over the years, the implied warranties codified in sections 2-
314 and 2-315 of the Code have become fixtures in our commercial
environment. A developing conception of reliance on the part of
the buyer, coupled with the knowledge of the seller, can reasonably
determine whether application of the implied warranties in a partic-
ular situation serves the underlying policy of reasonable protection,
and therefore determine when and where these warranties should
apply.
335 U.C.C. § 2-314(3).
336 Id. § 2-314 comment 12.
337 See id. at 102.
338 "[E]ither because litigation have failed to raise independent warranties or be-
cause courts have failed to address them, very few cases are to be found which discuss
implied warranties actually created by dealing or usage." Lord, Some Thoughts About War-
ranty Law: Express and Implied Warranties, 56 N.D.L. REv. 509-572-73 (1980).
339 Special Project, supra note 1, at 102.
340 Id.
341 Id
342 Id.
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IV
DAMAGES
After the buyer has satisfied sections 2-313 through 2-315, has
met the requirements of privity and notice,343 and has avoided any
exclusions and limitations 344 erected by the seller, he must prove
damages. The Code spells out four general principles for measur-
ing damages:
(1) The court should attempt to place the aggrieved party in
the same position as performance would have placed him. 345
(2) The court should require the parties to mitigate damages
where possible.346
(3) The court, where consistent with public and statutory
policies, should respect the intentions of the parties.3
47
(4) Common sense, commercial practicality and Code poli-
cies should guide the court.348
The buyer's damages fall into two categories: primary and re-
sultant.349 A buyer suffers primary damages to the extent that the
goods he receives are not as promised. Any other damages that the
buyer suffers are resultant damages, including property damages,
343 See infra notes 901-44 & 945-80 and accompanying text.
344 See infra notes 367-77 and accompanying text.
345 The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the
end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the
other party had fully performed but neither consequential or special nor
penal damages may be had except as specifically provided in this Act or
by other rule of law.
U.C.C. § 1-106(1).
346 "[T]he Act ... makes it clear that damages must be minimized." Id. § 1-106
comment 1; see id. § 1-203 (obligation of good faith in performance and enforcement);
id. § 2-706(1) (seller's remedy of resale when buyer breaches); id. § 2-712(2) (formula
for damages when buyer covers after seller's breach).
347 See id. § 1-102(2) ("[u]nderlying purposes and policies of this Act are.., to per-
mit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agree-
ment of the parties").
348 (1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its un-
derlying purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions ....
Id. § 1-102.
It is intended to make it possible for the law embodied in this Act to be
developed by the courts in the light of unforeseen and new circumstances
and practices.
The Act should be construed in accordance with its underlying pur-
poses and policies. The text of each section should be read in the light of
... the Act as a whole, and.., should be construed narrowly or broadly,
as the case may be, in conformity with the purposes and policies involved.
Id. comment 1.
349 We have chosen these terms to avoid confusing our analysis with the common-
law concepts of "direct" and "special" damages, which the Code rejects.
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personal injuries, lost profits, and the like. Section 2-714(3) allows
recovery for resultant damages "in a proper case," as determined
under section 2-715.35o
A. Primary Damages-Section 2-714(2)
Section 2-714(2) provides a formula for measuring primary
damages in warranty cases where the buyer has accepted and re-
tained nonconforming goods:
The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference
at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the
goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had
been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate
damages of a different amount.351
Courts often use either the cost of repair or independent indicia of
value to determine the difference between the value of the goods as
warranted and as delivered.
1. Cost of Repair
An easy and often accurate shortcut to measuring the difference
between the value of goods as warranted and as received is the cost
of repair. Courts often use cost of repair as the measure of primary
damages in cases in which the goods can be brought into conformity
with their warranties at a reasonable cost.3 52 The use of the cost of
repair measure is constrained by the requirements of section 2-
714(2) which sets the proper recovery amount at the difference be-
tween the value of the defective goods as accepted and the value of
350 See infra note 403 and accompanying text.
351 Id. § 2-714(2).
352 See, e.g., Custom Automated Mach. v. Penda Corp., 537 F. Supp. 77, 84 (N.D. Il.
1982) (difference in value between goods as accepted and as warranted equaled cost of
repairs); Industrial Graphics, Inc. v. Asahi Corp., 485 F. Supp. 793, 802 (D. Minn. 1980)
(if repairs will restore CB radios to their warranted value, cost of repairs is a reliable
measure of damages for breach of implied warranty of merchantability); Bendix Home
Sys., Inc. v.Jessop, 644 P.2d 843, 847, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 1686, 1692 (Alaska 1982) (absent
evidence of actual value of defective mobile home, only basis for awarding damages is
cost of repairing home so that it will conform to warranties of sale); Midland Supply Co.
v. Ehret Plumbing & Heating Co., 108 Ill. App. 3d 1120, 1126, 440 N.E.2d 153, 157
(1982) (practical measure of damages in determining difference between actual and war-
ranted value of boilers for heating system is cost of repairing goods to quality war-
ranted); Crest Container Corp. v. R.H. Bishop Co., 111 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 1075, 445
N.E.2d 19, 25 (1982) (useful objective measurement of difference between value of
goods accepted and value they would have had if they had been as warranted is cost of
repair or replacement); Vista St. Clair, Inc. v. Landry's Commercial Furnishings, Inc., 57
Or. App. 254, 258, 643 P.2d 1378, 1380 (1982) (useful objective measure of difference
in value "as is" and value as warranted is cost of repair or replacement); Cundy v. Inter-
national Trencher Serv., Inc., 358 N.W. 2d 233, 240 (S.D. 1984) (where repairable,
proper measure of damages for breach of warranty for sale of trenching machine should
be based on cost of repair).
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the goods as warranted.353 Therefore, if the cost of repair exceeds
the value of the goods as warranted,3 54 repair costs could not repre-
sent the proper recovery amount.
Nevertheless, in Continental Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. K & K Sand &
Gravel, Inc.3 55 the court allowed the buyer of defective construction
equipment to recover the cost of repairing the equipment even
though it exceeded the purchase price. The court found this result
logical because capping damages at the purchase price "would
clearly deprive the purchaser of the benefit of its bargain in cases in
which the value of the goods as warranted exceeds that price."3 56
Other courts adhere strictly to the theory that limits the buyer's re-
covery to the purchase price.35 7
Continental Sand adopts the better approach. Assume the seller
has promised the buyer functioning goods. Presumably, if the seller
could acquire goods in "as warranted" condition for less than the
cost of repairing the defective goods, he would do so. Because he
does not, the court must presume that the market value of the goods
as warranted is greater than both the cost of repair and the original
purchase price. In other words, contract price and value as war-
ranted are not always equivalent.358 A difference between the con-
tract price and the value as warranted is often attributable to section
2-714(2)'s requirement that courts measure the value as warranted
on the date of acceptance of the goods rather than on the contract
date.3 59
Normally, a buyer seeking repair costs does not need to pro-
duce additional evidence that the same figure would result from
subtracting the value as received from the value as warranted. Such
a requirement would defeat -the purpose of using the cost of repair
353 Section 2-714 "deals with the remedies available to the buyer after the goods
have been accepted and the time for revocation of acceptance has gone by." U.C.C. § 2-
714 comment 1.
354 Usually the purchase price. See infra notes 370-72 and accompanying text.
355 755 F.2d 87, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 387 (7th Cir. 1985).
356 Id. at 91-92, 40 U.C.C. Rep. at 393; cf American Elec. Power Co. v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435, 454 & n.34, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1009, 1025 & n.34
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (replacement of defective parts may be recoverable if reasonable be-
cause direct damages not limited to measure set forth in section 2-714(2)).
357 See, e.g., Richardson v. Car Lot Co., 10 Ohio Misc. 2d 32, 462 N.E.2d 459, 462
(Mun. Ct. 1983) (difference in market value of automobile as warranted and its value due
to defects can be proven by establishing reasonable cost of repairs as long as this cost is
less than warranted market value); Neuman v. Spector Wrecking & Salvage Co., 490
S.W.2d 875, 878, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 254, 257 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (buyer denied full
recovery for repairs to defective truck scale where repair cost exceeded purchase price).
358 See Hill v. BASF Wayandotte Corp., 280 S.C. 174, 177-78, 311 S.E.2d 734, 736
(1984) (appropriate damages in breach-of-warranty case involving defective herbicide
was value crop would have had if herbicide had worked minus value of crop actually
produced).
359 See infra notes 370-72 and accompanying text.
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as a practical shortcut to calculating the difference in value under
section 2-714(2). Courts should presume that the cost of repair ac-
curately represents the buyer's primary damages unless the seller
presents evidence to the contrary.3 60
Repairs to bring the goods into conformity with the contract
also might improve or extend the life of the goods beyond what was
originally warranted. In such a situation, the buyer will receive a
windfall. For example, in Cundy v. International Trencher Service361 the
buyer of a trenching machine was able to use the trencher, despite
its defects, for almost two years before the seller finally paid for re-
pairs. The repairs included installation of a new front axle and a
total cleaning of the machine costing over $15,000.362 The court
did not subtract the value of the buyer's use before repair;363 thus,
the buyer may have obtained the benefit of almost two years' free
wear and tear at the seller's expense.
The more logical approach is to allocate the cost of improve-
ment in value to the buyer.364 A Texas court, in Neuman v. Spector
Wrecking & Salvage Co., 3 65 reversed a jury award of the estimated re-
pair cost of a used truck scale where repairs included new parts and
cost more than the purchase price of the used scales. The court
reasoned that the buyer "purchased an old used scale . . . and his
recovery is for the cost of a new scale."'366 A court should make an
aggrieved buyer whole, but should not give him a windfall in the
form of greater efficiency or longer life at the seller's expense. 36 7
2. Independent Indicia of Value
Sometimes defective goods cannot be repaired or the cost of
repair is an inappropriate measure of the buyer's primary dam-
ages.3 68 In these situations, the buyer must independently prove
"the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had
if they had been as warranted."36 9
360 Not all courts accept cost of repair as a practical measure of the difference be-
tween value as received and value as warranted. See, e.g., Simmons v. Simpson, 626
S.W.2d 315, 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (cost of repairing defective van not proper mea-
sure of damages in breach-of-warranty case).
361 358 N.W.2d 233 (S.D. 1984).
362 Id at 236.
363 See id. at 240 (damages based solely upon repair cost without deduction).
364 The court should place the buyer in as good a position as if the seller had fully
performed but no better.
365 490 S.W.2d 875, 12 U.C.G. Rep. 254 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
366 Id. at 878, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 257.
367 For a more detailed look at the cases in this area, see Special Project, supra note
1, at 111-12. Our research has uncovered no new cases dealing with this particular issue
since 1978.
368 See supra notes 352-367 and accompanying text.
369 U.C.C. § 2-714(2). Because the plaintiffhas the burden of proving and pleading
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a. Value as Warranted. Section 2-714(2) fails to define "value as
warranted." Courts should attempt to ascertain the fair market
value of the goods as warranted3 70 rather than use the purchase
price as an estimate of value.37 1 The Code requires that courts mea-
sure the difference in value at the time of acceptance.3 72 The
purchase price, if it represents value at all, measures value at the
time of contract, not at the time of delivery. For example, assume a
buyer agrees on January 1 to take delivery of 100 direct-drive turn-
tables on June 1 for $200 each. On June 1, however, a direct-drive
turntable is only worth $100 because compact disc players are mak-
ing turntables obsolete. Additionally, the seller supplies turntables
that are not direct drive, but are belt driven and therefore are worth
only $75. Upon discovering this defect, the buyer sues the seller for
breach of warranty. A court that accepts the purchase price as prima
facie evidence of value will award the buyer $12,500, which includes
the buyer's $10,000 loss due to the rapidly improving technology of
compact disc players. Alternatively, a court using fair market value
at the time of acceptance of the goods would award the buyer only
the $2,500 difference in value between direct- and belt-driven
turntables.
damages, the buyer will not recover if he cannot prove to the court's satisfaction the
"value" of the goods as warranted and as accepted. See Chrysler Corp. v. Marinari, 177
Ga. App. 304, 306-07, 339 8.E.2d 343, 345-46, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 1310, 1311-12 (1985)
(buyer denied damages because he failed to establish value of defective van at time and
place of delivery), cert. denied (Ga.Jan. 17, 1986); Settell's, Inc. v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 209
Neb. 26, 30, 305 N.W.2d 896, 898-99 (1981) (affirming directed verdict for seller be-
cause buyer failed to offer "even a scintilla of evidence" of the value of defective good);
Ellison v. Heritage Dodge, Inc., 283 S.C. 21, 26, 320 S.E.2d 716, 718-19 (1984) (af-
firming summary judgment for seller because buyer failed to establish value of van in its
defective state).
370 Courts have defined "fair market value" as "the price at which property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any com-
pulsion to buy or sell." Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27, 32 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 918 (1960); see also Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365,
1379, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 1181, 1195 (8th Cir. 1977) (value is highest price product would
have sold for on open market if neither party is forced to deal).
371 Many courts use the purchase price as the value of the goods as warranted. See,
e.g., Marinari, 177 Ga. App. at 306, 339 S.E.2d at 345, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 1311 (purchase
price of van sufficient evidence of value of goods as warranted); Schatz Distrib. Co. v.
Olivetti Corp. of Am., 7 Kan. App. 2d 676, 681, 647 P.2d 820, 825, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 578,
581 (1982) (court presumes that the purchase price is value of computer as warranted);
Warren v. Guttanit, Inc., 69 N.C. App. 103, 112-13, 317 S.E.2d 5, 12 (1984) (purchase
price is strong proof of value as warranted); Ellison v. Heritage Dodge, Inc., 283 S.C. 21,
24, 320 S.E.2d 716, 718 (1984) (accepting purchase price of automobile as proof of
value of car as warranted); Long v. Quality Mobile Home Brokers, Inc., 271 S.C. 482,
484, 248 S.E.2d 311, 312, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 470, 471 (1978) ("the cash price paid for
goods is prima facie the value of the goods as warranted"); Lone Star Ford, Inc. v. Mc-
Glashan, 681 S.W.2d 720, 725 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (in absence of other proof sales
price is sufficient evidence of value of automobile as warranted).
372 U.C.C. § 2-714(2).
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The buyer, as well as the seller, keeps the benefit of a good
bargain when the court uses fair market value. In our example, if
protective trade legislation causes a shortage of turntables driving
the price up to $300 each, the buyer's primary damages could well
exceed the agreed upon purchase price of the goods.
b. Value as Accepted. Fair market value also provides the best
measure of the value of defective goods as accepted. The fair market
value of defective goods, however, is often more difficult to measure
than the fair market value of the goods as warranted. Thus, some
courts use the resale price of the defective goods as an approxima-
tion of the fair market value at the time of acceptance.373
Three criteria determine the appropriateness of using the re-
sale measure. First, the buyer must resell the goods in a reasonable
market.3 74 Standardized goods freely traded in a commercial mar-
ket will usually meet this test.3 75 Second, if the goods are perishable
or for some other reason their value fluctuates over time, the sale
must be timely. A buyer who waits one month before selling defec-
tive fresh vegetables cannot use the resale price of the vegetables as
their value at the time of acceptance.3 76 Third, the resale purchaser
must know of the defects because the price obtained on resale will
accurately reflect the goods' actual value only if the resale purchaser
knows of the defects.3 77
3. Special Circumstances
Section 2-714(2) allows courts to dispense with the prescribed
difference-in-value assessment of damages if "special circum-
stances" exist which "show proximate damages of a different
amount. 378 The Code fails to define the meaning or scope of "spe-
cial circumstances"; therefore, courts must determine the term's
meaning and scope.379 The 1978 Special Project addressed four
ways that courts interpret the "special circumstances" clause: (1) to
373 See infra notes 374-77 and accompanying text.
374 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 115.
375 Id.
376 See Th. Van HuiJstee, N.V. v. Faehndrich, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 598, 601, 603-04 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1972) (buyer waiting over one month to resell defectively marked eggs cannot
use the price received as value at time of acceptance). Nevertheless, when the resale
price is the best evidence available, some courts will use it as evidence of value. See
Lackawanna Leather Co. v. Martin & Stewart, Ltd., 730 F.2d 1197, 1203 (8th Cir. 1984)
(accepting resale price of defective cattle hides as value of defective goods when ac-
cepted even though goods were resold four months after acceptance when price of cattle
hides may have been inflated).
377 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 116.
378 U.C.C. § 2-714(2).
379 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 117.
19871 1225
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
award resultant damages; (2) to enter into the broader language of
section 2-714(1); (3) to allow a buyer's subjective valuation of dam-
ages; and (4) to shift the time frame used to measure damages.380
Building on the approach of the 1978 Special Project, we will define
the scope of the "special circumstances" clause and discuss the
events that allow courts to bypass the difference-in-value formula.
a. Resultant Damages. Most courts no longer use the "special
circumstances" provision to award resultant damages to an injured
buyer.381 Courts that still permit the buyer to recover resultant
damages under section 2-714(2) are evidently confused by the sec-
tion's general language. 382 By awarding resultant damages under
the "special circumstances" clause, these courts render sections 2-
714(3) and 2-715 superfluous. 383 For example, section 2-715's spe-
cific requirements for recovering resultant damages are moot if the
buyer can recover these damages under "special circumstances."
b. Entry into Section 2-714(1). Some courts construe the "spe-
cial circumstances" clause to allow the buyer to recover damages
under the expansive language of section 2-714(1).384 That section
provides that the buyer "may recover as damages ... the loss result-
ing in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as de-
termined in any manner which is reasonable. ' 3 8 5 The 1978 Special
Project found that courts generally apply section 2-714(1) to award
"fair" damages when faced with complex fact patterns that make as-
certaining actual damages difficult.386 The danger of applying sec-
tion 2-714(1) to assess damages is that courts will confuse primary
and resultant damages. If courts thoughtfully applied section 2-
714(2)'s difference-in-value formula in conjunction with section 2-
715, then they would avoid this danger and buyers would recover
380 Id. at 117-28.
381 For a complete discussion of resultant damages, see infra notes 401-571 and ac-
companying text.
382 See, e.g., Jeanneret v. Vichey, 541 F. Supp. 80, 86, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 56, 64-65
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (buyer allowed to recover resultant damages of $188,000 due to in-
curred interest charges and lost business income); In re Barney Schogel, Inc., 34 U.G.C.
Rep. 29, 48 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (buyer recovered replacement costs in excess of
product's value as warranted due to special circumstances arising from seller's failure to
make necessary repairs); Mountaineer Contractors, Inc. v. Mountain State Mack, Inc.,
268 S.E.2d 886, 893, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 134, 144 (W. Va. 1980) (allowing buyer to recover
repair costs plus loss of equipment's use).
383 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 117-18.
384 See, e.g., Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 311 S.E.2d 734, 736, 38 U.C.C. Rep.
1254, 1256 (S.C. 1984) (special circumstances exist when court cannot ascertain war-
ranted or accepted value of goods).
385 U.C.C. § 2-714(1).
386 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 119.
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adequate compensation for their losses.3 7
c. Subjective Valuation. Under a subjective standard, a buyer re-
ceives the goods' value as warranted less the goods' current value to
him. This value can either be higher or lower than the defective
goods' market value. In contrast, under an objective standard a
buyer recovers the value of the good as warranted less the market
value of the defective product.388
Professors White and Summers suggest that "special circum-
stances" exist when "the value of the goods to the particular buyer
[are not] the same as their value to a class of buyers in general," and
that courts should apply a subjective standard to determine dam-
ages in these cases.38 9 Courts should award damages based on a
subjective measure only if an objective measure would overcompen-
sate the buyer.390 "[C]ourts should recognize a presumption in
favor of the objective standard."391 This presumption would force
the seller to prove a higher subjective value before a court would
award damages based on the subjective measure.
As an illustration, suppose a buyer purchases a mobile home for
$16,900 and discovers soon after delivery that the roof leaks.3 92 Af-
ter living in the home and attempting repairs, the buyer moves out
and sues the seller for damages. The buyer estimates that the home
has zero value. Suppose the seller objectively establishes that the
mobile home has a salvage value of $5,000. If the court awards sub-
jective damages, then the buyer will recover $16,900, because the
value of the home to the buyer is zero and the value as warranted is
the purchase price. The buyer, however, can still sell the home for
its market value of $5,000 and receive a windfall. Thus, a court, in
order to avoid overcompensating the buyer for his loss, should only
award objective damages of $11,900. The buyer can then sell the
home and recover its market value.
Suppose, however, that the buyer values the mobile home at
more than the market price (assume $10,000). If the court awards
objective damages, then the buyer will receive $11,900 (warranted
value less market value) and a windfall in overall value received (his
subjective value of $10,000 plus the award of$11,900). For this rea-
387 Id. at 119 n.372.
388 J. WHrrIE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 10-2, at 382-83.
389 The "special circumstances" clause allows courts to calculate market value of the
defective goods at the time the buyer discovers the defect. This interpretation shifts the
time frame of § 2-714(2), which ordinarily requires valuation at the time the buyer ac-
cepts the goods. See infra notes 394-400 and accompanying text.
390 Professors White and Summers state that section 1-106 suggests this same result.
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 10-2, at 382.
391 Special Project, supra note 1, at 122.
392 See Vreeman v. Davis, 348 N.W.2d 756, 38 U.C.C. Rep. 850 (Minn. 1984).
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son, when a buyer values a good above its market value, a court
should apply a subjective measure to avoid overcompensating the
buyer. Because the Code favors a "liberal administration" of its
remedies, 393 however, the seller should bear the burden of proving
that the buyer has a higher subjective value.
d. Time-shifting. Courts have also used the "special circum-
stances" clause to shift the timeframe used in measuring the buyer's
damages from the time of acceptance (as stipulated in section 2-
714(2)) to some time after acceptance. The 1978 Special Project
argued that although the U.C.C. drafters intended this application
of the clause, the courts expressly used the time shifting construc-
tion only in section 2-312 warranty-of-title cases. 394 Since 1978,
however, courts have applied the clause to cases involving defective
products .395
Courts apply the time-shifting interpretation primarily in cases
involving latent product defects. 396 Courts deem the latent defect's
manifestation a "special circumstance" and measure the buyer's
damages using the date of discovery of the defect. In Intervale Steel
Corp. v. Borg & Beck Division, Borg-Warner Corp.,397 for example, a
buyer purchased sheets of steel to manufacture parts for an automo-
bile clutch assembly. The buyer inspected and accepted the sheets,
393 U.C.C. § 1-106(1); see also Special Project, supra note 1, at 122.
394 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 124-25. Courts continue to use the time-
shifting construction of "special circumstances" in warranty-of-title cases. See, e.g., Jean-
neret v. Vichey, 541 F. Supp. 80, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); U-J Chevrolet Co.
v. Marcus, 460 So. 2d 1341, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 485 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984); City Car Sales,
Inc. v. McAlpin, 380 So. 2d 865, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 993 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979); De Weber v.
Bob Rice Ford, Inc., 99 Idaho 847, 590 P.2d 103, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 1057 (1979); Metal-
craft, Inc. v. Pratt, 65 Md. App. 281, 500 A.2d 329, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 14 (1985). These
cases involve goods that were accepted before defects in title were revealed. The buyers
in these cases generally used the product for some period of time after acceptance and
later were dispossessed of the goods. Courts have assessed damages in these cases by
finding the defective title to be a "special circumstance." This approach relieves the
courts of section 2-714(2)'s difference-in-value formula and allows them to shift the cal-
culation of the goods' actual value to the date the buyer lost his use of the goods.
395 See Intervale Steel Corp. v. Borg & Beck Div., Borg Warner Corp., 578 F. Supp.
1081, 38 U.C.C. Rep. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (valuing defective steel at scrap value after
molded into unusable parts); Harlan v. Smith, 507 So. 2d 943 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986)
(valuing defective mobile home at time defect discovered); Vreeman v. Davis, 348
N.W.2d 756, 38 U.C.C. Rep. 850 (Minn. 1984) (valuing leaky mobile home at date leak
deemed irreparable); Ford Motor Co. v. Fairley, 398 So. 2d 216, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 440
(Miss. 1981) (assessing damages for two-year-old car at difference between value of a
functioning two-year-old car and value of car as defective); Vista St. Clair v. Landry's
Commercial Furnishings, Inc., 57 Or. App. 254, 643 P.2d 1378, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 1332
(1982) (valuing carpet three and one half years after discoloration discovered).
396 Latent defects are defects that the buyer cannot detect by a reasonable inspec-
tion of the goods upon acceptance. The defect manifests itself after acceptance through
no fault of the buyer.
397 578 F. Supp. 1081, 38 U.C.C. Rep. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
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and then began to fabricate the steel by stamping out "blanks" that
it stored until needed. One month later, the buyer discovered that
the blanks failed various stress requirements; the steel was defective
and unfit for its intended purpose. The buyer argued that the
blanks had only scrap value. The seller contended that under sec-
tion 2-714(2) the court must determine damages on the basis of the
steel's value at the time of acceptance. This value was higher than
the scrap value because the buyer could have sold the unprocessed
steel for another use. The court found that the seller's calculation
"of the 'value' of the steel would be unfair and contrary to the pur-
pose of the Code" because the buyer "reasonably could not have
discovered the defect in the steel until the steel was blanked out."398
The court adopted the time-shifting construction of the "special cir-
cumstances" provision and awarded damages by assessing the
steel's value at the time that the buyer discovered the defect.3 99
Such an approach is equitable because a buyer saddled with a
latently defective good cannot minimize his damages at the time of
acceptance (when the good has a higher value). Furthermore, be-
cause the seller's conduct is more culpable than the buyer's, the
seller should absorb the loss. Thus, courts should shift the time of
assessment of the defective good's value from the date of accept-
ance to the date of the defect's discovery. 40 0
B. Resultant Damages-Section 2-715
A commercial buyer who receives nonconforming goods often
sustains losses beyond the diminution in their value. In addition to
recovery of proximate damages for breach of the seller's contractual
398 Id. at 1090, 38 U.C.C. Rep. at 817 (emphasis in original). The Intermae court also
stated that although the steel was more valuable than scrap before the buyer stamped it
out, the buyer "could not have benefitted from that value nor could [he] have reasonably
known of the material's defective condition until the steel was processed." Id. at 1091,
38 U.C.C. Rep. at 817-18.
399 Id. at 1091, 38 U.C.C. Rep. at 818.
400 The 1978 Special Project attempted to justify the time-shifting construction of
"special circumstance" by citing the last clause of comment 3: "If, however, the non-
conformity is such as would justify revocation of acceptance, the time and place of ac-
ceptance under this section is determined as of the buyer's decision not to revoke."
U.C.C. § 2-714 comment 3. In 1978, the Special Project found no cases that cited this
clause, nor did we. See Special Project, supra note 1, at 124-25 & n.391.
Although the comment suggests a time-shifting assessment in "special circum-
stances" cases, courts can reach this conclusion without referring to the comment. The
language of section 2-714(2) requires the use of the difference-in-value formula "unless
special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount." Id. Courts have
correctly read this clause to release them completely from the Code's narrow formula
for calculating primary damages. Courts, therefore, can adopt the time-shifting method
without the comment's support. As long as the courts award only primary, and not re-
sultant, damages, the "special circumstances" clause of section 2-714(2) seems to allow
any formula chosen.
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obligations, 40 1 section 2-714(3)402 allows the buyer to recover inci-
dental and consequential damages as defined in Section 2-715. Sec-
tion 2-715 provides:
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include
expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transporta-
tion and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any com-
mercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in
connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense
incident to the delay or other breach.
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach
include
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements
and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had
reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented
by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from
any breach of warranty. 403
Courts must clearly distinguish between incidental and conse-
quential damages in order to honor the parties' contractual alloca-
tions of risk and to avoid overcompensating the buyer for his
loss. 40 4 Some courts have upset the parties' contractual allocations
401 "Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer rightfully
rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance," section 2-711 allows the buyer to seek inciden-
tal and consequential damages pursuant to sections 2-712 and 2-713. U.C.C. § 2-711.
402 "In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages [for breach of war-
ranty of an accepted good] under the next section may also be recovered." U.C.C. § 2-
714(3). The Code also provides for incidental and consequential damages for nondeliv-
ered or repudiated goods. U.C.C. § 2-713. Not all of the cases discussed in the follow-
ing sections are warranty cases, but the same principals of recovery apply.
403 U.C.C. § 2-715. Forty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Is-
lands, have adopted § 2-715 without modification. Louisiana has not adopted Article
Two. See U.C.C., IA U.L.A. 1-2 (1987 Supp.).
404 The court in Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A. Petrobras v. Ameropan Oil Corp., 372 F.
Supp. 503, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 661 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), made the following distinction between
incidental and consequential damages:
While the distinction between the two is not an obvious one, the
Code makes plain that incidental damages are normally incurred when a
buyer (or seller) repudiates the contract or wrongfully rejects the goods,
causing the other to incur such expenses as transporting, storing, or
reselling the goods. On the other hand, consequential damages do not
arise within the scope of the immediate buyer-seller transaction, but
rather stem from losses incurred by the non-breaching party in its deal-
ings, often with third parties, which were a proximate result of the
breach, and which were reasonably foreseeable by the breaching party at
the time of contracting.
Id. at 508, 14 U.C.C. Rep. at 667.
It often makes no difference whether a court labels damages "incidental" or "conse-
quential." See Special Project, supra note 1, at 130-31. Nevertheless, an accurate classifi-
cation of resultant damages is important because the Code's different categories base
recovery on separate legal requirements. A buyer may recover any reasonable incidental
damages. To recover consequential damages, however, a buyer must establish that, at
[Vol. 72:11591230
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of risk by labeling consequential damages as incidental.40 5 For ex-
ample, in Council Bros., Inc., v. Ray Burner Co. 40 6 the buyer purchased
a pressure vessel under an agreement excluding the seller's liability
for consequential damages. 40 7 The buyer incorporated the pressure
vessel into a unit and sold this combined unit. When the pressure
vessel failed, the original buyer sought indemnification from the
seller. 408 In addition to a refund of the contract price, 40 9 the court
awarded the reselling buyer incidental expenses incurred in adding
to, shipping, and starting up the boiler.410 The court also granted,
as incidental damages, the labor and repair expenses incurred by
the buyer's customer.411 This last item, however, is more properly
classified as consequential damages, and the court should have de-
nied recovery under the limitation clause of the contract. Allowing
recovery overcompensated the buyer.41 2
Classifying damages as consequential or incidental provides a
framework for accurately assessing damages and thereby facilitates
planning by allowing parties to allocate risks pursuant to established
categories of damages. Courts should first take care to distinguish
consequential losses from incidental losses. Then, before awarding
consequential damages, a court should examine the contractual in-
tentions of the parties and the type of transaction involved. 413
the time of contracting, the losses were foreseeable and could not have been prevented
by "cover or otherwise." U.C.C. § 2-715 (2)(a). Thus, a court that classifies conse-
quential damages as incidental may overcompensate the buyer to the extent the buyer
did not meet the restrictive standards of § 2-715(2). Cf. Indiana Farm Bureau Coop.
Assoc. v. S.S. Sovereign Faylene, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 74, 80-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (labeling
buyer's mitigation expenses "incidental"). Conversely, a court labeling incidental dam-
ages "consequential" may deny the buyer recovery if it finds the losses were not foresee-
able under § 2-715(2).
Fortunately, mislabeling damages is often harmless. See Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
438 F.2d 500, 507, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 625, 636-37 (8th Cir. 1971) (applying Arkansas Law)
(labeling cost of equipment repairs necessitated by seller's breach "incidental" damages
although buyer would have recovered same damages under the correct label). See gener-
ally Special Project, supra note 1, at 134-36.
405 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 136.
406 473 F.2d 400, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 1126 (5th Cir. 1973).
407 Specifically, the warranty provided that "[n]o claim for cost of removing, re-
turning, or replacing defective parts or for other consequential damages will be allowed." Id.
at 406, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 1134 (emphasis added). In view of this clause the court stated:
"[C]onsequential damages having been excluded by the terms of the warranty, Ray
Burner would be entitled to recover only those items of damage which might properly
be classified as incidental." Id. at 407, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 1136.
408 Id. at 402, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 1129.
409 Id. at 408 n.9, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 1136 n.9.
410 Id. at 408, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 1137.
411 The court awarded $3505.72 for repairs made by the third party, and $1519.76
for labor associated with those repairs. Id., 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 1137.
412 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 135-36.
413 See A.E.S. Technology Sys., Inc. v. Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933, 941, 24
U.C.C. Rep. 861, 871-72 (7th Cir. 1978) (Before court awards consequential damages, it
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
Courts that mislabel damages not only upset commercial planning,
but also violate the express provisions of the Code.
1. Incidental Damages-Section 2-715(1)
The Code expressly allows recovery of incidental damages
where the buyer rightfully rejects nonconforming goods, revokes ac-
ceptance, or incurs expenses associated with cover.4 14 A buyer who
justifiably rejects nonconforming goods may recover, as incidental
damages, the costs of inspecting the goods in addition to storage
and transportation expenses. 415 Similarly, although the Code's lan-
guage is not explicit on this point, a buyer who accepts and subse-
should "carefully examine the individual factual situation including the type of goods
involved, the parties and the precise nature and purpose of the contract. The purpose
of the courts in contractual disputes is not to rewrite contracts by ignoring parties' in-
tent; rather, it is to interpret the existing contract as fairly as possible when all events did
not occur as planned.").
414 Section 2-715(1) refers expressly to expenses connected with "goods rightfully
rejected" and with "effecting cover." U.C.C. § 2-715(1). A comment to that section
provides:
Subsection (1) is intended to provide reimbursement for the buyer who
incurs reasonable expenses in connection with the handling of rightfully
rejected goods or goods whose acceptance may be justifiably revoked, or
in connection with effecting cover where the breach of the contract lies in
non-conformity or non-delivery of the goods. The incidental damages
listed are not intended to be exhaustive but are merely illustrative of the
typical kinds of incidental damage.
Id. § 2-715 comment 1. The Code encourages the buyer to mitigate damages by cover-
ing his losses in the marketplace. Accordingly, a buyer may recover expenses associated
with effecting cover. These typically involve transaction costs associated with the
buyer's efforts to locate alternative goods or buyers in the marketplace. Section 2-
711 (1) provides that "[w]here the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer
rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance... [the buyer] may "cover" and have
damages under the next section as to all the goods affected whether or not they have
been identified to the contract." Id.
Section 2-712(2) states that "[tlhe buyer may recover from the seller as damages the
difference between the cost of cover and the contract price together with any incidental
or consequential damages as hereinafter defined (Section 2-715), but less expenses
saved in consequence of the seller's breach." Id.
Consequential damages under § 2-715(2)(a) may only be recovered if they "could
not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise." Id. Accordingly, a buyer who
wishes to recover consequential damages is obligated to attempt to cover his losses.
The concept of "cover" is absent from consequential damages under section 2-715(2)
concerning "injury to persons or property." See, e.g., Larry Goad & Co. v. Lordstown
Rubber Co., 560 F. Supp. 583, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 167 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (buyer entitled to
recover reasonable expenses for materials and labor in its attempt to complete contract
with customers).
415 See, e.g., Creusot-Loire Int'l, Inc. v. Coppus Eng'g Corp., 585 F. Supp. 45, 51, 39
U.C.C. Rep. 186, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (costs of transportation, inspection, and storage
of nonconforming goods recoverable as incidental damages); AFA Corp. v. Phoenix Clo-
sures, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 224, 230, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 81, 88-89 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (buyer
recovers cost of returning nonconforming goods to the seller even though some of the
goods were only suspected of being defective); Western Conference Resorts, Inc. v.
Pease, 668 P.2d 973, 977, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 131, 136 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (expenses
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quently revokes acceptance of nonconforming goods may recover
these items as incidental expenses. 416
For example, suppose that a wine bottler contracts to buy wine
from a California wholesaler.4 17 After accepting the wine, the bot-
tler learns from indignant customers that the wine contains fresno
mold. The bottler justifiably revokes acceptance. Upon notice of
the seller's breach, the bottler may recover as an incidental expense
the shipping charges incurred when the customers returned the
spoiled wine.418 Additionally, the buyer may recover the cost of in-
specting the remaining cases of wine and the cost of storing the
wine until the bottler could return it to California.4 19
Although courts may find it more difficult to conceptualize
items of incidental damages in a case in which the buyer retains the
good, this difficulty should not automatically bar a meritorious
claim. 4 20 In Horizons, Inc. v. Avco Corp.,421 for example, the buyer
related to defective plane's inspection, transportation, and maintenance recoverable as
incidental expenses).
416 Comment 1 states that the objective of section 2-715 is to reimburse the buyer
for reasonable expenses in connection with "goods whose acceptance may be justifiably
revoked." U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 1.
417 See Delano Growers' Coop. Winery v. Supreme Wine Co., 393 Mass. 666, 473
N.E.2d 1066, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 93 (1985).
418 Id. at 678-79 & n.6, 473 N.E.2d at 1074 & n.6, 40 U.C.C. Rep. at 103-04 & n.6.
419 The buyer in Delano actually inspected and reprocessed the wine at the seller's
request. Thus, the wine was not returned. The court properly allowed recovery for this
reprocessing expense. 393 Mass. at 678-79 & n.6, 473 N.E.2d at 1074 & n.6, 40 U.C.C.
at 103-4 & n.6.
The incidental damages listed in section 2-715(1) are not exhaustive. See U.C.C.
§ 2-715 comment 1. For example, the buyer of a defective automobile may be able to
recover as incidental damages the expenses associated with car insurance, license plates,
and interest on the purchase price of the automobile pending the return of the car.
Devore v. Bostrom, 632 P.2d 832, 835, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 984, 988 (Utah 1981).
420 The 1978 Special Project argued that a retaining buyer should not recover dam-
ages labeled incidental. This assertion was not based upon the Code's language, but
upon the view that by excluding the retaining buyer from recovery of such expenses,
courts would avoid the risk of awarding double compensation to the buyer. See Special
Project, supra note 1, at 132-40; see also Jackson v. Glasgow, 622 P.2d 1088, 1091, 30
U.C.C. Rep. 482, 486 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980) (incidental damages under section 2-715(1)
"would not be recoverable in this action because the owner accepted the goods rather
than taking other actions afforded him under the code upon seller's breach") (dictum).
But section 2-714(3) and comment 1 to section 2-715 indicate that the retaining buyer
may recover incidental damages in appropriate circumstances. Section 2-714(3) pro-
vides that where the buyer has accepted defective goods, "[iln a proper case any inciden-
tal and consequential damages under [section 2-715] may also be recovered." Id. § 2-
714(3). Moreover, the language of § 2-715 may be read as consisting of three separate
clauses under which incidental damages are recoverable for expenses related to rejec-
tion, for expenses related to cover, and for expenses related to delay or any other
breach. A seller who provides nonconforming goods is in breach whether the buyer
rejects the goods on receipt or accepts and subsequently revokes acceptances. Thus,
under section 2-715 courts should grant either type of aggrieved buyer recovery of inci-
dental expenses.
421 551 F. Supp. 771, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 102 (D.S.D. 1982), rev'd in part on other grounds,
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purchased a remanufactured airplane engine from the seller. Fol-
lowing acceptance, the buyer incurred, among other expenses, the
cost of shipping the defective engine to and from the seller's factory
for repairs, employee travel expenses to the factory, and additional
inspection costs. 422 The court found that these costs were recover-
able as incidental damages.423
Section 2-715 imposes two principal requirements for recovery
of incidental damages: (1) they must be incident to the breach, and
(2) they must be reasonable. Incidental expenses are limited to
those expenses solely attributable to the nonconformity of the
goods. 424 One of the purposes behind section 2-715(1) is to carry
forward the Code's policy that damages put the aggrieved party "in
as good a position as if the other had fully performed." 425 Limiting
incidental damages to expenses directly arising out of the breach
furthers this policy and also avoids overcompensating the buyer.
Courts risk overcompensating a buyer when they fail to identify
whether the claimed expenses reflect losses actually suffered as a
result of the breach.426 In Productora E Importadora de Papel, S.A. de
C. V v. Fleming4 2 7 the buyer of newsprint agreed to pay the required
import fees and freight charges from Boston to Mexico.428 The
seller breached by providing substantially less newsprint than
agreed upon in the contract.429 The trial judge awarded the buyer
shipping expenses as well as import fees for the entire quantity of
714 F.2d 862, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 1207 (8th Cir. 1983) (affirming holding below as to cover
expenses, reversing the holding as to amount of consequential damages). The following
discussion draws principally from the district court's memorandum opinion as the
Eighth Circuit focused primarily on the question of the buyer's right to consequential
damages, did not discuss the question of incidental damages, and cursorily affirmed the
lower court's decision on the issue of cover.
422 Id. at 774-75, 35 U.C.C. Rep. at 107-08.
423 Id. at 780-81, 35 U.C.C. Rep. at 116.
424 See, e.g., Industrial Graphics, Inc. v. Asahi Corp., 485 F. Supp. 793, 808, 28
U.C.C. Rep. 647, 668 (D. Minn. 1980) (incidental damages only recoverable "to the
extent that such losses would not have been incurred except for the breach"); McGinnis
v. Wentworth Chevrolet Co., 295 Or. 494, 503, 668 P.2d 365, 370-71, 37 U.C.C. Rep.
130, 138 (1983) (incidental damages under section 2-715(1) are "restricted to those
costs and expenses incurred by the buyer which directly result from the fact of the
breach").
425 The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the
end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the
other party had fully performed but neither consequential or special nor
penal damages may be had except as specifically provided in this Act or
by other rule of law.
U.C.C. § 1-106(1).
426 Courts also risk overcompensating the buyer when they confuse the Code's inci-
dental and consequential damages categories. See supra notes 404-13 and accompanying
text.
427 376 Mass. 826, 383 N.E.2d 1129, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 729 (1978).
428 Id. at 839, 383 N.E.2d at 1137, 25 U.C.C. Rep. at 736.
429 Id. at 828-29, 383 N.E.2d at 1132-33, 25 U.C.C. Rep. at 731-33.
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newsprint specified in the contract, including the unshipped news-
print.43 0 In reversing the award for these damages, the reviewing
court correctly observed that if the seller had shipped the agreed
upon tonnage of newsprint, the buyer would have had to pay the
import fees and the shipping costs for the entire order. Thus, the
costs associated with the undelivered amount represented expenses
saved because of the breach.431 Upon recovery of these damages,
the buyer could effectively fill its order through other suppliers
without having to pay any shipping or import fees. In short, these
expenses were not "incident" to the breach because they repre-
sented expenses that the buyer would have had to pay absent the
seller's breach.432
Section 2-715(1) also requires that the incidental damages be
reasonable. This requirement often directly relates to whether the
incidental expenses arose as a result of the seller's breach. In Indus-
trial Graphics, Inc. v. Asahi Corp.4 3 3 a federal district court held that
the buyer of defective citizens band radios could not claim inciden-
tal damages for additional overhead and interest expenses incurred
in the buyer's unsuccessful attempt to cover its losses by reselling
the radios.434 The court decided that these expenses were unrea-
sonable because the buyer maintained high prices in a declining
market.43 5
Where the buyer establishes that the breach caused the claimed
expenses and that he acted reasonably under the circumstances,
courts generally grant incidental expenses. In District Concrete Co. v.
Bernstein Concrete Corp.,436 for example, the court awarded the buyer
incidental damages for the costs of field overhead necessitated by
defective concrete supplied by the seller. Although the buyer could
have chosen a less costly method of repairing the damage resulting
from the defective concrete, the court found the buyer's chosen
remedy reasonable under the circumstances and therefore held the
seller liable for the field overhead expenses. 437
430 Id. at 837, 383 N.E.2d at 1136, 25 U.C.C. Rep. at 734.
431 Id. at 839, 383 N.E.2d at 1137, 25 U.C.C. Rep. at 736.
432 Although Productura does not involve a warranty situation, the damages analysis
is the same.
433 485 F. Supp. 793, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 647 (D. Minn. 1980).
434 Id. at 808-09, 28 U.C.C. Rep. at 669.
435 Id., 28 U.C.C. Rep. at 669 ("The unreasonable adherence to high pricing deci-
sions throughout the time the 23 channel market was disintegrating was in large part the
cause of the delay which in turn contributed to the increased overhead and interest
expense.").
436 418 A.2d 1030, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 201 (D.C. 1980).
437 "The choice of the composite slab was reasonable at the time it was made.
Clearly Bernstein [the buyer) was most concerned with minimizing costs and delays.
Bernstein need not bear the burden of unanticipated costs that were actually incurred
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District Concrete suggests that courts may presume the reasona-
bleness of an incidental expense provided the buyer can establish
that the cause of the expense was the seller's breach. Courts are
unlikely to challenge the amount of the claimed incidental expenses
provided the buyer establishes the reasonableness of the claim.
Although a buyer should provide more than a rough guess,438 the
Code recognizes that buyers may suffer loss and still not have pre-
cise records of the amount of loss. 439 Thus, courts have properly
interpreted the Code to prevent breaching sellers from escaping lia-
bility merely because the other party was unable to establish losses
with mathematical precision.440
2. Consequential Damages-Section 2-715(2)
A buyer who receives nonconforming goods often sustains
losses peculiar to his situation that are not solely attributable to the
nonconformity. The Code recognizes this commercial reality and
authorizes consequential damages when appropriate.44' Recover-
able consequential damages include physical injuries, 442 property
damage, 443 and economic losses including loss of use or down-
because the selected method proved more expensive." Id. at 1037, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 210-
11.
438 See Buckeye Trophy, Inc. v. Southern Bowling & Billiard Supply Co., 3 Ohio
App. 3d 32, 443 N.E.2d 1043, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 140 (1982) (where buyer did not sit down
and calculate damages, but instead made a "guesstimate" that damages were between
$1,000 and $1,500, buyer only entitled to nominal damages of $5).
439 U.C.C. § 1-106(1) provides that the Code's remedies are to be administered lib-
erally. See supra note 425. Commentary to section 2-715 states: "the section on liberal
administration of remedies rejects any doctrine of certainty which requires almost math-
ematical precision in the proof of loss. Loss may be determined in any manner which is
reasonable under the circumstances." U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 4.
440 "The damage award need not be absolutely exact; a reasonable estimate based
on relevant data is sufficient to support an award." District Concrete, 418 A.2d at 1038, 30
U.C.C. Rep. at 211.
441 U.C.C. § 2-714(3).
442 Personal injuries resulting from a seller's breach of warranty occur primarily in
the consumer context. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 585 P.2d 1116, 24
U.C.C. Rep. 1070 (Okla. 1978) (warranty excluding consequential damages unconscion-
able so buyer entitled to damages for personal injuries sustained when car's tire blew
out). They also occur in commercial settings when a seller's breach results in injury to a
buyer's employee. See e.g.,Jennett v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp., 9 Mass. App. 823, 398
N.E.2d 755 (1980) (employees of co-defendant buyer entitled to damages from seller
who negligently failed to test steel-sling cable).
443 See e.g., Prutch v. Ford Motor Co., 618 P.2d 657, 662, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 1507, 1514
(Colo. 1980) (farmer entitled to recover for crop damage resulting from defects in farm
equipment); Fire Supply & Serv., Inc. v. Chico Hot Springs, 196 Mont. 435, 444, 639
P.2d 1160, 1165 (1982) (buyer of defective fire alarm system entitled to recover for
damage to hotel); Lidstrand v. Silvercrest Indus., 28 Wash. App. 359, 366, 623 P.2d 710,
715, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 978, 983 (buyer of mobile home entitled to recover for damage to
drapes, carpets, clothing, and furniture resulting from roof leakage).
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time,4 44 investments made in reliance upon the seller's assurances
of conformity, 44 5 increased production CoStS, 44 6 and attorney's fees
where the buyer incurs liability to third parties. 447 In addition, a
buyer in the resale business may recover lost profits where the
breach frustrates plans to resell the warranted goods.448 Courts
also award consequential damages where the buyer suffers loss of
444 See, e.g., Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Harrell, 431 So. 2d 156, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 553
(Ala. 1983) (automobile buyers entitled to recover damages including motel and food
bills, taxi expenses, and car rental expenses); Jacobs v. Rosemount Dodge-Winnebago
S., 310 N.W.2d 71, 79, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 456, 466 (Minn. 1981) (buyer entitled to dam-
ages for loss of use ofmotorhome); Chapman v. Neil, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 1296, 1300 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1978) (damages awarded for down-time while loader-dozer was being
repaired).
445 See, e.g., Huntington Beach Union High School Dist. v. Continental Info. Sys.
Corp., 621 F.2d 353, 358, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 112, 118 (9th Cir. 1980) (where seller knew
buyer ordered peripheral equipment in reliance on timely delivery of computer system,
buyer awarded consequential damages for cost of renting equipment upon seller's fail-
ure to deliver computer by specified date).
446 See, e.g., Hawthorne Indus., Inc. v. Balfour Maclaine Int'l, Ltd., 676 F.2d 1385,
1387, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 1339, 1342-43 (11th Cir. 1982) (buyer entitled to recover in-
creased production costs as consequential damages after defective goods caused buyer
to incur additional machine time and lose materials in production process); Danjee, Inc.
v. Addressograph Multigraph Corp., 44 N.C. App. 626, 627, 262 S.E.2d 665, 672, 28
U.C.C. Rep. 689 (1980) (buyer entitled to recover extra expenses associated with cost of
redoing tapes occasioned by defect of seller's phototypesetter), cert. denied, 300 N.C. 196,
269 S.E.2d 623 (1980).
447 See, e.g., Alterman Foods, Inc. v. G.C.C. Beverages Inc., 168 Ga. App. 921, 924,
310 S.E.2d 755, 757-58, 38 U.C.C. Rep. 148, 152 (1983) (where supermarket buyer
defended action by consumer of manufacturer's softdrinks, supermarket could recover
attorney's fees from manufacturer under general principles of indemnity). Under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2301-2312 (1982), a successful plaintiff may recover the costs of litigation and attor-
ney fees. Id. § 2310(d) (1982). See Freeman v. Hubco Leasing, Inc., 253 Ga. 698, 705,
324 S.E.2d 462, 469, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 408, 416 (1985); Champion Ford Sales, Inc. v.
Levine, 49 Md. App. 547, 562-63, 433 A.2d 1218, 1226-27, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 108, 120
(1981).
448 "In the case of sale of wares to one in the business of reselling them, resale is
one of the requirements of which the seller has reason to know within the meaning of
subsection (2)(a)." U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 6; see, e.g., Mann v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 703
F.2d 272, 276, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 1147, 1153 (8th Cir. 1983) (buyer entitled to recover
from box manufacturer revenues lost when it reduced price to dissatisfied customers);
Kunststoffwerk Alfred Huber v. Rj. Dick, Inc., 621 F.2d 560, 563, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 1371,
1375 (3rd Cir. 1980) (seller who knew that buyer was in the business of resale liable for
costs incurred by buyer in extending credit to customers for seller's defective belting);
Wullschleger & Co. v.Jenny Fashions, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 373, 378, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 1213,
1221-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (dressmaker entitled to recover profits lost from cancelled or-
der for dresses to be made from seller's flawed fabric); Sun-Maid Raisin Growers v.
Victor Packing Co., 146 Cal. App. 3d 787, 792, 194 Cal. Rptr. 612, 615, 37 U.C.C. Rep.
148, 152 (1983) (seller who knew buyer was in business of resale required to reimburse
buyer for profits lost due to seller's failure to deliver raisins); R.A.Jones & Sons, Inc. v.
Holman, 470 So. 2d 60, 70, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 843 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (buyer enti-
tled to recover consequential damages from lost sales; buyer's customers purchased
sprinkler systems from another supplier due to their bad experience with manufacturer's
systems), review dismissed, 482 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1986).
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business reputation or goodwill.449
To recover consequential damages an aggrieved buyer must es-
tablish: first, that he suffered loss; second, that such loss resulted
from the seller's breach; and third, that the seller could have fore-
seen the consequences flowing from the breach. The buyer must
also establish the claimed losses with reasonable certainty and at-
tempt to mitigate those losses.450
a. Loss. The Code's damages provisions seek to make the ag-
grieved buyer whole without allowing him to profit from the seller's
breach. A court, therefore, should not award consequential dam-
ages when the seller's breach does not cause the buyer any loss
whatsoever. 45' For example, in Wilson v. Marquette Electronics, Inc.452
the lower court awarded the corporate buyer damages for the time
an employee doctor was required to spend away from his private
practice to work on a computer system which failed to function as
warranted. 45 3 The Eighth Circuit denied these damages because no
evidence showed that the corporate buyer suffered loss. Rather, the
evidence showed a loss to the doctor's private practice. 454 Other
courts have recognized that only variable expenses are proper items
of loss and have barred buyer claims for the recovery of fixed
expenses 455
Courts must also distinguish between profits lost from inability
449 See, e.g., Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 708 F.2d
385, 394, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 59, 70 (9th Cir. 1983) (buyer entitled to recover loss of good-
will because manufacturer of computer equipment had reason to know that buyer-dis-
tributor would suffer loss of business reputation in connection with seller's
nonconforming equipment); Delano Growers' Coop. Winery v. Supreme Wine Co., 393
Mass. 666, 683-84, 473 N.E.2d 1066, 1077, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 93, 108 (1985) (wine bottler
entitled to damages for loss of goodwill arising directly from seller-winery's supply of
spoiled wine).
450 Consequential damages include "any loss resulting from general or particular
requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to
know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise." U.C.C. § 2-
715(2) (a).
451 A buyer who has not suffered a loss would probably not sue. For practical pur-
poses, the loss requirement only comes in where problems of proof arise.
452 630 F.2d 575, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 399 (8th Cir. 1980).
453 Id. at 585, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 415.
454 Id. at 586, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 415-16.
455 Courts have avoided including the buyer's fixed expenses when calculating lost
profits. See, e.g., Barnard v. Compugraphic Corp., 35 Wash. App. 2d 414, 418, 667 P.2d
117, 120, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 141, 145 (1983) ("employee costs were a fixed expense, unaf-
fected by defendant's breach and need not have been deducted in calculating profits");
see also Special Project, supra note 1, at 145 ("[sleller's breach does not reduce buyer's
fixed expenses, so a court should deduct only variable expenses from buyer's recov-
ery"); cf. Coast Trading Co. v. Parmac, Inc., 21 Wash. App. 896, 909, 587 P.2d 1071,
1079, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 1047, 1054 (1978) ("overhead expenses or plant 'burden' should
not have been deducted in computing [seller's] lost profit" where the buyer was in
breach).
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to produce and those lost as a result of diminished business reputa-
tion. In Hydraform Products Corp. v. American Steel &Aluminum Corp.456
the buyer contracted with the seller for enough steel to manufacture
400 woodstoves during the peak manufacturing season.457 The
seller failed to supply the steel in time for the peak season and the
buyer was unable to locate alternative suppliers. The resultant de-
lays led to cancelled orders. Two years later, the buyer sold the
woodstove business. 458 The court held that the buyer could recover
profits "lost on the sale of 150 stoves, the difference between the
400 mentioned in the contract and the 250 actually sold." 459 The
court, however, denied the buyer's claim for lost profits on sales
projected for the two subsequent years in addition to loss of good-
will. 460 In denying the buyer recovery for these items, the court
stated: "even if such profits could have been calculated in this case,
allowing the jury to consider both a claim for diminished value rest-
ing on lost profits and a claim for lost profits themselves would have
allowed a double recovery." 46' In the two years following the
breach, the buyer could have procured substitute steel from other
sources and could have continued to manufacture woodstoves.
Whatever lost profits the buyer suffered in the two years subsequent
to the breach arose from loss of business reputation, not from the
buyer's inability to produce.
Courts also risk overcompensating the buyer where the claimed
damages include interest expenses on money borrowed to finance
the purchase. The Third Circuit observed:
In the absence of special circumstances, interest is not a proper
factor to be considered. Interest represents the cost of the money
borrowed to buy the goods because capital was not available to
make a cash purchase. If, however, the buyer is awarded lump
sum damages, he would be able to make a replacement purchase
without borrowing and incurring interest expenses. To the ex-
tent, therefore, that the recovery included interest on the original
purchase, it would constitute a windfall.462
Thus, a buyer should not ordinarily recover financing expenses as
456 127 N.H. 187, 498 A.2d 339, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 1201 (1985).
457 Id. at 191, 498 A.2d at 341-42, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 1203 (seller agreed to provide
steel beyond the 400-stove level on demand).
458 Id., 498 A.2d at 341-42, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 1203.
459 Id. at 198, 498 A.2d at 345-46, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 1211.
460 Id. at 199, 498 A.2d at 346, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 1210.
461 Id. at 199-200, 498 A.2d at 346-47, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 1211.
462 Chatlos Sys., Inc., v. National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1088, 30
U.C.C. Rep. 416, 425 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982); see also War-
ren v. Guttanit, Inc., 69 N.C. App. 103, 113, 317 S.E.2d 5, 12, 38 U.C.C. Rep. 1583,
1592 (1984) (buyer could recover established purchase price despite having received
discount for paying cash).
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consequential damages. If, however, the seller had reason to know
that the buyer would borrow money to purchase the goods, a court
might award expenses as consequential damages. 463 Additionally,
courts might allow recovery of losses caused by rapidly changing
interest rates incurred as a result of a seller's breach.464
Courts thus risk overcompensating buyers when they fail to dif-
ferentiate the elements of the claimed losses. For this reason, courts
should avoid awarding lump sum damages. For example, suppose
an insecticide that a farmer applies to his crop fails to perform as
warranted, resulting in crop loss. To place the farmer in the posi-
tion he would have been in had the insecticide performed as war-
ranted, the court should award the difference between the crop's
probable value at harvest had the insecticide performed as war-
ranted and its actual value at harvest, less any savings in labor and
expenses attributable to the reduced yield.46 5 At least one court,
however, has granted buyers in similar circumstances double recov-
ery by also awarding the price of the worthless goods. 466 Neverthe-
less, most courts in recent years have apparently avoided the
mistake of granting buyers lump sum damages representing both
the integrated whole and its parts.467
b. Causation. In addition to proving loss, the buyer must prove
that damages resulted from the seller's breach.468 The causation re-
463 See, e.g., Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325, 334, 12
U.C.C. Rep. 1070, 1080 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (because seller had reason to know at time of
contracting that buyer would borrow money to purchase computer, interest charge was
a proper item of damages under section 2-715), aff'd mein., 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974).
464 See, e.g., Chatlos, 635 F.2d at 1088, 30 U.C.C. Rep. at 425. ("With today's rapidly
changing interest structures, however, it may be that the buyer can demonstrate some
actual loss.").
465 See Swenson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 89 S.D. 497, 234 N.W.2d 38, 18 U.C.C. Rep.
67 (1975); see also Special Project, supra note 1, at 144-45 (discussing Swenson and its
implications).
466 See R. Clinton Constr. Co. v. Bryant & Reaves, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 838, 846, 23
U.C.C. Rep. 310, 319-20 (N.D. Miss. 1977) (awarding buyer cost of worthless antifreeze,
cost of repair, and lost profits).
467 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 144-45. We have uncovered no other cases
since 1978 in which the court made such a mistake.
468 Compare J & J Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 693 F.2d 830, 836 (8th Cir. 1982)
(buyer of contaminated seed not entitled to consequential damages from subsequent
disruption of marketing program because such project "too remote and speculative")
and Kirby v. Chrysler Corp., 554 F. Supp. 743, 752-54, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 497, 511-12 (D.
Md. 1982) (automobile dealer failed to prove that investment losses arose from manu-
facturer's breach where dealer had lost money in preceding years and unordered vehi-
cles could not acci)unt for the magnitude of the claimed losses) with Cottonwood
Elevator Co. v. Zenner, 105 Idaho 469, 470, 670 P.2d 876, 877 (1983) (buyer of spring
wheat seed in business of resale could recover losses sustained in reimbursing customers
for their subsequent damages proximately resulting from seller's breach) and Perry v.
Lawson Ford Tractor Co., 613 P.2d 458, 464, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 75, 82 (Okla. 1980)
[Vol. 72:11591240
ARTICLE TWO WARRANTIES
quirement poses two immediate practical problems. First, the buyer
must establish an independent link of causation between the seller's
breach and each item of claimed damages. 469 Second, the buyer
must establish that the seller's breach was both the cause in fact and
the proximate cause of the loss. 4 70 Courts generally do not differen-
tiate between these two elements of causation,471 but an alert seller
should be careful to make the distinction. Suppose that a buyer
purchases watered-down gasoline that causes her truck to break
down. Another vehicle strikes the disabled truck, causing damage to
the truck and injuring the buyer. If the court fails to differentiate
between the two elements of causation it might award the buyer
lump sum damages for personal injuries and damage to the truck,
even though the personal injuries probably were not proximately
caused by the seller's breach of warranty. 4 72
Situations in which either the goods or the buyer are unique
create the greatest conceptual difficulty with the causation require-
ment. The Sixth Circuit addressed such a situation in Overstreet v.
Norden Laboratories, Inc. 473 The buyer, a veterinarian, desired to pre-
vent mares from contracting a particular virus which caused them to
abort their foals.474 The seller represented that its vaccine would
inoculate horses against the virus.475 Although the buyer adminis-
tered the vaccine, six inoculated mares contracted the virus and
(buyer's damages could have proximately resulted from nonconforming combine where
rains and birds destroyed crops while buyer awaited delivery of parts).
469 This is an obvious proposition, but in cases involving complicated items of proof
seller's counsel must examine whether the claimed damages in fact resulted from the
breach and not from some other intervening or independent cause.
470 Cause in fact asks the question: Did the defendant's conduct in fact cause the
plaintiff's harm? Often, the cause-in-fact issue involves circumstantial proof, and plain-
tiffs may try to introduce statistical evidence to establish causation. See, e.g., Smith v.
Rapid Transit, Inc., 317 Mass. 469, 470, 58 N.E.2d 754, 755 (1945) (evidence that math-
ematical chances suggest that defendant bus company caused plaintiff's accident was
insufficient to establish causation).
Proximate cause, on the other hand, asks the question of whether the defendant
should be held legally responsible for the injury. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.,
248 N.Y. 339, 345, 162 N.E. 99, 101 (1928). See generally W. KEETON, supra note 182,
§§ 41-42, at 263-80 (5th ed. 1984). The proximate cause issue is often framed in terms
of foreseeability. See infra notes 483-99 and accompanying text.
471 See, e.g., Southern Ill. Stone Co. v. Universal Eng'g Corp., 592 F.2d 446, 454, 25
U.C.C. Rep. 1336, 1347 (8th Cir. 1979) (buyer entitled to "incidental and consequential
damages proximately flowing from" breach); El Fredo Pizza, Inc. v. Roto-Flex Oven Co.,
199 Neb. 697, 704-05, 261 N.W.2d 358, 363 (1978) (buyer may recover, as consequent-
ial damages, lost profits proximately resulting from seller's breach).
472 See Weaver v. Ralston Motor Hotel, Inc., 135 Ga. App. 536, 537 n.1, 218 S.E.2d
260, 261 n.1, 17 U.C.C. Rep., 963 n.1 (1975) (stating under similar facts that court had
grave doubts as to whether buyer's injuries "proximately resulted" from the seller's
breach).
473 669 F.2d 1286, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 174 (6th Cir. 1982).
474 Id. at 1288, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 176.
475 Id., 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 177.
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aborted.476 The court held that the buyer failed to establish causa-
tion as a matter of law because no alternative treatment existed to
prevent the horses from contracting the virus and the vaccine did
not cause the mares to abort.477 In the words of a concurrence,
"There was simply a failure to prevent an occurrence that nothing
would have prevented, and [the buyer] may not recover the value of
the foals." 478 The dissent vigorously argued that the majority had
established an "alternative product" rule allowing "manufacturers
of new products to make unsupportable claims concerning product
effectiveness; yet insulate the manufacturers from liability for conse-
quential damages." 479
The dispute centers on whether the court should focus on the
buyer's resulting injury, or the seller's breach of warranty. When de-
termining causation, courts should focus on the warranty rather
than the resulting injury. Although the seller's vaccine did not
cause the mares to abort, the abortions would not have occurred
had the product performed as warranted. The implied warranty ex-
tended not only to preventing the mares from contracting the virus,
but ultimately to preventing the abortions caused by the virus. The
Code's language permits recovery for damages "resulting from the
breach." Although the manufacturer's drug did not cause the mares
to abort, the abortions resulted directly from the breach of
warranty.480
The advantage of focusing on the warranty rather than on the
particular buyer's situation is especially clear when the buyer's situa-
476 Id., 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 177.
477 Id. at 1296, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 189.
478 Id., 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 189 (Engel and Kennedy, JJ., concurring). The concurring
judges discussed several ways the buyer might have established a causal link between the
loss of the foals and the seller's breach: "He might have claimed that the abortions were
directly due to some effect of the vaccine, or that this batch of Rhinomune [the vaccine]
was ineffective and a good batch of Rhinomune would better have prevented the abor-
tions. He might have claimed that the warranty induced him to forego some other, ef-
fective means of preventing the abortions, or that he acted to his detriment in some
other way in reliance on the warranty." Id., U.C.C. Rep. at 189. The opinion goes on to
state that there was evidence in the record to support such claims.
479 Id. at 1294, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 186.
480 Other courts facing similar causation issues have not had the same trouble find-
ing the seller liable for the resulting damages. See, e.g., Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438
F.2d 500, 507, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 625, 636 (8th Cir. 1971) (unsuitability of additive oil re-
sulted in damage to buyer's mill). Because consequential damages flow not from the
nature of the goods supplied but from the unique needs and position of the buyer, see
supra note 403 and accompanying text, nonconforming goods may have adverse effects
on the buyer not directly connected with the supplied goods. In these situations the
issue is foreseeability rather than causation. See infra notes 491-505 and accompanying
text. In Overstreet, however, the foreseeability limitation did not apply because the seller
should have known at the time of contracting of the veterinarian's intended use and
need for the vaccine.
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tion is unique. Assume that several available drugs will prevent hor-
ses from contracting the virus, but one horse is allergic to all except
one of the drugs. 48 ' Under the Overstreet majority's reasoning, the
buyer could not recover consequential damages if the product fails
to prevent the allergic horse from aborting, but could recover if the
other horses aborted because the alternative drugs, presumably,
would have prevented the abortions. To avoid this anomalous con-
clusion courts must focus on the breach of warranty. Courts should
consider the difference between the product's actual performance
and the warranted performance, disregarding what would have hap-
pened without the product.
The causation issue also arises when the buyer's intervening
conduct contributes to the damages or to the nonconformity of the
goods. 482 In Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Products,483 for ex-
ample, the seller furnished and installed a reactor charge heater in
the buyer's factory. The buyer sued to recover for property damage
and economic loss after the heater and the refinery caught fire.4 84
The Texas Supreme Court, upon evidence that the explosion re-
sulted from both the defective design of the heater and the buyer's
failure to follow warnings, held:
The buyer may recover only those consequential damages proxi-
mately caused by the breach of warranty; he may not recover for
those consequential damages proximately caused by the buyer's
own negligence or fault .... [T]he buyer's negligence or fault
does not automatically bar recovery, but only diminishes or miti-
gates the damages the buyer may recover.485
When the buyer's negligence is a concurring proximate cause
of the damages, the trier of fact should determine the percentages
by which the concurring causes contributed to the damages. 48 6 If
the buyer is ninety-five percent negligent, the seller should be liable
for the remaining five percent.487 This result is sensible if the
481 The court in Overstreet presented this hypothetical. 669 F.2d at 1293-94, 33
U.C.C. Rep. at 185-86 (Keith, J.).
482 Subsection (2)(b) states the usual rule as to breach of warranty, allowing
recovery for injuries "proximately" resulting from the breach. Where the
injury involved follows the use of goods without discovery of the defect
causing the damage, the question of "proximate" cause turns on whether
it was reasonable for the buyer to use the goods without such inspection
as would have revealed the defects. If it was not reasonable for him to do
so, or if he did in fact discover the defect prior to his use, the injury
would not proximately result from the breach of warranty.
U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 5.
483 572 S.W.2d 320, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 555 (Tex. 1978).
484 Id. at 322-23, 24 U.C.C. Rep. at 557-58.
485 Id. at 328, 24 U.C.C. Rep. at 567.
486 Id., 24 U.C.C. Rep. at 567.
487 See Peterson v. Bendix Home Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 50, 52-55, 33 U.C.C. Rep.
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seller's breach of warranty did in fact cause some of the damages.
Thus, the seller's attorney should distinguish cause in fact from
proximate cause to avoid compensating the buyer for expenses not
caused by the seller's breach.
c. Foreseeability, Certainty, and Duty to Cover. In addition to loss
and causation, an aggrieved buyer must establish three other ele-
ments to recover damages: (1) that the loss resulted from needs the
seller knew or had reason to know about, at the time of con-
tracting;488 (2) that the damages are ascertainable with reasonable
certainty; 489 (3) that the damages could not have been prevented by
cover or otherwise,490
(1) Foreseeability. The Code's foreseeability requirement finds
its origin in Hadley v. Baxendale,49 1 where the court declared that the
aggrieved parties could only recover damages "arising naturally"
from the breach, or damages that both parties could reasonably con-
template, at the time of contracting, would result from a breach.492
Following the Hadley rule, the Code rejects the tacit agreement
test4 93 and requires only that the parties know the facts that make
the loss a foreseeable result of the breach.494
876, 880-84 (Minn. 1982) (under Minnesota comparative fault law plaintiff-buyer's 75
percent fault in living at home with toxic formaldehyde fumes is a defense to claim for
consequential damages, but not to nonconsequential damages); Indust-Ri-Chem Labo-
ratory, Inc. v. Par-Pak Co., 602 S.W.2d 282, 290-92, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 794, 804-05 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1980) (buyer's consequential damages reducible to the extent damages re-
sulted from buyer's unreasonable conduct).
488 U.C.C. § 2-715(2) ("Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach
include (a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of
which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know.").
489 Id. § 2-715 comment 4 ("Loss may be determined in any manner which is rea-
sonable under the circumstances.").
490 Id. § 2-715(2)(a) ("Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach in-
clude (a) any loss... which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise.").
491 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
492 Id. at 151. The court stated that the buyer could recover only such damages as
"may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to the
usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be
supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the
contract, as the probable result of the breach of it." Id.
493 For the tacit agreement test see, e.g., Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co.,
190 U.S. 540, 544 (1903) ("The consequences [of the breach] must be contemplated at
the time of the making of the contract."). Thus, the tacit agreement test would require
the parties to have contemplated the extent of potential liability, not just the facts that
give rise to the liability.
494 See U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 2.
Subsection (2) operates to allow the buyer, in an appropriate case, any
consequential damages which are the result of the seller's breach. The
"tacit agreement" test for the recovery of consequential damages is re-
jected. Although the older rule at common law which made the seller
liable for all consequential damages of which he had "reason to know" in
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Under the Code, a buyer rarely has difficulty recovering conse-
quential losses because the commercial contexts in which parties
contract suggest to the seller how a breach will affect the buyer's
general needs. 49 5 For example, if the seller is aware that resale is
part of the ordinary course of the buyer's business, the buyer need
not expressly state plans to resell the goods. 49 6 Moreover, the "rea-
son to know" 497 requirement is an objective standard. The Code
presumes the seller is a reasonable, sophisticated party and there-
fore imposes liability for all foreseeable consequences of a breach,
even if the seller did not in fact foresee the actual consequence.498
The Code's foreseeability requirement balances the buyer's in-
terest in recovering for all losses resulting from the breach against
the seller's need to identify potential liabilities when structuring
prices. If a court finds that the risks associated with the breach were
foreseeable, the Code requires the seller to assume the full conse-
quences of the buyer's loss. If the seller does not wish to assume
liability for consequential damages, the seller may exclude them in
the sales contract as an item of recovery. 499
A buyer with particular needs that the seller could not reason-
ably foresee must make these needs known to the seller to recover
advance is followed, the liberality of that rule is modified by refusing to
permit recovery unless the buyer could not reasonably have prevented
the loss by cover or otherwise.
Id.; see also C. MCCORMICK, THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 138, at 562-65 (1935) (observing
that immediate effect of Hadley was to limit discretion in imposing jury awards). For a
brief discussion of the Hadley foreseeability rule and the background to the Code's fore-
seeability requirement, see Special Project, supra note 1, at 147-48.
495 See U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 3 ("[G]eneral needs [of the buyer] must rarely be
made known to charge the seller with knowledge."); Special Project, supra note 1, at 140-
52 and sources cited therein.
496 U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 6 states: "[i]n the case of sale of wares to one in the
business of reselling them, resale is one of the requirements of which the seller has
reason to know." Id.; see supra note 448 (cases interpreting this provision).
497 U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a).
498 See, e.g., Troxler Elec. Laboratories, Inc. v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 722 F.2d 81,
84-85, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 472, 475-77 (4th Cir. 1983) (lost profits due to delayed delivery
may be foreseeable); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 346, 581 P.2d
784, 804, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 91, 121 (1978) (defendant seller had reason to know that
defective tractor would cause plaintiff's consequential damages); Massey-Ferguson, Inc.
v. Evans, 406 So. 2d 15, 19-20, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 424, 431-32 (Miss. 1981). Additionally,
the seller need not foresee the actual amount of the buyer's loss. See, e.g., Barnard v.
Compugraphic Corp., 35 Wash. App. 414,418,667 P.2d 117, 120,37 U.C.C. Rep. 141,
145 (1983) ("It is not necessary that the specific injury or amount of harm be foreseen, but
only that a reasonable person in [the seller's] position would foresee that in the usual
course of events, damages would follow from its breach.") (emphasis in original).
499 U.C.C. section 2-719 expressly allows the parties to exclude consequential dam-
ages unless the exclusion is unconscionable. In Carboline Co. v. Oxmoor Center, 40 U.C.C.
Rep. 1728 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985), the court upheld a seller's exclusion of liability for con-
sequential damages, but refused to enforce the contractual exclusion of incidental
damages.
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consequential damages. This requirement allows the parties to allo-
cate risks in the contract. In Seaman v. United States Steel Corp.500 the
seller constructed a heel plate to link the boom of a floating crane to
the crane base. The seller breached its warranty by providing steel
of inappropriate quality.50 1 Although the seller knew at the time of
contracting that the buyer needed the steel to fashion a heel plate
for the floating crane, the seller had no reason to know, and the
buyer failed to inform it, that the buyer planned to use the crane in a
bid on an Army Corps of Engineers contract. 50 2 The buyer spent
$410.45 for the steel and claimed damages of $85,000.503 In re-
jecting the buyer's claim, the court commented that if the seller had
known that it could be liable for lost profits it "might have refused
to sell the plate without some assurance that [it] would not be re-
sponsible beyond a stipulated sum." 50 4 The Code is generous in
the amount of consequential damages a buyer may recover for
breach of warranty, but if the buyer fails to advise the seller of spe-
cial needs, and the seller neither knows nor has reason to know of
such needs, the buyer must bear the consequential losses.505
(2) Certainty. An aggrieved buyer must show consequential
losses with a reasonable degree of certainty in order to recover. A
buyer need not show mathematical precision, however. 506 Com-
500 166 N.J. Super. 467,400 A.2d 90, 26 U.C.C. Rep. 80, cert. denied, 81 NJ. 282,405
A.2d 826 (1979).
501 Id. at 470, 400 A.2d at 92, 26 U.C.C. Rep. at 82.
502 Id. at 472, 400 A.2d at 93, 26 U.C.C. Rep. at 84.
503 Id. at 468-70, 400 A.2d at 91-92, 26 U.C.C. Rep. at 81-82.
504 Id. at 472, 400 A.2d at 93, 26 U.C.C. Rep. at 84.
505 See also Ohoud Establishment for Trade & Contracts v. Tri-State Contracting &
Trading Corp., 523 F. Supp. 249, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 1131 (D.N.J. 1981) (broker could not
recover future profits because seller could not have foreseen that broker's deliveries of
unmerchantable sodas would alienate clients and reduce future business in Saudi
Arabia).
506 See, e.g., National Papaya Co. v. Domain Indus., 592 F.2d 813, 818, 26 U.C.C.
Rep. 429 (5th Cir. 1979) (damages need not be established with "absolute exactness");
In re Lifeguard Indus., 42 Bankr. 734, 739-40, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 1268, 1275 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1983) (mathematical certainty not required, but proof of lost profits must be more
than "pure conjecture"); Givan v. Mack Truck, Inc., 569 S.W.2d 243, 248, 24 U.C.C.
Rep. 1077, 1083-84 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) ("substantial basis," not mathematical cer-
tainty, required, but buyer failed to prove that work was available for him while truck
was being repaired, so claim of lost profits not allowed); Alliance Tractor & Implement
Co. v. Lukens Tool & Die Co., 204 Neb. 248, 253-55, 281 N.W.2d 778, 781-82, 27
U.C.C. Rep. 137 (1979) (buyer's evidence of production, price, sales, and costs of manu-
facturing sufficient factual basis for computation of damages); Leininger v. Sola, 314
N.W.2d 39, 46, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 191, 201 (N.D. 1981) (exact calculation or mathematical
precision not required). But see Perry v. Lawson Ford Tractor Co., 613 P.2d 458, 464, 29
U.C.C. Rep. 75, 82-83 (Okla. 1980) (conjecture not sufficient); cf. Cates v. Morgan Port-
able Bldg. Corp., 591 F.2d 17, 21, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 1060, 1064 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding
that the trial court erred in accepting damages evidence on the grounds that the calcula-
tions were overly-specific).
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ment 4 to section 2-715 indicates that courts should apply the cer-
tainty standard flexibly and liberally:
The burden of proving the extent of loss incurred by way of con-
sequential damage is on the buyer, but the section on liberal ad-
ministration of remedies [section 1-106] rejects any doctrine of
certainty which requires almost mathematical precision in the
proof of loss. Loss may be determined in any manner which is
reasonable under the circumstances. 50 7
The buyer need only establish the probability of some loss. By
identifying an available market for the goods, a buyer in the busi-
ness of resale can establish lost profits.508 Where a buyer purchases
goods to incorporate into the production process, however, the
amount of loss is not as easy to quantify because the lost profits
become more remote from the breach of warranty.
In some cases, the buyer's claim for lost profits is based upon
sheer speculation. Suppose a buyer in the home repair business
purchases defective aluminum siding.509 The buyer testifies that the
business depends on word-of-mouth advertising and since the
seller's breach she has been unable to locate other work in the
neighborhood. If the buyer's testimony is the only evidence linking
the loss to the breach, a court should not award damages for lost
profits. 510 As one court stated under similar facts: "This may or may
not be true, and if true may be either an unfortunate coincidence or
a conspiracy by the homeowners of that neighborhood." 511 Sup-
pose, however, that the buyer establishes that she did, in fact, lose
business because of the defective siding, but cannot specify the
amount lost. In response to this practical problem, courts have
adopted the "fact-amount" doctrine: "The reasonable level of cer-
tainty required to establish the amount of a loss is generally lower
than that required to establish the fact or cause of a loss."512 The
fact-amount doctrine most frequently applies where the breach in-
terrupts the buyer's production process, the buyer is involved in a
new business, or the buyer suffers a loss of goodwill.
(a) Interruption to the Buyer's Production Process. Hawthorne
507 U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 4.
508 See supra note 448 and accompanying text (cases discussing section 2-715).
509 See In re Lifeguard Indus., 42 Bankr. 734, 736, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 1268, 1269-70)
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
510 Id. at 740, 39 U..C. Rep. at 1276.
511 Id. at 744, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 1276.
512 Cook Assocs., Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1166, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 1213, 1219
(Utah 1983) (emphasis in original). For a discussion of the doctrine, see Special Project,
supra note 1, at 155-56. But see 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1022, at 135-47
(1964) (negating the fact-amount doctrine).
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Industries, Inc. v. Balfour Maclaine International, Ltd.513 illustrates the
practical difficulties that make the fact-amount doctrine necessary.
In Hawthorne a carpet manufacturer bought jute to use as carpet
backing.514 Substantial deviations in the quality of the jute forced
the buyer to slow down its machinery to make adjustments by hand
and to add extra adhesive to the carpet surface. The buyer sought
to recover consequential damages for increased production costs
caused by the nonconformingjute. The buyer testified that the nor-
mal speed of the jute processing machines had to be slowed by ap-
proximately three feet per minute to process the seller's jute.515
The buyer used this estimate, together with weekly production re-
ports and estimates of plant down-time while processing the seller's
jute, to prepare an estimate of the total costs to the buyer. A witness
previously involved with other carpet plants in the buyer's locale
substantially confirmed the buyer's estimate of lost efficiency. 51 6
Unquestionably, the buyer suffered loss due to seller's breach. The
court decided that having established some loss, the buyer's recov-
ery "should not be denied merely because the amount of damages
cannot be precisely and exactly determined.-517
Courts are loathe to deny recovery if the buyer can establish
some loss. Even if documented proof is lacking, the testimony of
the buyer, corroborated by an independent expert, should provide a
sufficient basis for assessing damages.5 18 Ultimately, the fact-
amount doctrine helps to deter breaches. The Code's provisions
discourage breaches and favor contractual performance. 519 A seller
should stand behind all representations made and should not es-
cape liability merely because the buyer cannot quantify loss with ex-
acting particularity.
(b) New Businesses. The rationale for the fact-amount doc-
trine is perhaps most evident in situations involving new busi-
513 676 F.2d 1385, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 1339 (11th Cir. 1982).
514 Id. at 1386, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1340.
515 Id. at 1386-87, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1340-41.
516 Id. at 1386, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1341.
517 Id. at 1388, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1343. Because the district court held that the
plaintiff's claimed damages were not certain enough, id. at 1387, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at
1343, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case for determination of whether the buyer
established his losses with reasonable certainty. Id. at 1388, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1344.
518 Cf. infra text accompanying note 525.
519 See Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together after Material Breach-Common Law Mitigation
Rules, the U.C.C., and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 553, 579-93
(1976) (arguing that the Code's provisions on cover, good faith, notice, seller's right to
cure, and parties' rights to demand adequate assurance of performance encourage par-
ties to avoid breaching); see also 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 512, § 1002, at 34 ("The fact
that damages must be paid tends directly to the prevention of breaches of contract.").
This applies equally to breaches of warranty.
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nesses.5 20 When a seller's breach causes interruption of a buyer's
ongoing business, courts prefer records of past profits as evidence
of the business's lost prospective profits. 52' The buyer may
strengthen this proof by showing profits earned after the operation
returned to normal. 522
Where the seller's breach interrupts the buyer's new business,
but does not cause it to fail, the buyer likewise should be able to
establish his losses with reasonable certainty. In Cook Assocs., Inc. v.
Warnick523 the buyer contracted to buy parts for the silo storage
complex of an explosives plant it was constructing. The seller
delayed delivery of some of the parts for almost a year, causing de-
lay in plant completion.524 The court awarded the buyer lost profits
based on two elements of proof: (1) evidence of the buyer's profits
once the plant opened; (2) profit and sales statistics from a similar
plant.5 25 Taken together, these elements of proof supplied a rea-
sonably certain basis for awarding the buyer lost profits. 5 26
Proof of lost profits is more difficult, however, if the buyer's
new business fails as a result of the seller's breach. The buyer can-
not introduce evidence of past or subsequent profitability. The
buyer must therefore rely solely on evidence of sales from compara-
ble businesses. Although this is not the preferred method of proof,
courts have begun to accept this comparative approach for new
businesses.5 27
520 See Vickers v. Wichita State Univ., 213 Kan. 614, 518 P.2d 512 (1974).
Strict application of the certainty doctrine would place a new business at
a substantial disadvantage. To hold recovery is precluded as a matter of
law merely because a business is newly established would encourage
those contracting with such a business to breach their contracts. The law
is not so deficient.
Id. at 620, 518 P.2d at 517. See generally Comment, Remedies-Lost Profits as Contract Dam-
ages for an Unestablished Business: The New Business Rule Becomes Outdated, 56 N.C.L. REV.
693 (1978) (arguing that the new-business rules, predicated on the belief that lost profits
of new businesses cannot be established with reasonable certainty and therefore are not
recoverable, should be abandoned).
521 See Wallach, The Buyer's Right to Monetary Damages, 14 U.C.C. L.J. 236, 260-65
(1982) (twentieth-century common law has preferred proof of lost profits based upon
the individual business's established pattern of profits); cf. Lorenz Supply Co. v. Ameri-
can Standard, Inc., 100 Mich. App. 600, 613, 300 N.W.2d 335, 340-41, 30 U.C.C. Rep.
810, 816 (1980) (allowing plaintiff to estimate lost profits based on profits in past years),
aff'd, 419 Mich. 610, 358 N.W.2d 845, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 1169 (1984).
522 See infra text accompanying note 525.
523 664 P.2d 1161, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 1213 (Utah 1983).
524 Id. at 1163-64, 36 U.C.C. Rep. at 1215.
525 Id. at 1165-66, 36 U.C.C. Rep. at 1217-19.
526 Id. at 1166 n.4, 36 U.C.C. Rep. at 1218 n.4.
527 See Comment, supra note 520, at 713 (the "yardstick measure" which compares
"the performance of businesses as similar to the plaintiff's as possible in size, location
and nature during the time period in question" is the most recognized method of prov-
ing lost profits other than using past profits); see also supra note 521 (demonstrating the
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Allowing new businesses to rely on comparative sales evidence
places them under a looser evidentiary standard than a buyer with
an established business. Situations could arise in which a court de-
nies recovery to a buyer in an established business but, under simi-
lar evidence, grants recovery to a counterpart in a new business.
The fact-amount doctrine is the fairest way to allocate liability be-
cause it requires any buyer, new or old, to establish actual loss.
Once loss is established, the factfinder must assess damages.
Although damages awarded under this doctrine may not always re-
flect the exact value of the loss, the doctrine roughly apportions lia-
bility according to the risks bargained for, and provides consistent
application of the Code's damages provisions.
(c) Goodwill. Loss of goodwill presents the final situation in
which proving loss with reasonable certainty becomes difficult.
Goodwill is an intangible property interest "which attaches to a
business on account of name, location, reputation for competency
and the imponderables which cause buyers to return." 528 When a
breach injures goodwill, a plaintiff should recover if he proves dam-
ages with sufficient certainty. Nevertheless, some courts deny recov-
ery for goodwill damages because of the inherently speculative
nature of such claims 529 or because the seller could not have known
of the buyer's needs under section 2-715(2)(b). 530 However, some
courts have allowed recovery for loss of goodwill.531
In contrast to profits lost from a specific transaction, goodwill
relates closely to future profits. In calculating the "good will" value
preferred method of proof-past profits); Cates v. Morgan Portable Bldg. Corp., 591
F.2d 17, 21-22 n.7, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 1060, 1065 n.7 (7th Cir. 1979) (noting that "profits
of closely comparable businesses are the second-best measure of consequential damages
after a party's own track record") (citing Comment, supra note 520, at 713).
528 Westric Battery Co. v. Standard Elec. Co., 522 F.2d 986, 988 (10th Cir. 1975)
(per curiam); see also Wallach, supra note 521, at 269 (loss of future business occurs when
present customers take their business elsewhere or when potential customers learn of
dissatisfaction.).
529 See, e.g., Argo Welded Products, Inc. v. J.T. Ryerson Steel & Sons, Inc., 528 F.
Supp. 583, 589, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 1349, 1357 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (goodwill damages too spec-
ulative to be recoverable under section 2-715(2)); Harry Rubin & Sons, Inc. v. Consoli-
dated Pipe Co., 396 Pa. 506, 153 A.2d 472, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 40 (1959) (same).
Pennsylvania categorically denies a buyer recovery of goodwill damages. See, e.g., Draft
Sys., Inc. v. Rimar Mfg., 34 U.C.C. Rep. 585, 587 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating Pennsylvania's
rule barring recovery for lost goodwill); Blackwood Coal Co. v. Deister Concentrator
Co., 626 F. Supp. 727, 731, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 1228, 1233 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (same); Argo
Welded Prods., Inc. v.J.T. Ryerson Steel & Sons, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 583, 588, 33 U.C.C.
Rep. 1349, 1356 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (same).
530 See Chrysler Corp. v. E. Shavitz & Sons, 536 F.2d 743, 744-45, 19 U.C.C. Rep.
519, 522 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that seller could not have known of buyer's lost job
opportunities).
531 See supra note 449 (cases allowing recovery of goodwill losses).
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of a business, courts consider such matters as the profit the business
has made "over and above an amount fairly attributable to the re-
turn on the capital investment and to the labor of the owner... ; (2)
... [and] the reasonable prospect that this additional profit will con-
tinue into the future, considering all circumstances existing and
known as of the date of the valuation. '532 The method by which a
buyer proves loss of goodwill varies with the nature of the business.
A reselling buyer might establish loss of goodwill by showing that
certain customers began trading with a competitor as a result of the
seller's breach.533 Alternatively, the buyer might introduce evi-
dence of decreasing profits following the breach, 534 or the buyer
might provide testimony of the value of the goodwill.5 35 Finally, a
buyer might sell the business and claim the difference between the
pre-breach value and the sale price as the value of the goodwill
loss. 5 36
The above examples illustrate that no comprehensive method
exists for establishing the value of goodwill loss. A buyer may suc-
cessfully establish that a loss in goodwill occurred as a result of the
seller's breach, but precisely quantifying that loss may be impossi-
ble. Nevertheless, goodwill is often one of a business's primary as-
sets. Thus, courts should not, per se, bar recovery for loss of
goodwill. In many commercial contexts, a seller can anticipate that a
breach will injure the buyer's goodwill, causing substantial damage.
A California wine wholesaler, for example, should anticipate that
the bottler it supplied will suffer loss of goodwill when customers
discover that the bottler has sold them bad wine.537 The customers
will likely blame the bottler, not the wholesaler; the bottler may per-
manently lose customers. The fact-amount doctrine allows the bot-
tler to recover for some of its lost goodwill. This doctrine should
not, however, override the requirements of causation, loss, and cer-
532 Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690, 698 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
533 Cf. Delano Growers' Coop. Winery v. Supreme Wine Co., 393 Mass. 666, 681-84,
473 N.E.2d 1066, 1075-77, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 93, 106-08 (1985) (retail wine bottler could
recover loss of goodwill following customer dissatisfaction with distributor's wine).
534 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 166.
535 Id.; see also Wallach, supra note 521, at 270 ("The courts have not required cer-
tainty in the evidence showing the value of the lost goodwill. In a development parallel-
ing that involving proof of lost profits for new businesses, the courts have been willing
to accept expert testimony to establish the amount of loss.") (citations omitted). For
judicial discussion on the use of expert testimony, see Roundhouse v. Owens-Illinois,
Inc., 604 F.2d 990, 995, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 1010, 1018 (6th Cir. 1979) (plaintiffs lost good-
will claim because they failed to provide expert testimony valuing goodwill); Westric
Battery Co. v. Standard Elec. Co., 522 F.2d 986, 988 (10th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (ex-
pert testimony permitted to show loss of goodwill).
536 See Special Report, supra note 1, at 166.
537 See supra note 533.
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tainty. The Code protects the seller from unwarranted claims by
requiring the buyer to prove that the seller did foresee or should
have foreseen the loss of goodwill and that the loss proximately re-
sulted from the seller's breach. Only after the buyer has met these
threshold requirements does the fact-amount doctrine lower the evi-
dentiary standard required to meet the Code's reasonable certainty
provision.
(3) Duty to Cover. A buyer may only recover those consequent-
ial losses "which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or
otherwise."538 The Code's mitigation requirement reduces the
seller's overall liability to the difference between the cost of reason-
able cover and the actual damages under the contract. Thus, the
Code attempts to place the buyer in the same economic position
that he would have occupied had the seller performed as war-
ranted. 53 9 The duty to cover also reduces difficulties associated with
calculating damages and allows the buyer to achieve the primary ob-
jective of securing conforming goods.540
The greatest practical difficulty with the cover requirement lies
in determining what activities qualify as reasonable attempts to
cover. If the buyer is unable to cover because of either lack of pres-
ent resources or unavailability of alternative conforming goods,
courts may still award consequential damages. 541 If circumstances
538 U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a).
Subsection (2)(b), seemingly designed principally for consumer situations, does not
impose a mitigation requirement. The reason for the distinction between the two sub-
sections is that commercial parties can control risks through contractual planning more
easily than the consumer, who frequently is in no position to negotiate the terms of sale.
Moreover, the consumer is frequently unable to effect cover because of either a lack of
resources or becausc the harm resulting from the defective goods is not readily remedia-
ble. See Special Project, supra note 1, at 252 n.938. The Code defines "cover" as follows:
"making in good faith and without reasonable delay any reasonable purchase of or con-
tract to purchase goods in substitution for those due from the seller." U.C.C. § 2-
712(1).
539 Dura-Wood Treating Co. v. Century Forest Indus., 675 F.2d 745, 753, 33 U.C.C.
Rep. 1201, 1212 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 865 (1982); see supra text accompanying
note 525. The cover requirement also helps prevent the buyer from profiting as a result
of the seller's breach.
540 675 F.2d at 753, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1212-13.
541 See, e.g., Wullschleger & Co. v. Jenny Fashions, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 373, 378, 41
U.C.C. Rep. 1213, 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (buyer recovers lost profits after reasonable but
unsuccessful attempt to purchase substitute fabric); Bende & Sons, Inc. v. Crown Recre-
ation, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 1018, 1022-23, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 1587, 1593 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(reselling buyer awarded lost profits for nondelivery of 11,000 army combat boots where
it was unable to locate substitute goods), aff'd, 722 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1983); cf. Chatlos
Sys. Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738, 746, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 647,
657 (D.N.J. 1979) (buyer in no position to cover by obtaining alternate computer sys-
tem), remanded on other grounds, 635 F.2d 1081, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 416 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
dismissed, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982).
1252 [Vol. 72:1159
ARTICLE TWO WARRANTIES
make cover impossible the buyer should cooperate with the seller's
efforts to make the goods conforming. Failure to cooperate in good
faith or to effect cover may reduce consequential damages in pro-
portion to the losses that the buyer could have avoided through rea-
sonable attempts to mitigate. 542
One court has held that the buyer may cover by manufacturing
the goods internally. In Dura-Wood Treating Co. v. Century Forest In-
dustries543 the seller breached by not supplying cross-ties at the con-
tract price.544  After soliciting price quotations from other
manufacturers, the buyer determined that producing the ties inter-
nally was cheaper than buying substitutes. 54 The court found this
method of cover reasonable because it provided goods that were the
object of the contract and reduced the buyer's overall damages. 546
Moreover, by covering in this manner, the buyer did "not have to
prove damages through more onerous means." 547 The Dura-Wood
opinion, however, suggests that courts should not compel buyers to
cover by producing goods internally. Frequently, a buyer with the
capacity to produce the goods internally will suffer lost volume prof-
its. In Dura-Wood the buyer could have sold the cross-ties used for
cover to new or different customers at the higher market price. 548
The court, however, denied the buyer recovery for profits lost by
using the goods to cover rather than to fill other orders because
"Century Forest should not be obligated to pay for Dura-Wood's
poor choice." 549 Following this reasoning to its logical conclusion,
Dura-Wood should have bought cross-ties at the higher market
price and recovered the price differential from the breaching seller.
The buyer then could have sold internally manufactured ties at the
market price. The court might have awarded lost profits had the
buyer demonstrated that it actually had to forego some orders.550
The lesson of Dura-Woods is that a buyer may cover by manufactur-
542 See, e.g., Larry Goad & Co. v. Lordstown Rubber Co., 560 F. Supp. 583, 588, 36
U.C.C. Rep. 167 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (reducing buyer's damages by the amount third party
offered to pay and buyer unreasonably refused to accept); Chatlos Sys., 479 F. Supp. at
746, 27 U.C.C. Rep. at 657 (denying buyer recovery of consequential damages when it
refused to cooperate with seller's attempts to cure).
543 675 F.2d 745, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 1201 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 865 (1982).
544 Id. at 748, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1204.
545 Id., 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1204.
546 Id. at 753-54, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1212-13.
547 Id. at 753, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1213.
548 Id. at 755, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1215.
549 Id., 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1216. One concern in internal cover cases is that damages
may be too speculative. See, e.g., Cives Corp. v. Callier Steel Pipe & Tube, Inc., 482 A.2d
852, 858-60, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 1705, 1713-16 (Me. 1984) (buyer could not recover claims
for overhead expenses associated with internal cover because of inadequate proof of
loss).
550 675 F.2d at 755, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1216.
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ing substitute goods internally, but in so doing risks losing profits
that could have been made by selling the goods used for cover on
the open market.
To recover consequential damages, a buyer need not choose
what, in hindsight, appears the best method of mitigation. In S.J.
Groves & Sons Co. v. Warner Co. 55 1 the seller failed to deliver adequate
supplies of ready-mixed concrete at the scheduled times, but reas-
sured the buyer that it would make the deliveries.552 The buyer, had
one alternative source for ready-mixed concrete, but that supplier
had limited production facilities, charged more for the concrete, and
did not have certification to do state work.553 Commenting that
"[t]here are situations in which continuing with the performance of
an unsatisfactory contractor will avoid losses which might be exper-
ienced by engaging others to complete the project, '554 the Third
Circuit held that the buyer met its obligation to mitigate by cooper-
ating with the seller. 555
In an alternative holding, the Groves court adopted the "equal
opportunity doctrine": "Where both the plaintiff and the defendant
have had equal opportunity to reduce the damages by the same act
and it is equally reasonable to expect the defendant to minimize
damages, the defendant is in no position to contend that the plain-
tiff failed to mitigate."'556 Thus, the court held that the seller had an
obligation to cover the buyer's losses because the seller could have
engaged the alternative supplier to meet the delivery schedule. 557
The Seventh Circuit in Cates v. Morgan Portable Building Corp.558
rejected the "equal opportunity doctrine" because it conflicts with
the policy behind the duty to cover: "to preserve the buyer's incen-
tive to consider a wide range of possible methods of mitigation of
damages." 559 Less incentive would exist if a buyer could rely on the
seller's ability to find substitute goods or make the present goods
conforming.
Courts should reject the "equal opportunity doctrine" because
the economic inefficiency it creates outweighs any fairness argu-
ments that support it. The buyer is often in a better position to
assess the potential damages flowing from the breach of warranty
and is therefore in a better position to determine appropriate steps
551 576 F.2d 524, 24 U.C.C. Rep. I (3d Cir. 1978).
552 Id. at 526, 24 U.C.C. Rep. at 4.
553 Id., 24 U.C.C. Rep. at 4.
554 Id. at 530, 24 U.C.C. Rep. at 10.
555 Id., 24 U.C.C. Rep. at 10.
556 Id., 24 U.C.G. Rep. at 10.
557 Id., 24 U.C.C. Rep. at 10.
558 780 F.2d 683, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 451 (7th Cir. 1985).
559 Id. at 689, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 457.
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to reduce losses.560 This is particularly true with consequential
damages, which flow from the buyer's particular situation.561 The
Code imposes liability on the seller to the full extent of the buyer's
consequential losses, even if the amount of the damages was not
foreseeable; 562 thus the party in the best position to reduce losses
should have an affirmative duty to do so. Moreover, because the
seller often has the burden of establishing the buyer's failure to
cover,563 the buyer's claim that the seller passed up an equal oppor-
tunity to cover would unduly burden the seller. The seller would
have to show not only that the buyer failed to cover, but that the
seller lacked the opportunity. These considerations outweigh the
fairness argument that would place responsibility to mitigate on the
breaching seller as well as the innocent buyer.564 Finally, efforts to
cover may allow the buyer to recover for loss incurred after discov-
ery of the defect. Normally, a buyer may not recover consequential
damages for losses which occur after the buyer discovers the defect
in the goods. 565 Nevertheless, in Prutch v. Ford Motor Co. 566 the court
allowed farmers to recover such losses from the seller of defective
farm equipment. The court reasoned that the farmers had a duty to
mitigate by producing a partial crop, and this necessitated the use of
the defective equipment.567
Courts permit a wide range of activities to constitute mitigation
560 See id. at 688, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 455-56.
561 See supra note 403 and accompanying text.
562 See supra notes 512-27 and accompanying text.
563 Cases are split on the burden to prove failure to cover. See Cates v. Morgan Port-
able Bldg. Corp., 780 F.2d 683, 688, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 451, 455-56 (burden on seller to
prove failure to mitigate); Carnation Co. v. Olivet Egg Ranch, 229 Cal. Rptr. 261, 266-
67, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 1531, 1534-40 (1986) (burden on breaching party to prove inade-
quacy of efforts to mitigate consequential damages). But see International Petroleum
Serv. v. S&N Well Serv., Inc., 230 Kan. 452, 463, 639 P.2d 29, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 217, 229
(1982) (buyer must prove compliance with cover requirement). Some courts place the
burden of proving attempts to cover on the buyer, and the burden of proving the impro-
priety of such attempts on the seller. Kiser v. Lemco Indus., Inc., 536 N.W.2d 585, 589,
19 U.C.C. Rep. 1134, 1139 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
564 See supra text accompanying note 556.
565 Consequential damages created by a buyer's use of a product after discovery of a
defect may not be recovered in a breach-of-warranty action. General Instrument Corp.
v. Pennsylvania Pressed Metals, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 139, 149-50, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 829,
835-37 (M.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 506 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 1974); Michigan Sugar Co. v.
Jebavy-Sorenson Orchard Co., 66 Mich. App. 642, 646, 239 N.W.2d 693, 695, 19 U.C.C.
Rep. 100, 103 (1976); cf U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 5 ("Where the injury involved follows
the use of goods without discovery of the defect causing the damage, the question of
'proximate' cause turns on whether it was reasonable for the buyer to use the goods
without such inspection as would have revealed the defects. If it was not reasonable for
him to do so, or if he did in fact discover the defect prior to his use, the injury would not
proximately result from the breach of warranty.")
566 618 P.2d 657, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 1507 (1980) (per curiam).
567 Id. at 662, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 1514.
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so long as they do not find bad faith. 568 A buyer who incurs reason-
ably avoidable losses acts in bad faith and the Code reduces dam-
ages accordingly. The decision of whether a buyer should have
covered losses depends upon the Code's policy concerns and the
court's judgment concerning the buyer's good faith actions.
C. Conclusions
The Code's damages provisions present two principal policy is-
sues: the extent to which the seller should be held liable for breach
of warranty and the amount of proof the buyer must produce to
recover claimed losses. These policy issues do not generally arise
with the Code's incidental damages provisions because the claims
result directly from the goods involved in the transaction; 569 they
are more capable of proof. Consequential damages, however, pres-
ent greater difficulties. The Code allows courts to award damages
for breach of warranty in many situations. The seller is liable for
breach of warranty when the goods fail to meet their implied war-
ranty of merchantability or implied warranty for a particular pur-
pose.570 Additionally, a wide range of actions may create express
warranties that trigger liability against the seller.571
Although the frequent creation of warranties suggests that the
buyer should easily recover both primary and incidental damages,
recovery of consequential losses is not so easy. The Code presumes
that commercial parties can more efficiently allocate risk by contract
than through litigation and it therefore limits the seller's liability by
requiring cover and foreseeability. The foreseeability requirement
568 U.C.C. § 2-712 comment 2 states, "The test of proper cover is whether at the
time and place the buyer acted in good faith and in a reasonable manner, and it is imma-
terial that hindsight may prove that the method of cover used was not the cheapest or
most effective." Id.; see also Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 775 F.2d 587, 590 n.2, 41
U.C.C. Rep. 1553, 1557 n.2 (4th Cir. 1985) (buyer's hiring of neighboring farmers to
plant after tractor failed was reasonable cover); Huntington Beach Union High School
Dist. v. Continental Information Sys., 621 F.2d 353, 357, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 112, 116-17
(9th Cir. 1980) (purchase of substitute computer system following seller's failure to de-
liver not made in bad faith); Wullschleger & Co. v. Jenny Fashions, Inc., 618 F. Supp.
373, 378, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 1213, 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (buyer's unsuccessful but good
faith effort to purchase substitute fabrics satisfied cover requirement); Bende & Sons,
Inc. v. Crown Recreation, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 1018, 1022-23, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 1587, 1593
(E.D.N.Y. 1982) (buyer's good faith effort to locate substitute army boots satisfied sec-
tion 2-715(2)(a)), aft'd, 722 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1983); Leininger v. Sola, 314 N.W.2d 39,
49, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 191, 205 (N.D. 1981) (purchase of one bull to impregnate cows
reasonable cover for seller's failure to provide pregnant cows). But see Larry Goad & Co.
v. Lordstown Rubber Co., 560 F. Supp. 583, 588, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 167 (E.D. Mo. 1983)
(buyer's refusal to accept money offered by its customer for the value of its work upon
cancellation of contract resulted in reduction of buyer's consequential damages).
569 See supra note 424 and accompanying text.
570 See supra notes 186-202 and accompanying text.
571 See supra notes 38-142 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 72:11591256
ARTICLE TWO WARRANTIES
assures that, at the time of contracting, the parties at least implicitly
allocated the risks of loss associated with the transaction. Likewise,
the duty to cover reflects the view that reasonable parties expect
each other to minimize losses. The Code permits efficient breach to
the extent that a breaching party can calculate potential losses asso-
ciated with the breach and consider the buyer's ability to mitigate
losses. If the risks of entering a transaction outweigh the potential
profits, the Code authorizes the parties to exclude liability for con-
sequential losses.
Once a court determines that the parties implicitly agreed to
allocate the risk of consequential loss, a reduced evidentiary stan-
dard applies. Under the fact-amount doctrine, once the buyer es-
tablishes that a loss ocurred, the buyer need not establish the exact
amount of loss to recover. The buyer must, however, establish the
creation-and subsequent breach-of a warranty. Once the buyer
makes this showing, the Code's damages provisions establish a
framework for the accurate assessment of loss and reasonable stan-
dards for recovery of such losses.
V
LIMITATIONS ON WARRANTY LIABILITY
We have examined thus far the creation of both express and
implied warranties in commercial sales and considered a buyer's po-
tential remedies against a seller who has breached his warranty obli-
gations. For the most part, we have assumed a passive seller who
leaves the resolution of warranty conflicts to the Code rather than to
contract. Such an assumption is unrealistic in an actual commercial
context, for sellers often carefully draft agreements to limit signifi-
cantly their exposure to warranty liability. Sellers may employ sec-
tion 2-316 to negate virtually all implied warranties in commercial
transactions. Section 2-719 allows sellers to restrict buyer recovery
for breach of warranty, thus limiting the reach of undisclaimable ex-
press warranties.
Applying sections 2-316 and 2-719 to both commercial and
consumer transactions creates tension. The drafters found com-
mercial utility in allowing parties to allocate contractually the risks
inherent in any sale. 572 The drafters tempered this power, however,
by imposing procedural and substantive requirements to protect un-
sophisticated buyers. 573 Because commercial sellers need less pro-
572 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 170.
573 Note that the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improve-
ment Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982), imposes federal limitations on disclaimers to
consumers. Section 2-316 might have differed had it been drafted after the Magnuson-
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tection, courts are less likely to demand strict compliance with the
requirements in cases involving sophisticated buyers.
A. Basic Purpose of Section 2-316
Sellers often include phrases like "there are no warranties ex-
press or implied" in their sales contracts to limit liability. Section 2-
316 establishes the requirements that these phrases must meet to
serve as effective disclaimers of warranties. The section
is designed principally to deal with those frequent clauses in sales
contracts which seek to exclude "all warranties, express or im-
plied." It seeks to protect a buyer from unexpected and unbar-
gained language of disclaimer by denying effect to such language
when inconsistent with language of express warranty and permit-
ting the exclusion of implied warranties only by conspicuous lan-
guage or other circumstances which protect the buyer from
surprise.574
In seeking to protect buyers from unbargained disclaimers, section
2-316 establishes procedures to ensure that the buyer knows the
risks he undertakes regarding product quality pursuant to the
agreement.5 75
B. Disclaimers and Express Warranties-Section 2-316(1)
The Code's position regarding conflicts between express war-
ranties and disclaimers appears in section 2-316(1):
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express war-
ranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty
shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each
other; but subject to the provisions of this Article on parol or ex-
trinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limitation is inopera-
tive to the extent that such construction is unreasonable. 576
In accordance with the Code's mandate that warranties and dis-
claimers be reconciled "wherever reasonable," courts may interpret
a disclaimer narrowly rather than simply declare it invalid.57 7 When
Moss Act went into effect. The drafters could have avoided the present tension in the
Code by relying on the Magnuson-Moss Act to protect consumers.
574 U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 1.
575 See 2 W. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-316:01, at 376-77
(1984).
576 U.C.C. § 2-316(1).
577 See, e.g., Limited Flying Club, Inc. v. Wood, 632 F.2d 51, 57, 29 U.C.C. Rep.
1497, 1503-04 (8th Cir. 1980) (reading "as is" disclaimer "to disclaim all implied war-
ranties, leaving the written express warranties... intact"); Fundin v. Chicago Pneumatic
Tool Co., 152 Cal. App. 3d 951, 958, 199 Cal. Rptr. 789, 794-95, 38 U.C.C. Rep. 55, 60
(1984) (construing disclaimer not to exclude express description which could not rea-
sonably be disclaimed rather than simply finding disclaimer ineffective); Paulson v. Ol-
son Implement Co., 107 Wis. 2d 510, 520, 319 N.W.2d 855, 859-60, 34 U.C.C. Rep.
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courts cannot construe away apparent inconsistencies, however, the
Code declares inoperative disclaimers that conflict with express war-
ranties. 578 Most courts routinely579 refuse to give effect to disclaim-
ers that negate express warranties. 580
1. Warranty Language in the Written Agreement-Consistency
a. Words of Disclaimer and the Basis of the Bargain. An express
warranty, once created, may not be disclaimed. But words of dis-
claimer may help to prevent the formation of express warranties by
excluding warranties from the basis of the bargain. 581 Subsection
146, 153 (1982) (finding disclaimer does not apply to specially manufactured equipment
like that at issue but noting that, if disclaimer did apply to the equipment, disclaimer
would be ineffective as inconsistent with the express warranty).
578 Ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the express warranty. See, e.g., Hartman
v. Jensen's, Inc. 277 S.C. 501, 504, 289 S.E.2d 648, 649, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 889, 890-91
(1982) (disclaimer placed under bold heading of "TERMS OF WARRANTY" ineffective
because it created an ambiguity not likely to alert the consumer of exclusion of war-
ranty); W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76, 81, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 64, 71
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979) ("mhe inconsistent language of the instruments . . . creates a
question of fact as to the intention of the parties .... [A]ny ambiguity [should] ... be
resolved in favor of the express warranty.").
579 In applying the Uniform Commercial Code to leases in three recent cases, fed-
eral district courts ignored the express mandate of section 2-316(1) and found disclaim-
ers of express warranties effective. See Agristor Credit Corp. v. Schmidlin, 601 F. Supp.
1307, 1315-16, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 1653, 1659 (D. Or. 1985) ("Whether the U.C.C. applies
or not, [the lessor] disclaimed all warranties, either express or implied. The disclaimers
are conspicuous and are valid under Oregon law.") (emphasis added) (footnote omit-
ted); Agristor Leasing v. Hansen, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 1660, 1666 n.7 (D. Minn. 1985) ("The
lease provision in [question] ... effectively disclaims any express warranties which might
exist."); Agristor Leasing v. Kjergaard, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 1667, 1671 n.5 (D. Minn. 1985)
(same). These cases seem to be based on St. Paul Leasing Co. v. Winkel's Inc., 309
Minn. 583, 244 N.W.2d 661 (1976) (granting summary judgment in favor of lessor en-
forcing disclaimer terms in lease despite finding that salesman for lessor "made certain
representations . . . concerning the performance of the equipment"). These cases
should not be followed.
580 See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 777 F.2d 405, 412, 42
U.C.C. Rep. 1, 12 (8th Cir. 1985) (disclaimer inoperable when inherently inconsistent
with the warranty specifications as found by the jury); Consolidated Data Terminals v.
Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 708 F.2d 385, 391, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 59, 67 (9th Cir. 1983)
(express statements prevail over general warranty disclaimer); Schlenz v. John Deere
Co., 511 F. Supp. 224, 229, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 1020, 1027 (D. Mont. 1981) (disclaimer
"ineffective to destroy the express warranty of safety made in the operator's manual");
First New England Fin. Corp. v. Woffard, 421 So. 2d 590, 597, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 650, 658
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (disclaimer of warranty of fitness for particular purpose inef-
fective when warranty essential factor in the initial agreement between the parties); Cen-
tury Dodge, Inc. v. Mobley, 155 Ga. App. 712, 713, 272 S.E.2d 502, 504, 30 U.C.C. Rep.
844, 846 (1980) (unreasonable to allow express warranty, a description of car as new, to
be negated by disclaimer); H. G. Fischer X-Ray Co. v. Meredith, 121 N.H. 707, 710, 433
A.2d 1306, 1308, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 1586, 1589 (1981) (effective warranty created by the
description of goods despite a disclaimer in the installment contract).
581 For a detailed discussion of express warranties and the basis of the bargain, see
supra notes 61-142 and accompanying text. Note also, however, that a disclaimer may
not be given effect if it simply is not part of the bargain between the parties. See McNa-
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(1) emphasizes that courts should attempt to construe words of dis-
claimer and warranty consistently wherever reasonable. This re-
minds courts that the underlying goal of buyer protection does not
override section 2-313's express warranty requirements. According
to section 2-313 comment 4, parties may consciously make any bar-
gain they wish. Thus, the parties may, by carefully disclaiming war-
ranties, create an agreement without warranties.
Universal Drilling Co. v. Camay Drilling Co. 582 illustrates how a dis-
claimer may operate to prevent the creation of an express warranty.
In Universal Drilling the Tenth Circuit applied section 2-316(1) to
find that the description of the used goods accompanying the con-
tract did not create an express warranty. The court reasoned that
"[t]he exhibits to the contract that described the goods must be read
in conjunction with the contract itself. ' 58 3 In an agreement between
"experienced, sophisticated, intelligent business [persons] with vast
education and experience" 58 4 the court gave effect to the contrac-
tual statement that "the goods are used and there is no guarantee
that they are fit or even operable."585 The court stated that it could
not "think of alternative language which would memorialize the in-
tent of the parties-to purchase and sell used 'as is' equipment
which has value but which may need repairs or additional parts to be
fit and operable."586 This specific disclaiming language, in conjunc-
tion with sections 2-313 and 2-316, prevented the formation of any
warranties. 587
Most courts, however, do not enforce such disclaimers. 588
Courts often find the disclaimer inoperative because it conflicts with
the product's description. While such findings may protect buyers
from unexpected disclaimers, courts should avoid a reflexive pro-
buyer, antidisclaimer stance. Courts should carefully consider the
entire contract to determine whether the description forms a guar-
antee that the parties consider integral to the bargain, or whether
they consider the disclaimer integral to the bargain and the descrip-
mara Pontiac, Inc. v. Sanchez, 388 So. 2d 620, 621, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 931, 932 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1980) (dealer warranty disclaimer not given effect when neither purpose of
document nor nature of disclaimer discussed with buyer and salesman described dealer
warranty to buyer); Rottinghaus v. Howell, 35 Wash. App. 99, 106-07, 666 P.2d 899,
903, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 42, 47-48 (1983) (disclaimers ineffective because not part of bar-
gain between parties).
582 737 F.2d 869, 38 U.C.G. Rep. 1576 (10th Cir. 1984).
583 Id. at 874, 38 U.C.C. Rep. at 1581.
584 Id. at 870, 38 U.C.C. Rep. at 1577.
585 Id. at 874, 38 U.C.C. Rep. at 1581 (emphasis in original).
586 Id. at 871, 38 U.C.C. Rep. at 1581.
587 See also Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 696 F.2d 287, 291, 35 U.G.C. Rep. 91, 96
(4th Cir. 1982) (disclaimer on label limited warranties to those expressly stated; dis-
claimer instrumental in preventing creation of any parol warranties).
588 See supra note 580.
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tion merely secondary. Although section 2-316(1) subordinates dis-
claimers to warranties in the event of conflict, both section 2-313
and section 2-316 mandate enforcement of the bargain between the
parties. Rather than declare any inconsistent disclaimer inoperative,
courts must evaluate carefully all descriptions589 and only enforce
those that clearly constitute warranties basic to the bargain.
b. "Time Warranties'"--A Special Problem of Consistency. Sellers
often limit the duration of warranties. Time qualifications may di-
rectly limit the duration of the warranty or simply limit the period590
after delivery in which a buyer must notify the seller of a breach to
recover under the warranty. Such limitations effectively exclude
warranties covering nonconformities that a buyer could not reason-
ably discover within the prescribed time period.591 So long as such
exclusions do not conflict with express warranties, courts should en-
force these limitations. 592 Conflicts may arise when a seller provides
an unqualified warranty in one clause while a subsequent clause at-
tempts to qualify it by establishing a time limit.593 Sellers can avoid
these conflicts by extending limited warranties only, or by placing
clauses describing the time limit immediately after the warranty. For
example, rather than make an unqualified promise that items are of
good, merchantable quality, a seller might simply warrant goods
against any defects discovered within a certain time period.
Professors White and Summers have noted that "[s]ince the
Code does not oblige the seller to make any express warranties, lim-
itations on such warranties should stand in the absence of inconsis-
tency under [section] 2-316(1)." 5 94 Since 1978, few reported cases
have addressed the problem of "time warranties." Courts that have
addressed the issue appear more willing to enforce time limitations
than they were in 1978. 595
589 Pictures in advertisements and brochures may also create undisclaimable warran-
ties. See Grady, Inadvertent Creation of Express Warranties: Caveats for Pictorial Product Repre-
sentations, 15 U.C.C. L.J. 268 (1983).
590 Special Project, supra note 1, at 173.
591 Id.
592 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 12-2, at 431 n.19 (2d ed. 1980).
593 See, e.g., Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 404-05,
244 N.E. 2d 685, 689, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108, 112-13, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 1213, 1217-18 (1968)
(clause excluding liability for defects discovered more than 10 days after delivery does
not limit unqualified express warranty that yarn was of good, merchantable quality).
594 J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 12-2, at 431 n.19.
595 See Kodiak Elec. Ass'n., Inc. v. DeLaval Turbine, Inc., 694 P.2d 150, 156-57, 40
U.C.C. Rep. 155, 158-59 (Alaska 1984) (neither citing nor considering section 2-316 in
finding 18-month warranty provision effective); Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d
943, 953, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 1277, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (jury could find buyer aware
of warranty's limited duration and thus find it effective); McCullough v. General Motors
Corp., 577 F. Supp. 41, 44, 47, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 1529, 1532, 1536 (W.D. Tenn. 1982)
(Question of fact whether language "ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY APPLICABLE TO
1987] 1261
1262 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1159
In Hart Engineering Co. v. FMC Corp. ,596 for example, the court
accepted the White and Summers position and validated a one-year
time warranty. The court found the warranty disclaimers governed
by section 2-316 but also found
no explicit authorization anywhere in the Code for invalidating
[time warranties]. In fact, such an approach would appear to run
at cross purposes with the spirit, if not with any specific provision,
of the Code .... [A]ssuming arguendo that the interdiction of a
time warranty might be appropriate in an exceptional case, no
such departure is merited ... [where] no ... unfairness polluted
the process by which the contract was negotiated, drafted, and ul-
timately executed. 597
2. Parol Warranties
Section 2-316(1), by explicitly referring to section 2-202,598
protects sellers' disclaimers from buyers' allegations of oral warran-
ties that the parties did not include in their complete and final
agreement.599 Most courts apply section 2-202 literally and require
that evidence of parol warranties meet the same standards of admis-
sibility as the agreement's other terms. 600 Of course, the parol evi-
THIS CAR IS LIMITED TO THE DURATION OF THIS WRITTEN WARRANTY"
effective to limit duration of all warranties; court will consider "the purpose and effect of
the time limitation, the commercial setting in which the contract was executed, the rea-
sonableness of the time limitation at the time of contracting, and the particular conse-
quences of applying such a time limitation to a safety device").
596 593 F. Supp. 1471, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 1313 (D.R.I. 1984)
597 Id. at 1479-80, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 1323-25 (footnotes omitted). The court also
considered the length of the warranty-a year rather than days-and the fact that the
seller's attempts to repair went far above and beyond the call of duty in validating the
warranty.
598 U.C.C. § 2-202 provides:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the par-
ties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the
parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms
as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior
agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be ex-
plained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by
course of performance (Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds
the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclu-
sive statement of the terms of the agreement.
599 See also U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 2 ("The seller is protected under this Article
against false allegations of oral warranties by its provisions on parol and extrinsic evi-
dence .... )
600 Parol evidence is admissible when the written agreement is not the complete and
final expression of the parties' agreement. See, e.g., Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes,
Inc., 723 F.2d 758, 763, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 1076, 1082-83 (10th Cir. 1983) (where invoice
not intended to express final agreement of the parties, district court properly submitted
express warranty question and properly excluded written disclaimer language); Comput-
erized Radiological Servs. v. Syntex Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1495, 1505, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 49,
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dence rule only protects the seller who raises the defense. 60'
Occasionally a court may fail to consider the parol evidence rule
in determining the effectiveness of a disclaimer. For example, in Art
Hill, Inc. v. Heckler60 2 the court did not mention section 2-202 in
finding a written disclaimer ineffective to disclaim an express war-
ranty created by the seller's conduct. The court noted that
"[b]ecause these affirmations were made orally and were not con-
tained in a writing intended as a final expression of the agreement,
whether they amount to an express warranty is a question of
fact." 60 3 The court found that the seller's conduct created an ex-
press warranty; 60 4 however, the court never specifically stated that
the purchase agreement was not a complete and final expression of
the parties' agreement. The court should have decided this fact
before finding the disclaimer inoperative.60 5
61-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (agreement explicitly referring to extrinsic secondary documents
not complete and exclusive statement and may be supplemented by evidence of consis-
tent additional terms), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 786 F.2d 72,42 U.C.C. Rep. 1656 (2d
Cir. 1986); Session v. Chartrand Equip. Co., 133 Ill. App. 3d 719, 725, 479 N.E.2d 376,
380, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 749, 753 (1985) (jury could find writing not final expression of
parties' agreement and thus effective oral warranty created despite disclaiming lan-
guage). Courts may properly refuse to consider parol warranties that are inconsistent
with effective disclaimers. See, e.g., Jaskey Fin. & Leasing v. Display Data Corp., 564 F.
Supp. 160, 164, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 26, 31 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (parol evidence rule precludes
claim that advertising and promotional material produced warranty where seller in-
cluded an effective disclaimer in writing); Corbett v. North Fla. Clarklift, Inc., 155 Ga.
App. 701, 701, 272 S.E.2d 563, 564, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 825, 826 (1980) (where warranty
disclaimer effective under section 2-316, evidence of contradictory prior or contempora-
neous parol agreement prohibited by section 2-202); Harper v. Calvert, 687 S.W.2d 227,
230, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 1655, 1658 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) ("The term 'as is' is not ambiguous
and parol evidence contradicting its meaning is not to be permitted under [section
202]."); Basic Adhesives, Inc. v. Robert Matzkin Co., 101 Misc. 2d 283, 288, 420
N.Y.S.2d 983, 986, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 933, 937-38 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979) ("[Slpecific written
disclaimer... governs to overcome the alleged orally expressed warranty which in any
event would run afoul of the parol evidence rule .... ); Southerland v. Northeast Dat-
sun, Inc., 659 S.W.2d 889, 891-92, 38 U.C.C. Rep. 78, 82 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (where
sales agreement unambiguous parol evidence inadmissible to show warranties that con-
flict with effective express disclaimer).
601 See, e.g., Miller v. Hubbard Wray Co., 52 Or. App. 897, 903, 630 P.2d 880, 884,
32 U.C.C. Rep. 1378, 1384 (where defendant failed to raise parol evidence rule objec-
tion, disclaimer ineffective against inconsistent express oral warranty), modified, 53 Or.
App. 531, 633 P.2d 1 (1981).
602 457 N.E.2d 242, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
603 Id. at 244, 37 U.C.C. Rep. at 700.
604 Id. at 245, 37 U.C.C. Rep. at 700.
605 Had the court considered the issue, however, it would likely have reached the
same result. The court's reference to the fact that the oral affirmations were not in a
"writing intended as afinal expression of the agreement," id. at 244, 37U.C.C. Rep. at
700 (emphasis added), leads one to believe that the court would not have found the
writing the final expression of the agreement, rendering the parol evidence admissible.
If the court had found the purchase agreement the final expression of the parties' agree-
ment, the court might still have considered the sellers' promises under the fraud excep-
tion to the parol evidence rule. The seller's repeated assurances that created the
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C. Express Disclaimers of Implied Warranties Under Section
2-316(2)
Section 2-316(2) establishes the general procedure by which a
seller can effectively disclaim the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.60 6 Subsec-
tion(2) provides:
Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied
warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must
mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspic-
uous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the
exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to ex-
clude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for
example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the
description on the face hereof."60 7
1. Language Requirements
a. Language to Disclaim the Implied Warranty of Merchantability.
Section 2-316(2) mandates that the seller use the word
"merchantability" effectively to exclude or modify the implied war-
ranty of merchantability.608 Uniformly60 9 requiring the parties to
express warranty induced the buyer to enter into the agreement. If the seller had no
intention of fulfilling the promises, then his conduct might be considered fraud under
state law. Parol evidence is admissible to prove fraud. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 5, § 2-11, at 88; see also Society Nat'l Bank v. Pemberton, 63 Ohio Misc. 26, 409
N.E.2d 1073, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 76 (Mun. Ct. 1979) (court failed to consider parol evidence
rule in finding oral express warranty created and not effectively disclaimed by conspicu-
ous written disclaimers since such disclaimers inconsistent with oral express warranty),
aff'd mem., Case No. 9502 (Ohio Ct. App.Jun. 25, 1980). Had this court considered the
parol evidence rule, it probably would have found the written agreement was not the
complete and final expression of the parties' agreement. See generally J. WHrrE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 2-1 to -12, at 50-95 (detailed analysis of parol evidence rule
and its exceptions).
606 For discussion of effective disclaimers of implied warranties under section 2-
316(3)(a), see infra notes 682-707 and accompanying text.
607 U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
608 While the express language requirements of section 2-316(2) are clear, section 2-
316(3)(a) appears to undermine completely these requirements. For a discussion of the
relationship between the two subsections, see infra notes 682-707 and accompanying
text. Nevertheless most courts enforce disclaimers under section 2-316(2) without ref-
erence to section 2-316(3)(a). See, e.g., Two Rivers Co. v. Curtiss Breeding Serv., 624
F.2d 1242, 1252, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 1169, 1179 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying only section 2-
316(2) to find effective disclaimer of merchantability); Hi Neighbor Enters., Inc. v. Bur-
roughs Corp., 492 F. Supp. 823, 826, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 1256, 1260 (N.D. Fla. 1980) (hold-
ing that "[the warranty exclusions of the contracts in this case meet the requirements
for modification or exclusion" after citing section 2-316(2)); Rocky Mountain Helicop-
ters, Inc. v. Bell Helicopter Co., 491 F. Supp. 611, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 127 (N.D. Tex. 1979)
(enforcing a waiver that refers specifically to merchantability, without reference to the
requirements of section 2-316(3)(a)).
609 Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 73 (Ist Cir.
1962), appeared to ignore this requirement by finding a waiver of the warranty of
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use the word "merchantability" before enforcing disclaimers, courts
have adopted the express language of section 2-316(2).610
b. Language to Disclaim the Implied Warranty of Fitness. Section 2-
316(2) does not require specific language to disclaim the implied
warranty of fitness. Rather, written and conspicuous general lan-
guage that clearly demonstrates the seller's intent suffices to dis-
claim such warranties. 611 The case law does not include many
examples of effective612 or ineffective 613 uses of general language to
disclaim the implied warranty of fitness. Successful disclaimers of
merchantability even though the specific language was not used. Roto-Lith was expressly
rejected in Potler v. MCP Facilities Corp., 471 F. Supp. 1344, 1350, 26 U.C.C. Rep. 651,
661 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) ("We believe we must follow the example set by [Zicari v. Harris
Co., 33 A.D.2d 17, 304 N.Y.S.2d 918, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 1246 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969),] rather
than Roto-Lith and hold that the language printed on MCP's brochure and labels does
not exclude or modify the warranty of merchantability." ) (footnote omitted).
610 See, e.g., Jaskey Fin. & Leasing v. Display Data Corp., 564 F. Supp. 160, 165, 36
U.C.C. Rep. 26, 33 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (upholding claim for breach of implied warranty of
merchantability on a motion to dismiss because the disclaimer provisions in the con-
tracts, although conspicuous, failed to mention the word merchantability); Wright v. T &
B Auto Sales, Inc., 72 N.C. App. 449, 453, 325 S.E.2d 493, 496, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 58, 61-
62 (1985) (ineffective disclaimer where no mention of "merchantability"); Allis-Chal-
mers Credit Corp. v. Herbolt, 17 Ohio App. 3d 230, 234, 479 N.E.2d 293, 298, 41
U.C.C. Rep. 485, 491 (1984) (no effective disclaimer because "the word 'merchantable'
occurs in the express warranty but is not found in the disclaiming language") (emphasis in
original); Discount Drug Corp. v. Honeywell Protection Servs., Div. of Honeywell, Inc.,
303 Pa. Super. 522, 525-26, 450 A.2d 49, 50, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 491, 494 (1982) (finding
ineffective disclaimer where contract neither mentions the term "merchantability" nor
indicates that the buyer takes the goods "with all faults" or "as is").
611 "Unlike the implied warranty of merchantability, implied warranties of fitness for
a particular purpose may be excluded by general language, but only if it is in writing and
conspicuous." U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 4 (emphasis added).
612 See, e.g., Jaskey Fin. &Leasing, 564 F. Supp. at 163, 36 U.C.C. Rep. at 30 ("EX-
CEPT AS SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED HEREIN, THERE ARE NO WARRANTIES, EX-
PRESS OR IMPLIED, WHICH EXTEND BEYOND THE DESCRIPTION ON THE
FACE OR THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF" effectively disclaims implied warranty of
fitness); R & L Grain Co. v. Chicago E. Corp., 531 F. Supp. 201, 207, 209, 33 U.C.C.
Rep. 532, 535, 539 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("THERE ARE NO WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR OTHERWISE WHICH EXTEND BEYOND THE DESCRIP-
TION OF THE FACE HEREOF AND NO WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND WITH RE-
SPECT TO ELECTRIC MOTORS" effectively disclaims the implied warranty of fitness);
Cline v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 690 S.W.2d 764, 768, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 430, 436 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1985) (effective disclaiming language on purchase order: "THERE ARE NO WAR-
RANTIES WHICH EXTEND BEYOND THE FACE OF THOSE EXPRESSLY STATED
HEREIN" and "COMPANY... DOES NOT MAKE ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS"); Allis-Chalmers Credit Corp. v. Herbolt, 17
Ohio App. 3d 230, 234, 479 N.E.2d 293, 298, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 485,491 (1984) ("THERE
ARE NO WARRANTIES WHICH EXTEND BEYOND THOSE EXPRESSLY STATED
HEREIN" effective disclaimer of implied warranty of fitness).
613 See, e.g., Imperial Stamp & Engraving Co. v. Bailey, 82 Ill. App. 3d 835, 838, 403
N.E.2d 294, 297, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 1307, 1310 (1980) (language "overall production is not
guaranteed" is unclear and ambiguous thus failing to waive the implied warranty of
fitness).
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this sort use language very similar to that recommended in section
2-316(2): for example, "There are no warranties which extend be-
yond the description on the face hereof."'6 14 Although the Code
does not require mention of the word fitness, cautious sellers often
preclude the creation of any implied warranty of fitness by explicitly
mentioning "fitness" in the disclaimer.6 15 Sellers risk an ineffective
disclaimer if they stray too far from the recommended language.6 16
2. Conspicuousness
Section 2-316(2) instructs courts to give effect only to conspicu-
ous disclaimers of implied warranties. Courts6 17 must choose be-
tween an objective and a subjective test for conspicuousness. "The
drafters apparently felt that the goals of certainty, long-run buyer
protection, and avoidance of difficult fact questions counseled
against looking beyond the 'four comers' of the written instru-
ment. ' 618 Some courts believe that this suggests that an objective
test is the appropriate test to determine conspicuousness.6 19 Other
courts, however, reject the objective test and consider the buyer's
actual awareness of the disclaimer in evaluating its conspicuous-
ness. 620 Still other courts have adopted the "modified objective
test,"' 62 ' suggested in the 1978 Special Project, which we continue
to advocate.
614 See supra note 612.
615 See, e.g., Schlenz v.John Deere Co., 511 F. Supp. 224, 228, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 1020,
1026 (D. Mont. 1981) (contract language states that the contract does not "MAKE ANY
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS"); Spring Motors Dis-
tribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 NJ. 555, 563, 489 A.2d 660, 664, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 1184,
1188 (1985) ("THIS WARRANTY IS IN LIEU OF ALL OTHER WARRANTIES ...
EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED AND THERE IS NO IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.").
616 See Imperial Stamp & Engraving Co., 82 Ill. App. 3d at 838, 403 N.E.2d at 297, 28
U.C.C. Rep. at 1310 (merely stating "OVERALL PRODUCTION IS NOT GUARAN-
TEED" is insufficient to disclaim warranty of fitness).
617 Note that conspicuousness is a question of law, not fact. See U.C.C. § 1-201(10)
("Whether a term or clause is 'conspicuous' or not is for decision by the court."); see also
Bert Smith Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Franklin, 400 So. 2d 1235, 1237, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 1273,
1275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (conspicuousness is a question of law, but seller waived
objection to jury instruction on this question when it failed to object at trial); Todd
Equip. Leasing Co. v. Milligan, 395 A.2d 818, 820, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 704, 707 (Me. 1978)
(trial court erred in submitting question of conspicuousness to jury).
618 Special Project, supra note 1, at 182.
619 For a complete discussion of the objective test, see infra notes 622-46 and accom-
panying text.
620 For a complete discussion of the buyer awareness test, see infra notes 647-54 and
accompanying text.
621 Special Project, supra note 1, at 185; see supra notes 597-99 and accompanying
text (discussing a different instance when the Code suggests going beyond the four cor-
ners of the document). For a complete discussion of the "modified objective test," see
infra notes 655-62 and accompanying text.
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a. The Objective Test. Section 1-201(10) defines "conspicuous."
It suggests an objective test focusing on whether a disclaimer is "so
written" that a "reasonable" buyer ought to have noticed it.622 Sec-
tion 1-201(10) provides:
A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a
reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have
noticed it. A printed heading in capitals (as: NON-NEGOTIABLE
BILL OF LADING) is conspicuous. Language in the body of a
form is "conspicuous" if it is in larger or other contrasting type or
color. But in a telegram any stated term is "conspicuous". 623
Many courts base their decisions on the conspicuousness of the writ-
ten words alone.624 In evaluating the conspicuousness of a written
disclaimer, these courts frequently consider the location of and
reference to the disclaimer in the contract, 625 the type face, type
size, and variation in printing,626 the heading referring to the dis-
622 Although the Code requires that disclaimers of the implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose be written, the Code does not mandate that disclaimers of im-
plied warranties of merchantability be written. The conspicuousness requirement is lim-
ited to written disclaimers. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) ("the language must mention
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous") (emphasis added); see also
Two Rivers Co. v. Curtiss Breeding Serv., 624 F.2d 1242, 1252, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 1169,
1179 (5th Cir. 1980) ("To disclaim an implied warranty of merchantability, the dis-
claimer.., in the case of a writing, must be conspicuous.").
623 U.C.C. § 1-201(10).
624 Note, however, that some courts consider the sophistication of the buyer or par-
ity of bargaining power in evaluating the conspicuousness of the disclaimer. For a de-
tailed discussion of the modified objective text, see infra notes 655-62 and accompanying
text. See, e.g., R & L Grain Co. v. Chicago E. Corp., 531 F. Supp. 201, 209, 33 U.C.C.
Rep. 532, 538 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("The instant warranty [exclusion] is reasonably noticea-
ble, especially to a business entity participating in an arms length transaction. The exclusion ap-
pears in a separate section of the sales contract and is printed, in part, in boldface
type.") (emphasis added).
625 See, e.g., Agristor Leasing v. Guggisberg, 617 F. Supp. 902, 909, 41 U.C.C. Rep.
1671, 1678 (D. Minn. 1985) (notice provision on front insufficient to bring to attention
of reasonable buyer presence of disclaimers on back thus disclaimer inconspicuous and
ineffective); Anderson v. Farmers Hybrid Cos., 87 Ill. App. 3d 493, 502, 408 N.E.2d
1194, 1200, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 1264, 1270 (1980) ("[W]hile the type used for disclaiming
the warranties was conspicuous, in the sense of being larger than other type in the para-
graph, the presence of that paragraph on the reverse side of the order slip was not at all
conspicuous, either from the general appearance of the slip or from any conspicuous
language on the front side of the slip."); Cline v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 690 S.W.2d 764,
768, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 430, 435-36 (Ky. App. 1985) (where large type on front of agree-
ment refers to large type disclaimer on reverse, disclaimer conspicuous and effective);
Deaton, Inc. v. Aeroglide Corp., 99 N.M. 253, 256, 657 P. 2d 109, 112, 35 U.C.C. Rep.
130, 134 (1982) (Disclaimer is conspicuous if reference to disclaimer - though not ac-
tual disclaimer - printed in capital letters. "Language which refers the reader to condi-
tions or provisions on reverse side of form suffices to make language referred to
conspicuous.").
626 See, e.g., Schlenz v.John Deere Co., 511 F. Supp. 224, 228, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 1020,
1026 (D. Mont. 1981) (disclaimers which were "printed in significantly larger typeface
than the other printing in the body of the text ... [and] the only words in the body of the
text printed in capital letters" were conspicuous); Armco, Inc. v. New Horizon Dev. Co.,
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claimer, 627 or some combination of these factors. 628 Courts gener-
ally apply the same objective standards of conspicuousness to
disclaimers on labels as they do to disclaimers in written
contracts. 6
29
Courts have not adopted a universal definition of a minimally
conspicuous disclaimer. In Collins Radio Co. v. Bell 630 the Oklahoma
Court of Appeals considered a disclaimer in "minimal compliance"
229 Va. 561, 566-61, 331 S.E.2d 456, 460, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 367, 372 (1985) (because the
excluding language in the contract is in larger type it is conspicuous).
627 Courts that focus solely on the heading referring to the disclaimer tend to find
the disclaimer ineffective due to ambiguity rather than inconspicuousness. See, e.g.,
Hartman v.Jensen's, Inc., 227 S.C. 501, 504, 289 S.E.2d 648, 649, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 889,
990-91 (1982). In the typical, objective conspicuousness test the heading may be one of
several factors considered. See infra note 628.
628 See, e.g., Transurface Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 738 F.2d 42,46, 39 U.C.C.
Rep. 833, 838 (1st Cir. 1984) (effective disclaimer where print not large but "disclaimer
appears on the front of the document and the lead clause, 'DISCLAIMER OF WARRAN-
TIES' ... printed in larger type with all capital letters"); Delhomme Indus., Inc. v. Hous-
ton Beechcraft, Inc., 669 F.2d 1049, 1061, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 490, 506-07 (5th Cir. 1982)
(conspicuous waiver when written in boldface, uppercase type, located on same side of
contract as signatures, and contract contains prominent warning to read the contract
before signing); Union Exploration Co. v. Dowell Div., Dow Chem. Co., 41 U.C.C. Rep.
759, 762 (D. Kan. 1985) (considering the language, contrasting type, ink color, and size,
as well as references on front to disclaimer on reverse page, in finding disclaimer con-
spicuous); Rudy's Glass Constr. Co. v. E.F. Johnson Co., 404 So. 2d 1087, 1090, 32
U.C.C. Rep. 1373, 1374-75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("The reference on the front of the
document to terms and conditions stated on the back, when coupled with the separate
paragraph titled, 'Disclaimers of Warranties', and the contrasting type, clearly causes
disclaimer" to be conspicuous.);J & W Equip., Inc. v. Weingartner, 5 Kan. App. 2d 466,
471, 618 P.2d 862, 866, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 866, 871 (1980) (adopting a broader objective
approach to evaluating the conspicuousness of a disclaimer by referring to the whole
document rather than simply to the elements of type size, color, and contrast); Commer-
cial Credit Corp. v. CYC Realty, Inc., 102 A.D.2d 970, 972, 477 N.Y.S.2d 842, 844, 39
U.C.C. Rep. 108, 111 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (disclaimer which was "the only boldface
print in the only four paragraphs on the first page of the agreement ... [, which was]
under the broad heading of "TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF LEASE" and [which]
appear[ed] before the authorizing signatures on the front side of the agreement and not
on the back with the boilerplate paragraphs," was conspicuous); Henderson v. Benson-
Hartman Motors, Inc., 33 Pa. D. & C.3d 6, 13-14, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 782, 787 (Ct. C. P.
1983) (disclaimer inconspicuous "because it appears on the second page of the lease in
small print and would not come to the attention of the lesee unless he or she read the
entire contents of this form lease agreement").
629 See, e.g., Monsanto Agricultural Prods. Co. v. Edenfield, 426 So. 2d 574, 577, 35
U.C.C. Rep. 781, 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (disclaimer was conspicuous when ap-
pearing in bold face capitals on labels of each can and in directions for product use, and
thus effective despite buyer's claim he did not read it); Victor v. Mammana, 101 Misc. 2d
954, 955, 422 N.Y.S.2d 350, 351, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 1295, 1296 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979)
("Courts interpreting 'conspicuousness' on labels have used standards similar to those
that have been used for forms."); Basic Adhesives, Inc. v. Robert Matzkin Co., 101 Misc.
2d 283, 290, 420 N.Y.S.2d 983, 987, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 933, 939 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979)
("(C]onsidering all factors-the size, prominence, and contrast of the capitalized
words-the disclaimer on the label was sufficiently conspicuous.").
630 623 P.2d 1039, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 58 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980).
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with the conspicuousness requirement of section 2-316(2)631 when
the disclaimer appeared on the reverse side of a single sheet con-
tract, was in all capital letters set off in a separate paragraph, and
was virtually the only language in capital letters on the page.632 In
addition, an easily read, small-type reference to terms on the back
and a large-type general reference to warranties appeared on the
front of the document.633 We agree with the Collins Radio court and
maintain that this disclaimer meets the minimal requirements of an
objective test634 of conspicuousness. 635 Given the easily read refer-
ence to terms on the back and the large type and placement of the
disclaimer in a separate paragraph, we believe any reasonable buyer,
commercial or consumer, 636 ought to have noticed it when reading
the contract. Because the disclaimer certainly could have been more
conspicuous, 6 3 7 we agree that it simply meets minimal compliance.
We would counsel sellers when drafting disclaimers to observe
the following guidelines: Disclaimers should be written in large, no-
ticeable print, set off from the rest of the page, and placed below a
heading that clearly indicates that a disclaimer follows; sellers should
ensure that the disclaimer or a noticeable reference to it appears
near the buyer's signature.
A Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, apparently relying on
a statement in a federal district court decision in Pennsylvania, 63
tentatively accepted "understandable" as an element of conspicu-
ousness in Wagaman v. Don Warner Chevrolet-Buick, Inc. 639 This exten-
sion of the definition led to rather bizarre results in which the court
found a twenty-three-line paragraph, 640 although "somewhat long
631 Id. at 1051, 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 72.
632 The section headings and limitation-of-remedies clause also appeared in capital
letters. Id. at 1051, 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 71.
633 Id. at 1049-50, 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 71-72.
634 The Collins Radio court's test was not completely objective. Id. at 1051, 31 U.C.C.
Rep. at 71-72; see infra note 636.
635 The Collins Radio court considered the sophistication of both parties before find-
ing the disclaimer conspicuous. Id. at 1050, 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 72.
636 Note that the Collins Radio court specifically relied in part on the fact that the
buyer was a "sophisticated business concern" in finding the disclaimer conspicuous "in
this case, upon thesefacts." Id. at 1051, 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 72 (emphasis in original). Never-
theless, we maintain that the minimum standard adopted is suitable for objective appli-
cation even if one ignores the individual characteristics of the parties.
637 For example, the reference to the back of the contract could have appeared in
large type or the disclaiiner itself could have appeared on the front.
638 See Thermo King Corp. v. Strick Corp., 467 F. Supp. 75, 78, 26 U.C.C. Rep. 50,
53 (W.D. Pa.) ("We conclude, therefore, that such language is 'conspicuous,' since a
reasonable person should have noticed and understood it."), aff'd mer., 609 F.2d 503
(3d Cir. 1979).
639 17 Pa. D. & C.3d 572, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 1604 (Ct. C. P. 1981).
640 It is mutually understood and agreed that:
(a)(1) if said property is principally used for business or agricultural pur-
poses, or (2) if buyer is dearly informed in writing prior to the sale that
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and somewhat complicated, ' 64 1 understandable because "a little
time and patience unravels its meaning." 642 We believe, however,
that most readers would need more than a little time and patience to
unravel and understand the morass of words constituting this dis-
claimer. 643 Viewing conspicuousness without the "understandable"
gloss, a reader might accept the twenty-three-line paragraph printed
in bold type as conspicuous, although "burying [an exclusion or
modification] in a profusion of words may operate to hide and to
make it inconspicuous."6 4 4 Because section 1-102(10) simply de-
fines "conspicuous" as noticeable 645 without reference to ease of
comprehension, no other court has or should infuse an element of
understandability into the objective test of conspicuousness. 646
b. The "Evidence of Buyer Awareness" Test. In 1978 a majority of
courts considered evidence of buyer awareness to support or com-
pel the finding of an effective disclaimer in commercial transac-
tions.647 Since 1978, however, only a few courts have found
effective disclaimers compelled by evidence of buyer awareness.
These courts either completely ignored the conspicuousness re-
quirement, 64 8 or they enforced a disclaimer despite its inconspicu-
the property is sold on an 'as is' basis and that the entire risk as to the
quality of performance of the property is with the buyer, there is no im-
plied warranty of merchantability, no implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose and no implied warranty which extends beyond the
description of said property on the face hereof; (b) except where the
seller is also the manufacturer of said property and, as such manufac-
turer, issued to buyer or to a prior buyer of said property said manufac-
turer's separate written new product warranty in respect thereof and said
warranty is in effect at the date hereof, there are no express warranties
and no representations, promises or statements have been made by seller
in respect of said property unless endorsed hereon or incorporated
herein by reference hereon; but seller's obligations under any express
warranty made and evidenced as aforesaid shall continue in accordance
with the terms thereof and regardless of whether seller shall have trans-
ferred and assigned to another seller's rights hereunder; and (c) except
where the seller is also the manufacturer of said property, buyer will not
assert against any subsequent holder as assignee of this contract any
claim or defense which the buyer may have against the manufacturer or a
seller other than the seller of said property obtained pursuant hereto.
Id. at 576, 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 1606.
641 Id. at 577, 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 1606.
642 Id., 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 1606-07.
643 See supra note 640.
644 17 Pa. D. & C.3d at 576, 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 1606.
645 See U.C.C. § 1-201(10) comment 10 ("[T]he test is whether attention can reason-
ably be expected to be called to it.").
646 Note, however, that a Kansas federal district court alluded to the understandabil-
ity gloss when stating that disclaiming "language [was] clear and concise" in its determi-
nation that a disclaimer was conspicuous. Union Exploration Co. v. Dowell Div., Dow
Chem. Co., 41 U.C.C. Rep. 759, 762 (D. Kan. 1985).
647 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 184.
648 See Twin Disc, Inc. v. Big Bud Tractor, Inc., 772 F.2d 1329, 1335 n.3, 41 U.C.C.
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ousness. 64 9 We disapprove of these courts' refusals to follow the
express mandate of section 2-316.650
The drafters intended section 2-316 to protect buyers from sur-
prise and unbargained language. 651 Although the courts did not vi-
olate this intent, they did ignore the express conspicuousness
requirement of section 2-316. Courts should abide by the section's
language and only enforce disclaimers that are objectively conspicu-
ous. Because the Code rejects the parties' subjective knowledge as a
test for determining the effectiveness of disclaimers, courts should
ignore evidence of such knowledge.
As a prerequisite to the enforcement of a conspicuous dis-
claimer, however, we believe that the buyer must have had an op-
portunity to read the disclaimer. In Willoughby v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. 652
the court justifiably refused to enforce a conspicuous disclaimer that
the buyers never had the opportunity to see. The buyers purchased
herbicide from the sellers and hired their agent to apply the prod-
uct. Although the container bore a conspicuous disclaimer, the sell-
ers never showed the buyers the container or told the buyers about
it.653 The conspicuous disclaimer did not protect the buyers from
surprise or unbargained language because the buyers never had an
opportunity to read the disclaimer. Thus, the court considered the
conspicuous disclaimer ineffective. 654 To validate a conspicuous,
written disclaimer the seller must at least provide the buyer with an
opportunity to see the disclaimer. The buyer may acknowledge this
opportunity simply by signing a contract or by receiving a written
disclaimer from the seller.
c. The Modified Objective Test. We continue to advocate a modi-
fied objective test 5 5 to determine the conspicuousness of a dis-
Rep. 1627, 1635 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985) ("There is . . . no need to determine whether a
disclaimer is conspicuous ... when the buyer has actual knowledge of the disclaimer.");
Imperial Stamp & Engraving Co. v. Bailey, 82 Ill. App. 3d 835, 837, 403 N.E.2d 294,
296, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 1307, 1310 (1980) ("The conspicuousness requirement is not con-
trolling here since defendant admits that he read and was aware of the provision.").
649 See Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, 784, 34 U.C.C. Rep.
857, 868 (E.D. Wis. 1982) ("Discussion of the effectiveness of the disclaimer provisions
in the contract does not end with the finding of lack of conspicuousness"; evidence that
buyer was aware of disclaimers and disclaimers neither unexpected nor unbargained for
was sufficient to make them enforceable.).
650 See also J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 12-5, at 444 (also criticizing en-
forcement of inconspicuous disclaimers even when buyers knew of their existence).
651 See U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 1 ("[section 2-316] seeks to protect a buyer from
unexpected and unbargained language .... ").
652 601 S.W.2d 385, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 1515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
655 Id. at 388, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 1518.
654 Id., 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 1518.
655 We first proposed the modified objective test in the 1978 Special Project. See
Special Project, supra note 1, at 185-87.
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claimer. This test focuses on the phrase "reasonable person against
whom it is to operate"656 found in section 1-201(10). It allows courts
to concentrate
not only on the writing, but on the commercial buyer's experience
and size as well. Where parties of relatively equal bargaining
power negotiated the contract terms, a court could appropriately
find that the buyer "ought to have noticed" a disclaimer despite
its inconspicuous print. The modified objective test [enables]
courts to distinguish between commercial and consumer buyers
without compromising the drafters' goal of avoiding inquiry into
the parties' negotiations. Since courts would probably expect the
reasonable consumer to notice only objectively conspicuous lan-
guage, this approach would continue to promote disclaimer
visibility.657
Several courts have adopted this test.658 For example, in AMF
Inc. v. Computer Automation, Inc.659 the court expressly adopted the
modified objective test to determine the conspicuousness of a limi-
tation-of-remedies clause. The court noted that "[t]he modem
trend... is to determine if the bargaining strength and commercial
sophistication of the parties made it reasonable [to assume] that the
limiting language was brought to the attention of the parties." 660
The court found the clause conspicuous even though it did not dif-
fer from the surrounding text in size, color, or typeface. 66' Because
both parties were commercially sophisticated, had dealt extensively
with one another, and had actively negotiated the terms of the con-
tract, the court concluded that the buyer ought reasonably to have
noticed the clause. Thus, it was conspicuous. 662
3. Disclaimer or Limitation of Remedy Subsequent to Contracting
Conspicuous disclaimers must constitute an element of the par-
656 U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (emphasis added).
657 Special Project, supra note 1, at 186.
658 See, e.g., FMC Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 419, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 496,
501-02 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Where the disclaimer is in a commercial transaction involving
experienced businesspersons rather than a consumer transaction involving ordinary
purchasers, the concept of reasonableness under the circumstances depends on what a
reasonable businessperson is expected to notice."); R & L Grain Co. v. Chicago E.
Corp., 531 F. Supp. 201, 209, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 532, 538 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("The instant
warranty is reasonably noticeable, especially to a business entity participating in an arms length
transaction. The exclusion appears in a separate section of the sales contract and is
printed, in part, in boldface type.") (emphasis added); Ellmer v. Delaware Mini-Com-
puter Sys., Inc., 665 S.W.2d 158, 160, 38 U.C.C. Rep. 751, 753 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)
(court considers, among other things, fact that "the buyer was a business customer deal-
ing at arms length"); see also infra notes 659-62 and accompanying text.
659 573 F. Supp. 924, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 1583 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
660 Id. at 929, 37 U.C.C. Rep. at 1590 (citations omitted).
661 Id., 37 U.C.C. Rep. at 1590.
662 Id. at 930, 37 U.C.C. Rep. at 1590.
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ties' bargain to have effect. Thus, the disclaimers must appear in the
original contract or in a subsequent modification. 663 Section 2-
209664 controls contract modifications that seek to modify or limit
warranties, while section 2-207665 governs modifications that ac-
company or follow delivery of goods.666
663 See U.C.C. § 2-209 (permitting subsequent modifications of the agreement which
would include disclaimers); infra notes 674-75 and accompanying text.
664 (1) An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no
consideration to be binding.
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or recission ex-
cept by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded, but
except as between merchants such a requirement on a form supplied by
the merchant must be separately signed by the other party.
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this Article
(Section 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its
provisions.
(4) Although an attempt at modification or recission does not satisfy
the requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver.
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of
the contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received by
the other party that strict performance will be required of any term
waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view of a material change
of position in reliance on the waiver.
U.C.C. § 2-209.
665 (1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written con-
firmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an accept-
ance even though it states terms additional to or different from those
offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional
on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addi-
tion to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the
contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is
given within a reasonable time after notice of them is
received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a con-
tract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of
the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms
of the particular contract consist of those terms on which the writings of
the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated
under any other provisions of this Act.
Id. § 2-207.
666 The time at which a disclaimer becomes a part of the agreement does not affect
its conspicuousness. In Flory v. Silvercrest Indus., Inc., 29 U.C.C. Rep. 832 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1980), the court erroneously combined conspicuousness with the requirement that
a disclaimer be part of the bargain between the parties. The court stated:
The printed Silvercrest warranty containing a purported disclaimer of
any warranty of merchantability or fitness was not received until several
months after the sales transaction and in fact after delivery of the mobile
home. As such it could not have been "conspicuous" at the time the
Florys entered into the contract but was merely a unilateral attempt to
limit liability and therefore ineffective under the statute.
Id. at 834.
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a. Frequently Encountered Fact Patterns. In a simple retail sale, a
seller can effectively disclaim an implied warranty by a writing on
the outside of a package.667 The buyer accepts such a disclaimer as
a term of the seller's offer when he purchases the goods. A seller
cannot effectively disclaim an implied warranty by hiding a dis-
claimer inside a sealed package 668 because the buyer does not ac-
cept such a hidden disclaimer as a part of the parties' agreement
when he purchases the goods.
In more complex sales, a seller should disclaim implied warran-
ties at the time he enters into an oral or written contract with the
buyer. A seller who fails to do this may be unable to escape implied
warranties. 669 In Gold Kist, Inc. v. Citizens & Southern National Bank,670
for example, the court found a disclaimer printed on seed bags inef-
fective as a "post-contract, unbargained-for unilateral attempt by
[the seller] to limit its obligations under the contract." 671 Because
the parties had already reached an agreement prior to the delivery
of the seed bags and the seller failed to direct the buyer's attention
to the disclaimer at the time of the agreement, the disclaimer did
not become an effective term of the agreement.672 "According to
the prevailing interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code," the
667 See, e.g., Gropppel Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49, 61 n.13, 32
U.C.C. Rep. 35, 49 n.13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (manufacturer could disclaim warranties to
consumer by "prominent package markings").
668 The disclaimer will be effective if that buyer should have been aware of the dis-
claimer through course of dealing or trade usage. See infra notes 723-31 and accompany-
ing text.
669 See, e.g., Pennington Grain & Seed, Inc. v. Tuten, 422 So. 2d 948, 951, 36 U.C.C.
Rep. 458, 462 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (disclaimer on seed bag ineffective because it
was "post-contract, unbargained-for unilateral attempt to limit [seller's] obligations");
Midland Supply Co. v. Ehret Plumbing & Heating Co., 108 Ill. App. 3d 1120, 1125-26,
440 N.E.2d 153, 156-57, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 1535, 1540 (1982) (dealer's implied warranty
of merchantability not disclaimed by manufacturer's disclaimer given to buyer upon de-
livery of goods because no discussion of such terms at time parties reached agreement);
Gideon Serv. Div. v. Dunham-Bush, Inc., 80 I11. App. 3d 633, 636, 400 N.E.2d 89, 91-92,
28 U.C.C. Rep. 72, 76 (1980) (written disclaimer made at or after shipment of furnace
ineffective to disclaim warranty implied in oral contract completed before shipment);
Pfizer Genetics, Inc. v. Williams Mgmt. Co., 204 Neb. 151, 151-56, 281 N.W.2d 536,
539, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 85, 88-89 (1979) (buyer entitled to jury instructions that disclaimer
of warranty made subsequent to formation of contract by means of an invoice, receipt,
or similar note is ineffective unless buyer assents or is charged with knowledge of trans-
action); Hartwig Farms, Inc. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 28 Wash. App. 539, 543,
625 P.2d 171, 173-74, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 1552, 1555-56 (1981) (disclaimer in invoice sent
after oral contract complete ineffective). But see Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 696 F.2d
287, 291, 35 U.C.G. Rep. 91, 97 (4th Cir. 1982) (finding disclaimers on label of herbi-
cide effective to disclaim warranties despite fact that buyer appeared to enter contract
prior to delivery of herbicide; without explanation, finding these disclaimers not a "post-
contract or post-sale attempt unilaterally to avoid ... warranties").
670 286 S.C. 272, 333 S.E.2d 67, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 327 (Ct. App. 1985).
671 Id. at 277, 333 S.E.2d at 70, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 330.
672 Id., 333 S.E.2d at 71, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 330-31.
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court stated, "a disclaimer printed on a label or other document and
given to the buyer at the time of delivery of the goods is ineffective if
a bargain has already arisen." 673
If the parties agree to the modification, section 2-209 provides
that a subsequent disclaimer may become a binding part of the
agreement. To create an effective modification, the buyer must
know of the modification and have the opportunity to object to it.674
In Gold Kist the court found no modification because the seller
presented no evidence that the buyers ever learned of or accepted
the terms of the disclaimer.675
The Code does not require negotiation for an effective dis-
claimer.676 The drafters apparently felt that requiring conspicuous-
ness sufficiently protected buyers against surprise and unbargained
language. 677
b. Security Agreement Disclaimers. Article Two governs disclaim-
ers of warranties in purchase money-security agreements. 678 Sec-
tion 9-206 comment 3 notes:
[Subsection 2] prevents a buyer from inadvertently abandoning
his warranties by a "no warranties" term in the security agreement
when warranties have already been created under the sales ar-
rangement. Where the sales arrangement and the purchase
money security transaction are evidenced by only one writing, that
writing may disclaim, limit or modify warranties to the extent per-
mitted by Article 2.679
When parties execute a security agreement and a sales agreement
contemporaneously, the instruments should be construed together
in the absence of conflicting terms. 680 A conflict between ambiguous
673 Id., 333 S.E.2d at 70, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 330.
674 See U.C.C. § 2-209 (reprinted supra note 664). Sometimes the seller's first com-
munication with the buyer is upon delivery pursuant to the buyer's order. This should
not, however, affect the result. Under section 2-207, disclaimers constitute proposed
additional terms that materially alter the contract. See U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 4.
Thus, the disclaimers are effective only if the buyer is expressly aware of them.
675 Gold Kist, 286 S.C. at 278, 333 S.E.2d at 71, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 331.
676 In contrast, Washington state courts require that parties bargain for a disclaimer
for it to be effective. See Special Project, supra note 1, at 190 & n.670 (discussing Dobias
v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App. 194,491 P.2d 1346, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 42 (1971));
see also Hartwig Farms, Inc. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 28 Wash. App. 539, 545,
625 P.2d 171, 175, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 1552, 1557 (1981) ("Without negotiation and agree-
ment, no disclaimer.., can be effective.") (footnote omitted).
677 See U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 1.
678 "When a seller retains a purchase money security interest in goods the Article on
Sales (Article 2) governs the sale and any disclaimer, limitation or modification of the
seller's warranties." U.C.C. § 9-206.
679 Id. comment 3.
680 See Davis v. Dils Motor Co., 566 F. Supp. 1360, 1364, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 792, 795-
96 (S.D.W. Va. 1983) (clear waiver language in security agreement disregarded because
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waiver provisions in a purchase order may compel a court to disre-
gard clear disclaimer language in a contemporaneously executed se-
curity agreement. 681
D. Express Disclaimers of Implied Warranties Under Section
2-316(3)(a)
By its terms, section 2-316(3) (a) seems to undermine entirely 2-
316(2)'s disclaimer requirements. The subsection provides:
"Notwithstanding subsection (2) ... unless the circumstances indi-
cate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by expressions
like 'as is,' 'with all faults' or other language which in common un-
derstanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties
and makes plain that there is no implied warranty . . "682 Most
courts resist the temptation to read 2-316(3)(a) so broadly as to un-
dermine 2-316(2). Two courts have found "as is" language inappli-
cable in the sale of new goods. 683 Other language, however, may
effectively disclaim implied warranties accompanying the sale of new
goods if "in common understanding [it] calls the buyer's attention
to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no im-
plied warranty." 68 4
1. Language Requirements
Courts routinely validate "as is" disclaimers 68 5 but remain re-
luctant to enforce other disclaiming language under 2-316(3)(a) that
does not meet the language requirements of 2-316(2).686 For exam-
it conflicts with ambiguous waiver language in contemporaneously executed sales
agreement).
681 See id. at 1365, 36 U.C.C. Rep. at 796; see also Bone Int'l Inc. v. Johnson, 74 N.C.
App. 703, 706, 329 S.E.2d 714, 716, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 29, 31 (1985) (purchase-money
security agreement effectively disclaimed all warranties by meeting requirements of sec-
tion 2-316(2) but disclaimer waived by subsequent modification of contract).
682 U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a).
683 Gaylord v. Lawler Mobile Homes, Inc., 477 So. 2d 382, 383,42 U.C.C. Rep. 131,
133 (Ala. 1985) ("Because the product involved was new, the statutory disclaimer and its
language 'as is,' 'with all faults,' . . . has no application.").
684 U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a).
685 See, e.g., Limited Flying Club, Inc. v. Wood, 632 F.2d 51, 57, 29 U.C.C. Rep.
1497, 1503-04 (8th Cir. 1980) (in sale of used airplane "as is" clause effectively dis-
claimed all implied warranties); Pell City Wood, Inc. v. Forke Bros. Auctioneers, Inc.,
474 So. 2d 694, 695-96, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 1225, 1227-28 (Ala. 1985) (effective "as is"
disclaimer in auction of truck); Masker v. Smith, 405 So. 2d 432, 434, 32 U.C.C. Rep.
1121, 1121-22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (effective "as is" disclaimer in sale of used
auto); Society Nat'l Bank v. Pemberton, 63 Ohio Misc. 26, 28, 409 N.E.2d 1073, 1076,
30 U.C.C. Rep. 76, 79 (Mun. Ct. 1979) (in sale of used truck " 'as is' clause in the sales
agreement was sufficient to disclaim all implied warranties."), aff'd mem., Case No. 9502
(Ct. App. Jun. 25, 1980).
686 See, e.g., Lee v. Peterson, I U.C.C. Rep. 2d 85, 89 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986) (state-
ment "that the 30-day warranty was 'in lieu of all other warranties and/or representa-
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ple, in Insurance Co. of North America v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of
America 6 87 the court found the phrase "in lieu of" ineffective under
section 2-316(3)(a).688 Similarly, in Hartwig Farms, Inc. v. Pacific
Gamble Robinson Co. 68 9 the court found the language "[seller] gives
no warranty, express or implied, as to description, variety, quality,
or productiveness, and will not in any way be responsible for the
crop" 690 insufficient to constitute a valid disclaimer under 2-
316(3)(a). 691
2. Conspicuousness
Whether disclaimers under 2-316(3) (a) must be conspicuous re-
mains an open question.692 Most courts apply the section 2-316(2)
conspicuousness requirement to 2-316(3)(a) disclaimers 693 because
to do otherwise "would allow the implied warranties ... to be an-
nulled by implication by language less conspicuous than if they were
tions'" was ineffective disclaimer language); Discount Drug Corp. v. Honeywell
Protection Servs., Div. of Honeywell, Inc., 34 U.C.C. Rep. 491, 493-94 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1982) (lengthly limitation of liability clause ineffective because it neither men-
tions"merchantability" nor employs phrases like "as is" or "with all faults"). But see
Salcetti v. Tuck, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 679, 683 (D.C. Super. 1979) ("No guarantee as to
health, tameness or longevity unless in writing on sales invoice. Buyer agrees to assume
all risks and responsibilities for any losses from the time of the sale," meets require-
ments of valid disclaimer under 2-316(3) (a).); Joseph Charles Parrish, Inc. v. Hill, 173
Ga. App. 97, 98, 325 S.E.2d 595, 597,40 U.C.C. Rep. 1673 (1984) (" 'I accept the above
described car in its present condition ....' ... clearly signifies that the car was sold 'as
is' and is effective to exclude any implied warranties.");Jameson Chem. Co. v. Love, 401
N.E.2d 41, 47, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 1298, 1305 (not dearly rejecting language "we cannot
guarantee or accept any liability resulting from the use of our products" as failing to
meet language requirements of 2-316(3)(a) when rejecting disclaimer as inconspicuous),
modified on other grounds, 403 N.E.2d 928 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
687 67 Ohio St. 2d 91, 423 N.E.2d 151, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 1595 (1981).
688 Id. at 94, 423 N.E.2d at 154, 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 1599.
689 28 Wash. App. 539, 625 P.2d 171, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 1552 (1981).
690 Id. at 541 n.2, 625 P.2d at 173 n.2, 30 U.C.C. Rep. at 1555 n.2.
691 Id. at 545, 625 P.2d at 175, 30 U.C.C. Rep. at 1557 ("disclaimer does not make it
clear the buyer is assuming the risk as to the quality of the goods purchased").
692 See Leake v. Meredith, 221 Va. 14, 17 n.4, 267 S.E.2d 93, 95 n.4, 29 U.C.C. Rep.
484, 487 n.4 (1980) ("It is not settled that disclaimers pursuant to [section 2-316(3)(a)]
must be conspicuous.").
693 See, e.g., Bevard v. Ajax Mfg. Co., 473 F. Supp. 35, 38, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 684, 687
(E.D. Mich. 1979) (applying section 2-316(2) standards of conspicuousness and writing
to disclaimer under section 2-316(3)(a)); Snake River Equip. Co. v. Christensen, 107
Idaho 541, 549-50, 691 P.2d 787, 795-96, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 1902, 1907 (Ct. App. 1984)
(applying conspicuousness requirement to "as is" disclaimer); Jameson Chem. Co. v.
Love, 401 N.E.2d 41, 47, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 1298, 1305 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (inconspicu-
ous section 2-316(3)(a) disclaimer ineffective); Richards v. Goerg Boat & Motors, Inc.,
179 Ind. App. 102, 115-16, 384 N.E.2d 1084, 1094-95, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 1002, 1015
(1979) ("as is" language must be conspicuous to operate as disclaimer of all implied
warranties); Mill Printing & Litographing Corp v. Solid Waste Management Sys., Inc., 65
A.D.2d 590, 590, 409 N.Y.S.2d 257, 258, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 124, 125 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978)
(finding of effective "as is" disclaimer means inferential finding that it is conspicuous).
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directly eliminated. ' 694
3. A Narrow Reading of Section 2-316(3)(a)
We continue to urge courts to read section 2-316(3)(a) nar-
rowly. The drafters of section 2-316(3) (a) intended to give effect to
certain "magic words" 695 like "as is" and "with all faults" that are
recognized in commerce as disclaiming all implied warranties. 696
Courts should limit the applicability of the subsection solely to those
phrases that, through trade usage, buyers clearly expect to disclaim
implied warranties.6 97 Any broader application of section 2-
316(3) (a) could surprise buyers and thus subvert the primary goal of
section 2-316.698
Unlike the authors of the 1978 Special Project, however, we do
not believe that application of the subsection should be limited to
commercial transactions. Sellers commonly use "as is" disclaimers
when selling used goods to consumers, and courts have properly
enforced such disclaimers in those instances. 699 Noncommercial
buyers know the meaning of "as is," and they are not surprised that
it effectively disclaims implied warranties. The drafters expressly
endorsed disclaimers using "as is" language without limiting their
use to commercial settings. We believe that courts should continue
to give effect to these disclaimers in noncommercial as well as com-
mercial sales.
We believe that courts are generally justified in requiring that
disclaimers under section 2-316(3)(a) be conspicuous. In instances
where clear disclaiming language would be ineffective as inconspic-
uous under section 2-316(2), courts should not allow sellers to ef-
fectively disclaim warranties by using hidden "as is" language.
Giving effect to hidden, unexpected "as is" disclaimers would sub-
vert the drafters' specific intent to protect buyers from unbargained
language. 700
However, because the drafters intended section 2-316(3)(a) to
particularize the trade usage method of disclaiming warranties, 701
694 White v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 158 Ga. App. 373, 373-74, 280 S.E.2d 398,
399-400, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 1283, 1284 (1981).
695 2 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 575, § 2-316:03, at 384 (discussing how to reconcile
section 2-316(2) with section 2-316(3)(a)).
696 See U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 7.
697 In addition to "as is" and "with all faults," these phrases include "no adjust-
ments." See Trimpey Tire Sales & Serv., Inc. v Stine, 266 Pa. Super. 91, 92, 403 A.2d
108, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 92 (1979) ("no adjustments" as used in tire industry sufficient to
exclude warranties under section 2-316(3)(a)).
698 U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 1.
699 See supra note 685.
700 U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 1.
701 See U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 7 (phrases like "as is," etc. are "merely a particulari-
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we believe that conspicuous language is not always necessary to dis-
claim warranties effectively. In particular, where trade usage in
commercial sales dictates the disclaimer of warranties, buyers expect
disclaimers and do not need the protection of conspicuous lan-
guage.70 2 In such contexts, courts should give effect to inconspicu-
ous "as is" disclaimers 7 0s
Courts should consider such objective factors as trade usage in
fixing the scope of section 2-316(3)(a). They should not, however,
regard this as an invitation to delve into the negotiation process in
evaluating the effectiveness of disclaiming language under this sec-
tion. The drafters intended to limit the application of section 2-
316(3) (a) to discrete phrases that are commonly accepted in trade as
warranty disclaimers.704 The subsection was not meant to invite a
subjective inquiry into whether the buyer expected a disclaimer. In
South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. v. Combustion Engineering, Inc.70 5 the
court reviewed the following disclaimer: "There are no other war-
ranties, whether expressed or implied, other than title."' 706 The
court upheld the disclaimer under section 2-316(3)(a) after ex-
pressly rejecting it under section 2-316(2). The court scrutinized
correspondence between the parties and found that the disclaimer
was expected as a part of the bargain between the parties. We
strongly disapprove of this approach. This language does not con-
stitute a "magic words" expression commonly found in trade usage
to disclaim warranties. The drafters did not intend section 2-
316(3)(a) to create a subjective test which would enable courts to
enforce any disclaiming language other than those discrete phrases
commonly accepted in trade usage.70 7 Because the South Carolina
Electric court's approach rejects the drafters' intent, it should not be
followed.
4. "As Is" and Express Warranties
"As is" disclaimers apply only to implied warranties. Because
section 2-316(1) mandates that language creating and disclaiming
zation of [the provision] for exclusion or modification of implied warranties by usage of
trade").
702 See infra notes 723-31 and accompanying text.
703 Note that such disclaimers would be effective under section 2-316(3)(c) even if
ineffective under subsection (3)(a). See infra notes 723-31 and accompanying text for a
discussion of § 2-316(3)(c); see also 2 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 575, § 2-316:03, at 384
(retracting as overbroad the statement that all disclaimers must be conspicuous; con-
spicuousness less important to buyer than clarity of disclaimer of all warranties).
704 See 2 W.HAWKLAND, supra note 575, § 2-316:03, at 382.
705 283 S.C. 182, 322 S.E.2d 453, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 1257 (Ct. App. 1984).
706 Id. at 185, 322 S.E.2d at 455, 40 U.C.C. Rep. at 1259.
707 See U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 7.
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warranties be construed as consistent wherever reasonable,708
courts should attempt to construe "as is" disclaimers consistently
with express warranties. Like merchantability and fitness disclaim-
ers, "as is" disclaimers may or may not effectively prevent the for-
mation of express warranties. Thus, courts should consider the
disclaiming language to determine whether the parties meant other
language to create warranties. 709
E. Disclaimers Implied from Circumstances
Subsections 2-316(b) and (c) provide additional circumstances
which create an effective disclaimer.
1. By Examination-Section 2-316(3)(b)
According to section 2-316(3)(b) an effective examination by
the buyer may serve to disclaim implied warranties:
Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has ex-
amined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he de-
sired or has refused to examine the goods there is no implied
warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought
in the circumstances to have revealed to him .... 710
The subsection 711 provides that implied warranties arise unless,
before entering the contract, (1) the buyer examines the goods,
sample, or model712 "as fully" as he desires, 713 or (2) the buyer ig-
nores the seller's demand that the buyer examine the goods.7 14 A
708 See, e.g., Killion v. Buran Equip. Co., 27 U.C.C. Rep. 970, 973 (Cal. Ct. App.
1979) ("a reasonable construction of the parties' agreement is that the purported dis-
claimers were conditional and that the truck was being sold "as is" and with no warran-
ties other than those to which the parties had expressly agreed") (emphasis in original).
709 See supra notes 598-605 and accompanying text (discussing the parol evidence
rule); see also Weiss v. Keystone Mack Sales, Inc., 310 Pa. Super. 425, 431, 456 A.2d
1009, 1011-12, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 433, 436 (1983) (trial court erred in failing to consider
whether "as is "language effectively disclaimed express warranties; trial court also failed
to consider the parol evidence rule).
710 U.C.C. § 2-316(1).
711 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-316(5) (1966) excludes consumer goods; thus, section
2-316(3)(b) warranty exclusions do not apply to sale of consumer goods in Vermont.
See, e.g., Christie v. Dalmig, Inc., 136 Vt. 597, 396 A.2d 1385, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 1294
(1979).
712 Inspection of a prototype that is not presented as a definitive model does not
negate implied warranties. See Eaton Corp. v. Magnavox Co., 581 F. Supp. 1514, 1533,
39 U.C.C. Rep. 152, 183 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
713 See, e.g., Cardwell v. Hackett, 579 S.W.2d 186, 191, 26 U.C.C. Rep. 668 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1978) (no implied warranty as to defects which were plainly apparent to plain-
tiffs when they examined trailer at least twice prior to purchase).
714 See, e.g., Tarulli v. Birds in Paradise, 99 Misc. 2d 1054, 417 N.Y.S.2d 854, 26
U.C.C. Rep. 872 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979) (buyer who failed to have bird examined by vet as
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refusal to inspect service records does not operate as a waiver of
implied warranties. 7 15
An examination must occur prior to the formation of the con-
tract to exclude implied warranties. 716 Acceptance after post-con-
tractual inspection may preclude rejection or revocation of
acceptance,7 17 but the inspection itself should not affect the exist-
ence of implied warranties. 718
The seller may negate an implied warranty by showing that,
prior to the sale, either the buyer actually discovered the defect or
the buyer failed to perform a reasonably adequate inspection that
would have revealed the defect.719 Questions of fact often arise in
the determination of whether the buyer ought to have discovered
the defect;7 20 the buyer's skill is one factor relevant to such a deter-
mination.72 1 Subsection (3)(b) does not cover problems associated
requested by seller forfeited any claim based on a discoverable defect (anemia) which
such examination would have revealed).
715 See Mountaineer Contractors, Inc. v. Mountain State Mack, Inc., 165 W. Va. 292,
268 S.E.2d 886, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 134 (1980).
716 See, e.g., W.M. Hobbs, Ltd. v. Accusystems of Georgia, Inc., 177 Ga. App. 432,
433, 339 S.E.2d 646, 647, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 1296, 1298 (1986) (no implied warranties
where buyer insisted its original order of a copier be made contingent on a trial approval
basis and copier left with buyer for a week before buyer purchased it); Perry v. Lawson
Ford Tractor Co., 613 P.2d 458, 463 n.9, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 75, 80 n.9 (Okla. 1980)
("There are no reported cases dealing with exactly when an examination by the buyer
must occur to exclude the implied warranties and interpreting 'before entering the con-
tract.' But in our case, it seems clear that this use and examination by the buyer before
payment was early enough in the sale to warn him of obvious defects ... .
717 SeeJ. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 8-2, at 296-97.
718 "'Examination' as used in this paragraph is not synonymous with inspection
before acceptance or at any other time after the contract has been made." U.C.C. § 2-
316 comment 8.
719 Section 2-316(3)(b) reads in part "which an examination ought in the circum-
stances to have revealed to him" (emphasis added). See, e.g., Hall Truck Sales, Inc. v.
Wilder Mobile Homes, Inc., 402 So. 2d 1299, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (buyer who had grader examined by expert and failed to inspect and test for
grader's only function negated implied warranty of merchantability), review denied, 412
So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1982). But see Lafayette Stabilizer Repair, Inc. v. Machinery Wholesalers
Corp., 750 F.2d 1290, 1295, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 122, 128 (5th Cir. 1985) ("While a more
complete inspection of the lathe might have uncovered its hidden defect - of being
unable to cut [the type of] connections [for which it was being purchased] - the overall
problem with the machine was even more severe .... [Therefore] [t]he district court's
finding that the condition of the lathe 'was not apparent upon ordinary inspection' [was]
not clearly erroneous.").
720 See, e.g., Henry Heide, Inc. v. WRH Prods. Co., 766 F.2d 105, 111, 41 U.C.C.
Rep. 419, 427 (3d Cir. 1985) ("there is a disputed question of fact as to whether Heide
ought to have noticed a defect in the trays through its testing procedure"); Davis v. Dils
Motor Co., 566 F. Supp. 1360, 1365, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 792, 796 (S.D.W. Va. 1983)
("[Flurther inquiry into the facts is needed in order to clarify... whether the Plaintiff's
inspection of the tractor 'ought in the circumstances to have revealed [the alleged de-
fects] ....' ").
721 "The particular buyer's skill and the normal method of examining goods in the
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with "latent" defects. 722
2. By Course of Dealing, Trade Usage, or Course of Performance-
Section 2-316(3)(c)
An express contract disclaimer is not always necessary to dis-
claim warranties:723
Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by
course of dealing or course of performance or usage of
trade.724
Course of dealing, trade usage, or course of performance 725 may
add disclaimers to oral and written contracts or enforce express dis-
claimers in contracts. For example, in Standard Structural Steel Co. v.
circumstances determine what defects are excluded by the examination." U.C.C. § 2-
316 comment 8.
722 See, e.g., Wullschleger & Co. v. Jenny Fashions, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 373, 376, 41
U.C.C. Rep. 1213, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("the skew was a latent defect not discoverable
through reasonable physical inspection"; implied warranties not waived); Controltek,
Inc. v. Kwikee Enters., Inc., 284 Or. 123, 130, 585 P.2d 670, 675, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 421,
426 (1978) ("IT]he trier of fact could properly find that.., any defects were 'latent'
defects and would not have been revealed by the inspection and tests made by defendant
upon receiving them from plaintiff."); Twin Lakes Mfg. v. Coffey, 222 Va. 467, 473, 281
S.E.2d 864, 867, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 770, 773 (1981) ("[The] defects in manufacture [of
mobile home] did not become apparent, even to experienced workmen, until pressure
was applied to join the two sections [of the house] .... Such latent defects are not those
contemplated by [section 2-316(3)(b)]."; buyer's inspection did not waive implied war-
ranties as to those defects.).
723 SeeJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 3-3, at 100-01 (discussing how course
of dealing, course of performance, and trade usage may supersede or vary the effect of
contractually variable Code provisions).
724 U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(c).
725 Section 1-205 defines course of dealing and trade usage:
(1) A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between
the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as
establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their ex-
pressions and other conduct.
(2) A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such
regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an ex-
pectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in ques-
tion. The existence and scope of such a usage are to be proved as facts.
If it is established that such a usage is embodied in a written trade code or
similar writing the interpretation of the writing is for the court.
Id. § 1-205.
Section 2-208(1) defines course of performance:
(1) Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for per-
formance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the perform-
ance and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of
performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be rele-
vant to determine the meaning of the agreement.
Id. § 2-208(1); see alsoJ. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 3-3, at 98-104 (detailed
discussion of course of dealing, course of performance, and trade usage).
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Bethlehem Steel Corp. 726 the court found a long course of dealing be-
tween parties in which the seller always disclaimed warranties to an
extent sufficient to negate implied warranties in an oral contract.727
In Kincheloe v. Geldmeier 728 the court found minimally sufficient evi-
dence to show buyers at a cattle auction bought livestock "as is" and
accepted the risk that the animal was not in good health. 729 Trade
usage effectively excluded or modified the implied warranty of
merchantability. Course of performance may also operate to waive
disclaimers. 730
In applying section 2-316(3)(c) courts should remember that
knowledge or reasonable expectation of knowledge is a mandatory
element in the application of disclaimers stemming from course of
dealing, trade usage, and course of performance.73' Disclaimers
produced through carefully defined course of dealing, trade usage,
and course of performance should give effect to the parties' reason-
able expectations. Failure to limit application of this subsection to
instances in which the parties had the requisite knowledge could re-
sult in unexpected, unbargained disclaimers and buyer surprise,
thus subverting a primary goal of section 2-316.
F. Cumulation and Conflict of Warranties-Secti6n 317
Express warranties often conflict with implied warranties. 732
726 597 F. Supp. 164, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 1245 (D. Conn. 1984).
727 Id. at 185, 40 U.C.C. Rep. at 1252.
728 619 S.W.2d 272, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 1608 (rex. Ct. App. 1981).
729 Id. at 275, 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 1611; see also Gross v. Systems Eng'g Corp., 36
U.C.C. Rep. 42 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (trade usage limits warranties and remedies in contract);
Wilson v. Marquette Elecs., Inc., 630 F.2d 575, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 399 (8th Cir. 1980)
(insufficient course of dealing to disclaim warranties in sale of complex machinery);
United States Leasing Corp. v. Comerald Assocs., Inc., 101 Misc. 2d 773, 421 N.Y.S.2d
1003, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 1282 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979) (insufficient course of dealing to exclude
warranties from lease arrangement where arrangement included assignment of warranty
rights); Allied Indus. Serv. Corp. v. Kasle Iron & Metals, Inc., 62 Ohio App. 2d 144, 405
N.E.2d 307, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 439 (1977) (sufficient course of dealing to disclaim warran-
ties but no implied warranties attached where seller was not seller of goods).
730 See Oregon Bank v. Nautilus Crane & Equip. Corp., 68 Or. App. 131, 139, 683
P.2d 95, 101, 38 U.C.C. Rep. 1163, 1170 (1984) (concluding that course of performance
may operate to waive a disclaimer).
731 A "common basis of understanding" is an essential element of course of dealing.
See U.C.C. § 1-205(1). A usage of trade is a practice so regular to "justify an expecta-
tion" it will be observed in the particular transaction. See id. § 1-205(2). Knowledge of
the performance is an integral element of course of performance. See id. § 2-208(1).
732 See, e.g., Ingram River Equip., Inc. v. Pott Indus., Inc., 573 F. Supp. 896, 37
U.C.C. Rep. 88 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (express warranty that barges would be constructed in
accordance with contract specifications conflicting with implied warranty of
merchantability), aft'd, 756 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1985), vacated, 106 S. Ct. 3269 (1986);
Frazier v. Consolidated Equip. Sales, Inc., 64 Or. App. 833, 670 P.2d 153, 37 U.C.C.
Rep. 710 (conflict between written express warranty of repair and replacement and im-
plied warranty of merchantability), review denied, 296 Or. 236, 675 P.2d 490 (1983);
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When such a conflict occurs, the question arises whether the express
warranty should displace the implied warranty or whether the two
warranties should apply cumulatively. Section 2-317 provides:
Warranties whether express or implied shall be construed as
consistent with each other and as cumulative, but if such construc-
tion is unreasonable the intention of the parties shall determine
which warranty is dominant. In ascertaining that intention the fol-
lowing rules apply:
(a) Exact or technical specifications displace an inconsistent
sample or model or general language of description.
(b) A sample from an existing bulk displaces inconsistent
general language of description.
(c) Express warranties displace inconsistent implied warran-
ties other than an implied warranty of fitness for a partic-
ular purpose.733
Thus, a court may consider the parties' intent734 only after finding it
unreasonable to construe the warranties as consistent.
1. Consistency Among Warranties
Although section 2-317 does not enumerate explicitly when
warranties are consistent, one comment implies that warranties are
consistent if the seller can comply with all of them.735 This test
gives the buyer the benefit of all express and implied warranties and
puts the burden on the seller, who typically has drafted the sales
agreement, to resolve any possible inconsistency. 736
In addition to forcing the seller to resolve ambiguities in war-
ranty language, this test effectively places the burden on the seller to
disclaim any implied warranties he wishes to avoid. The typical case
involves a seller who drafts a sales agreement in which he promises
to make free repairs for ninety days. Although the seller may intend
to limit his liability to repair only defects that arise within the first
ninety days of operation, a court may conclude that the seller deliv-
ered the product in an unmerchantable condition if the seller also
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Central Eng'g & Equip. Co., 611 P.2d 863, 29 U.C.C. Rep.
817 (Wyo. 1980) (express 90-day parts and labor warranty conflicting with implied war-
ranty of merchantability).
73 U.C.C. § 2-317.
734 "The rules of this section are designed to aid in determining the intention of the
parties as to which of inconsistent warranties which have arisen from the circumstances
of their transaction shall prevail." Id. comment 2.
735 "To the extent that the seller has led the buyer to believe that all of the warran-
ties can be performed, he is estopped from setting up any essential inconsistency as a
defense." Id. § 2-317 comment 2; see Special Project, supra note 1, at 207-08.
736 J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 12-7, at 462 (because the seller usually
drafts the sales agreement and has the opportunity to resolve any possible inconsisten-
cies, it seems reasonable to place the burden of multiple warranties on him).
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failed to disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability. Such a
finding may require the seller to make repairs long after the ninety-
day express warranty period has expired. 737 If the seller does not
intend such a result, he must disclaim the implied warranty in the
sales agreement.738
2. Consistency Between Express and Implied Warranties
The consistency problem between express and implied warran-
ties commonly arises in two contexts. The first situation involves a
buyer who gives detailed specifications to the seller. One comment
states how the Code resolves conflicts between express and implied
warranties in contracts involving specifications: "[W]here the buyer
gives detailed specifications as to the goods, neither of the implied
warranties as to quality will normally apply to the transaction unless
consistent with the specifications. ' 73 9 Courts consistently hold that
express warranties by specification negate the implied warranty of
merchantability because holding otherwise would place the seller in
a hopeless dilemma.740 If compliance with the buyer's specifications
exposed the seller to the risk of delivering unmerchantable goods
(i.e., the express specifications warranty conflicted with the implied
warranty of merchantability), then the seller would have to breach
one warranty in order to honor the other.
A seller making an express specifications warranty does not
necessarily escape all implied warranty liability, however. If the
seller provides the specifications, he still may breach an implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose, even if he adhered to the
specifications. In Singer Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 74 1 for
example, the seller recommended and supplied paint specifications
to a manufacturer of air conditioners and furnaces for use in a new
electrodeposition paint system. Although the paint met contract
specifications, metal parts emerged from the paint tanks with
blotches and streaks. 742 The court upheld a jury finding that the
737 See, e.g., Dickerson v. Mountain View Equip. Co., 109 Idaho 711, 710 P.2d 621,
42 U.C.C. Rep. 114 (Ct. App. 1985); see also infra notes 744-51 and accompanying text
(suggesting than an express 90-day warranty is consistent with implied warranty of
merchantability).
738 See infra notes 763-78 and accompanying text.
739 U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 9.
740 See, e.g., Ingram River Equip., Inc. v. Pott Indus., Inc., 573 F. Supp. 896, 37
U.C.C. Rep. 88 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (express warranty stating that boats in barge construc-
tion contract would conform to contract requirements displaced implied warranty of
merchantability), aft'd, 756 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1985), vacated, 106 S. Ct. 3269 (1986);
Mahasco Indus., Inc. v. Anderson Halverson Corp., 90 Nev. 114, 520 P.2d 234, 14
U.C.C. Rep. 605 (1974) (detailed specifications in contract to purchase carpeting dis-
placed implied warranty of merchantability).
741 579 F.2d 433, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 276 (8th Cir. 1978).
742 Id. at 436, 24 U.C.C. Rep. at 278.
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buyer relied on the seller's expertise, creating an implied warranty
of fitness.743 To avoid such an unintended result, a careful seller
should comply with section 2-316 and disclaim the implied warranty
of fitness.
The second situation in which the consistency issue arises in-
volves an implied warranty that reaches a defect that an express war-
ranty does not. This is by far the more difficult of the two situations;
courts and commentators disagree whether an express warranty
should displace an implied warranty in the absence of a disclaimer.
The typical case involves the sale of goods with a repair war-
ranty of limited duration, typically ninety days. The goods are
plagued with defects and require many repairs, which the seller
makes at his own expense for ninety days. After the express war-
ranty expires, the seller begins charging the buyer for repair work.
The buyer, frustrated with the products' poor performance and furi-
ous with the seller for failing make adequate repairs, brings a suit
for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. The seller
argues that the parties intended the express warranty to displace all
implied warranties. The buyer argues that the two warranties are
consistent and that the court should construe them as cumulative.
Judicial decisions support both positions.
In Dickerson v. Mountain View Equipment Co. 744 the court distin-
guished between the implied warranty of merchantability, which
pertains to the goods' condition at the time of delivery, and the ex-
press ninety-day warranty, which extends to the future performance
of the goods. The court in finding for the buyer held that the two
warranties were consistent with each other and noted that the seller
could have disclaimed the implied warranty. 745 However, the court
in Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Central Engineering & Equipment Co. 746
took the opposite approach. In this case, the parties contracted for
the sale of a used gas compressor, including an express ninety-day
743 Id. at 444, 24 U.C.C. Rep. at 284-85; see also Ingram River Equip., 573 F.Supp. 896,
37 U.C.C. Rep. 88 (boat builder liable for breach of implied warranty of fitness, even
though contract specifications adhered to, because buyer relied on seller's expertise to
provide desired results); cf. Mohasco Indus., 90 Nev. 114, 520 P.2d 234, 14 U.C.C. Rep.
605 (where buyer supplied seller with exact specifications for carpet, seller not liable for
excessive shading because the contract specifications adhered to, and buyer did not rely
on seller's skill orjudgment).
744 109 Idaho 711, 710 P.2d 621, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 114 (Ct. App. 1985).
745 Id. at 716, 710 P.2d at 626, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 122; see also, e.g., Morrison v.
Devore Trucking, Inc., 68 Ohio App. 2d 140, 428 N.E. 2d 438, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 779
(1980) (express warranties do not displace implied warranty of merchantability unless
implied warranty is expressly disclaimed); Frazier v. Consolidated Equip. Sales, Inc., 64
Or. App. 833, 670 P.2d 153, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 710 (express 90-day warranty to repair
bulldozer not inconsistent with, and did not displace, implied warranty of
merchantability), review denied, 296 Or. 236, 675 P.2d 490 (1983).
746 611 P.2d 863, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 817 (Wyo. 1980).
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parts and labor repair warranty. The seller made two repairs during
the ninety-day warranty and a third repair after its expiration. The
buyer sued to recover the cost of the third repair. 747 The court
found for the seller, concluding that extending the warranty cover-
age beyond ninety days was unreasonable because the parties did
not intend such a result.748
Professors White and Summers favor sellers in these cases on
the ground that the parties probably intended the express warranty
to displace any implied warranty.7 49 We think courts finding for the
buyer have developed the better view. The White and Summers
view frustrates the policy of the Code's disclaimer section750 by al-
lowing the seller to displace an implied warranty through insertion
of a seemingly innocuous express warranty. Moreover, in finding
for the seller under these circumstances, courts displace section 2-
317's carefully designed presumption of cumulativeness. 751 Absent
clear evidence of the parties' contrary intent, courts should construe
an implied warranty reaching defects not covered by an express war-
ranty as consistent with any express warranty. A seller who wishes
to avoid liability under the implied warranty of merchantability
should be forced to disclaim clearly and unambiguously the implied
warranty.
3. Conflicts Among Express Warranties
Subsections 2-317(a) and (b) govern conflicts among express
warranties. The Code attempts to emulate the parties' probable in-
tent by establishing a hierarchy based on the specificity of the ex-
press warranties. Exact specifications have priority over
inconsistent samples, models, or general descriptions, and in turn, a
sample drawn from an existing bulk prevails over inconsistent gen-
eral descriptions. 752 However, section 2-317 does not aid in resolv-
ing conflicting warranties having the same specificity. In Heat
Exchanges, Inc. v. Aaron Friedman, Inc.,753 for example, the court con-
fronted two conflicting express warranties in an agreement for the
purchase of thirty-eight heat pumps. One warranty obliged the
747 Id. at 865-66, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 819-22.
748 Id. at 872, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 830-31; see also, Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales,
Inc., 557 P.2d 1009, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 873 (Utah 1976) (mobile home retailer could not
recover from manufacturer after expiration of one-year express warranty).
749 J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 12-7, at 459.
750 U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 1 explains that the disclaimer section's primary pur-
pose is to "protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer by
... permitting the exclusion of implied warranties only by conspicuous language or
other circumstances which protect the buyer from surprise."
751 Special Project, supra note 1, at 209-10.
752 U.C.C. § 2-317(a)-(b).
753 96 Ill. App. 3d 376, 421 N.E.2d 336, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 1388 (1981).
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seller to make repairs at its own expense for one year. The other
warranty limited the seller's liability to furnishing replacement parts
for one year.75 4 Because neither warranty was more specific than
the other, the court found section 2-317 inapplicable. The court
therefore turned to section 2-316(1) to determine which warranty
controlled. 755 Section 2-316(1) states that if an agreement contains
both an expanded obligation and a similar but more limited obliga-
tion, the more expansive warranty controls. Thus, the court held
that the seller was obliged to make repairs at its own expense. 756
The Code attempts to emulate the parties' intent.757 The par-
ties' conduct often makes clear that the strict application of sections
2-317(a) and (b) would contravene their true intent. In Stewart-Deca-
tur Security Systems, Inc. v. von Weise Gear Co. 758 the buyer extensively
tested a model gear motor manufactured by the seller. The buyer
approved the model but specified a different input speed on the
purchase order. The seller made motors conforming to the model,
not to the specifications. The court held that the buyer improperly
rejected the motors because it found that the parties intended the
model rather than the specifications to govern the seller's obliga-
tion. 759 Although the court held section 2-317 inapplicable because
the buyer did not accept the goods, it noted that section 2-317's
hierarchy only approximates intent and would have been inappro-
priate because the parties' intentions were clear.760
Although the law in this area is still somewhat in flux, several
principles regarding cumulation and conflict of warranties emerge
from the above discussion. First, the Code makes clear that evi-
dence of parties' intent supersedes application of section 2-317.
Therefore, parties should take care to spell out clearly their intent.
Second, a seller who makes an express warranty, intending it to dis-
place an implied warranty, should formally disclaim the implied war-
ranty in accordance with section 2-316. Because courts are split
over whether an express warranty displaces an inconsistent implied
754 Id. at 377-79, 421 N.E.2d at 337-38, 32 U.G.C. Rep. at 1389-91.
755 Id. at 387, 421 N.E.2d at 344, 32 U.C.C. Rep. at 1399.
756 Id. at 388-89, 421 N.E.2d at 344-45, 32 U.G.C. Rep. at 1400-01.
757 U.G.G. § 2-317 comment 2 states in relevant part: "The rules of this section are
designed to aid in determining the intention of the parties .... " Comment 3 states:
"These rules are not absolute but may be changed by evidence [of contrary party
intent]."
758 517 F.2d 1136, 17 U.G.C. Rep. 24 (8th Cir. 1975).
759 Id. at 1139, 17 U.G.G. Rep. at 29 ("The circumstances.., leave little doubt that
the parties intended [the model] to serve as the basis for any future dealings between
them. [Seller] knew that [buyer] was relying on the test results [of the model] to ...
uncover any defects that would have to be remedied.").
760 Id. at 1140 n.12, 17 U.G.G. Rep. at 30-31 n.12.
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warranty,761 cautious sellers should avoid the issue entirely by for-
mally disclaiming the implied warranty.
G. Remedy Limitations
1. Distinguished from Disclaimers
The Code provides a seller three ways to limit a buyer's poten-
tial remedies. As previously discussed, section 2-317 allows certain
warranties to override other inconsistent warranties, thereby reduc-
ing the buyer's available remedies. 762 In addition, a seller may limit
his liability through disclaimers and limitations.
Section 2-316 authorizes sellers to use disclaimers to prevent
warranties from arising. An effective warranty disclaimer com-
pletely insulates the seller from all liability under that warranty. 763
To be effective against implied warranties, the seller must provide a
conspicuous, written disclaimer. 764
Warranty limitations, on the other hand, do not prevent war-
ranties from arising; rather, they allow sellers to narrow the scope of
their potential liability under existing warranties. The procedures
for disclaiming warranties and for limiting remedies are entirely dis-
tinct. Section 2-316(4) directs sellers to sections 2-718 and 2-719 if
they wish to limit remedies for breach of an express or implied war-
ranty.765 Section 2-719(1)(a) specifies, without requiring conspicu-
ousness, that "the agreement ... may limit or alter the measure of
damages recoverable under this Article." Thus, although Section 2-
316(2) requires that a disclaimer of the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness must be conspicuous, the conspicuous-
ness requirement does not extend to remedy limitations under sec-
tion 2-719.
Some courts, however, recognize that a remedy limitation can
limit a buyer's recovery as effectively as a disclaimer and therefore
impose section 2-316's conspicuousness requirements on remedy-
761 See supra notes 744-51 and accompanying text.
762 See supra notes 732-61 and accompanying text.
763 U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 2 states that one function of this section is to protect
the seller from false allegations of oral warranties by its provisions on parol evidence.
Thus, proper disclaimers prevent warranties from arising either orally or in writing.
764 Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to ex-
clude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by
a writing and conspicuous.
U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
765 "Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with the provi-
sions of this Article on liquidation or limitation of damages and on contractual modifica-
tion of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719)." Id. § 2-316(4).
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limitation clauses. 766 Other courts similarly ignore the distinction
by reasoning that if the seller has not alerted the buyer to an incon-
spicuous remedy limitation, the term is not "bargained for" and
consequently is not part of the agreement.767 Because section 2-718
requires a written agreement between the parties to effect any limi-
tation of remedies, 768 these courts refuse to enforce the remedy lim-
itation unless the seller alerts the buyer that the contract includes
the limitation. A few courts have found that an inconspicuous rem-
edy limitation may be unconscionable and thus invalid under section
2-719(3).769 Nevertheless, the majority of courts recognize the
Code's distinction between the requirements for effectuating a war-
ranty disclaimer and for limiting remedies. 770 In Island Creek Coal Co.
v. Lake Shore, Inc.,771 the buyers of a steel mine shaft sued for lost
income due to an interruption of their mining business. A clause in
the sales agreement declared that "[i]n no event shall any claim for
consequential or special damages be made by either party. ' 772 The
buyer asserted that the language should not protect the seller be-
766 See, e.g., Zicari v. Joseph Harris Co., 33 A.D.2d 17, 304 N.Y.S.2d 918, 6 U.C.C.
Rep. 1246 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969) (holding that remedy limitation was "modification" of
implied warranty of merchantability within meaning of section 2-316(2) and was there-
fore ineffective because it did not mention "merchantability").
767 See, e.g., Frank's Maintenance & Eng'g, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 86 Ill. App. 3d
980, 408 N.E.2d 403, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 163 (1980) (lower court should have considered
conspicuousness of a clause excluding seller's liability for consequential damages in de-
termining whether clause was bargained for in sales agreement); Herbstman v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 131 N.J. Super. 439, 330 A.2d 384 (1974) (inconspicuous clause limiting
camera buyer's remedy to repair provided insufficient notice to create an implied agree-
ment respecting the limitations), rev'd on other grounds, 68 N.J. 1, 342 A.2d 181, 17 U.C.C.
Rep. 39 (1975); Avenell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 41 Ohio App. 2d 150, 324 N.E.2d
583, 16 U.G.C. Rep. 671 (1974) (inconspicuous remedy limitation not part of
agreement).
768 "Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement.
U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (emphasis added).
769 (3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limi-
tation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential dam-
ages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie
unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is
not.
Id. § 2-719(3); see, e.g., Frank's Maintenance &Eng'g, 86 Ill. App. 3d 980, 408 N.E.2d 403,
30 U.C.C. Rep. 163; Baker v. Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 226
(1971). For a further discussion on unconscionability as it relates to liability limitations,
see infra notes 779-844 and accompanying text.
770 See, e.g., Island Creek Coal Co. v. Lake Shore, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 285, 290, 2
U.C.C. Rep. 2d 59, 65 (W.D. Va. 1986) (consequential damages limitation need not
meet code requirements for disclaimers), rev'd in part on other grounds, 832 F.2d 274 (4th
Cir. 1987); Boone Valley Coop. Processing Ass'n v. French Oil Mill Mach. Co., 383 F.
Supp. 606, 612, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 650, 653 (N.D. Iowa 1974); Checker Taxi Co. v. Checker
Motor Sales Corp., 376 F. Supp. 997, 999, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 371, 374 (D. Mass. 1974)
("question of exclusion of implied warranties is a separate question from that of limita-
tion of implied warranties").
771 636 F. Supp. 285, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 59.
772 Id. at 288, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 2d at 61 (emphasis omitted).
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cause it did not meet section 2-316(2) requirements for an effective
implied warranty disclaimer. The court rejected the buyer's argu-
ment because "the damage limitation clause was exactly that: a limi-
tation on the damages available to either party and not a
limitation/disclaimer on the duties created under the implied
warranties." 773
One commentator has suggested that courts should impose
identical controls on disclaimers and remedy limitations because
both devices can have the same effect on a seller's liability.774 We
disagree. The Code recognizes some distinction between disclaim-
ers and remedy limitations. 775 In the majority of cases, the buyer
requires different protection depending upon which form of limita-
tion the seller uses. In the typical remedy limitation case, the seller
promises to make repairs and limits the buyer's recovery to the
purchase price plus consequential damages. Section 2-718 allows
the buyer to resort to the Code's usual remedies if the limited rem-
edy fails of its essential purpose, i.e., if the seller cannot or will not
make repairs.776 The buyer requires this protection because he pre-
sumably agreed to the remedy limitation in reliance on the seller's
promise to make repairs. On the other hand, the seller may choose
to disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability and explicitly
offer in its place to repair the goods for ninety days. The "failure of
essential purpose" analysis no longer applies because the buyer
does not specifically rely on the seller's ability to repair when he
accepts the disclaimer. Section 2-316's requirements that the dis-
claimer mention "merchantability" and be conspicuous adequately
protect the buyer by alerting him to potential problems with the
goods and allowing him to negotiate the price with the disclaimer in
mind.
Undoubtedly some sellers will attempt to use remedy limita-
tions as disclaimers solely to avoid the conspicuousness require-
ments of section 2-316. However, if a court determines that the
remedy limitation "unfairly surprised" the buyer, the court may re-
773 Id. at 290, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 2d at 65.
774 Note, Legal Control on Warranty Liability Limitation Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
63 VA. L. REv. 791, 791-92 & 805-06 (1977). The author observes that the seller can
achieve the same allocation of risk by using either a disclaimer ("the warranty of
merchantability expires after ten days") or a remedy limitation ("the buyer must assert
any breach of the warranty of merchantability within ten days"). Id. at 791. Because the
two clauses achieve the same effect, the author argues that the Code should apply the
same controls to each.
775 U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 2 states that "[u]nder subsection (4) the question of
limitation of remedy is governed by [§§ 2-718 and 2-719] rather than by this section." (em-
phasis added).
776 See infra notes 857-99 and accompanying text (discussing failure-of-purpose doc-
trine more fully).
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fuse to enforce the limitation under the unconscionability doc-
trine.777 Courts also may apply a "substance over form" analysis to
recharacterize a limitation as a disclaimer. 778 These two doctrines
suffice to prevent an unscrupulous seller from "sneaking" a dis-
claimer past an unwary buyer by disguising it as a remedy limitation.
2. Unconscionability and Liability Limitations
The Code offers no clear definition of unconscionability, leav-
ing the development of the doctrine to the courts.7 79 Section 2-302
provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the con-
tract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its
commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making
the determination. 780
In this section, we examine the unconscionability doctrine and its
application to three types of liability limitations: disclaimers of im-
plied warranties, exclusions of consequential damages, and exclu-
sions or limitations of primary damages.
a. Warranty Disclaimers. For a plaintiff's unconscionable dis-
claimer claim to succeed, the court must affirmatively answer two
777 U.C.C. § 2-302; see, e.g., Haugen v. Ford Motor Co., 219 N.W.2d 462, 15 U.C.C.
Rep. 92 (N.D. 1974) (buyer of new car was handed booklet containing Basic Warranty
and Limitation but signed no papers agreeing to limitation); see also infra text accompa-
nying note 779.
778 See, e.g., Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751, 19 U.C.C. Rep.
832 (3d Cir. 1976) (suggesting that complete exclusion of all damages is disclaimer);
Gladden v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 83 N.J. 320, 416 A.2d 394, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 369
(1980) (damages limitation clause must be viewed in context of warranty booklet as a
whole).
779 Although commentators express varying degrees of dissatisfaction with this ap-
proach, they all agree that the Code offers no workable definition. See J. WHiTE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 4-3, at 151 ("It is not possible to define unconscionability.")
(emphasis in original); Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 761
(1969) (arguing that section 2-302 defers to courts to define unconscionability); Leff,
Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 487
(1967) ("[R]eading this section alone makes nothing clear about the meaning of'uncon-
scionable.' "); Phillips, Unconscionability and Article 2 Implied Warranty Disclaimers, 62
CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 199, 215 (1985) ("Neither the Code nor its comments give a specific
definition of the word 'unconscionable.' ").
780 U.C.C. § 2-302.
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questions: (1) whether section 2-302 ever applies to implied war-
ranty disclaimers that satisfy section 2-316 tests, and (2) if so,
whether the disclaimer is unconscionable under section 2-302.
Commentators disagree whether courts should ever find uncon-
scionable warranty disclaimers that comply with section 2-316.781
Section 2-316 requirements "protect a buyer from unexpected and
unbargained language of disclaimer. ' 782 Professors White and
Summers 783 have noted that this purpose coincides with section 2-
302's desire to prevent "oppression and unfair surprise," 784 thereby
making application of section 2-302 unnecessary. Similarly, Profes-
sor Leff has argued that the detailed specificity of section 2-316's
disclaimer provisions evidences the drafters' intent to make section
2-316 the sole provision governing implied warranty disclaimers.
According to Leff, section 2-316's comments evidence the drafters'
"full awareness of the problem at hand. ' 785 Leff also has pointed
out that although nine sections of Article 2 contain specific cross-
references to section 2-302, section 2-316 does not, implying that
the drafters consciously omitted any reference to
unconscionability. 78 6
Nevertheless, neither section 2-316 nor its comments specifi-
cally prohibits section 2-302's application to warranty disclaimers.
Other Code provisions that also lack cross-references to section 2-
302 have applied it to contract terms. 78 7 By its express terms, sec-
tion 2-302 applies to "any clause of the contract." Moreover, com-
ment 1 to section 2-302 describes ten cases, seven of which deny full
781 See Leff, supra note 779, at 520-24 (Section 2-316 compliance eliminates "unfair
surprise" of section 2-301, making application of the unconscionability doctrine unnec-
essary). Professors White and Summers split on this issue. SeeJ. WHrIE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 5, § 12-11, at 481 ("One of us believes that such courts misread the intention
of the draftsmen and that the draftsmen never intended 2-302 to be an overlay on the
disclaimer provision of 2-316."); cf Phillips, supra note 779, at 200 ("[S]ection 2-302
should be aggressively applied to invalidate disclaimers of the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness.").
782 U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 1.
783 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 12-11, at 475; see also Leff, supra note 779,
at 516-28.
784 U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1.
785 Leff, supra note 779, at 523. U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 1 states the drafters' intent
to protect buyers from "unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer by...
permitting the exclusion of implied warranties only by conspicuous language or other
circumstances which protect the buyer from surprise."
786 Leff, supra note 779, at 523. The nine provisions containing cross-references to
section 2-302 are sections 2-202, 2-204, 2-205, 2-207, 2-303, 2-508, 2-615, 2-718, and 2-
719. Professor Phillips has argued that section 2-719(3)'s specific textual reference to
the possibility of unconscionability, which is conspicuously absent from section 2-316,
may support Leff's position. See Phillips, supra note 779, at 221-22.
787 See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 12-11, at 476 (waiver-of-defense
clause, U.C.C. § 9-206(1), and cross-security clauses, U.C.C. § 9-206, lack cross-refer-
ences to section 2-302); see also Phillips, supra note 779, at 221.
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effect to disclaimers. White and Summers have pointed out that
"[i]t is difficult to reconcile an intent on the part of the draftsmen to
immunize disclaimers from the effect of 2-302 with the fact that they
used cases in which courts struck down disclaimers to illustrate the
concept of unconscionability.1788 Even if a disclaimer is both con-
spicuous and actually understood by the buyer,789 it may "oppress"
the buyer within the meaning of comment 1 to section 2-302 be-
cause of unequal bargaining power. Thus, a seller in a strong bar-
gaining position could force a buyer to accept an unconscionable
warranty disclaimer that fully complies with section 2-316's require-
ments. Furthermore, because buyers rarely read and understand im-
plied warranty disclaimers, section 2-316(a)'s conspicuousness
requirement probably will not protect buyers from "unexpected"
disclaimer language.
A court applying section 2-302 to a disclaimer 790 must decide
whether the disclaimer is in fact unconscionable. This determination
is difficult to make because, as White and Summers have pointed
out, "[i]t is not possible to define unconscionability. It is not a concept
but a determination to be made in light of a variety of factors not
unifiable into a formula. 791 The most common factors that courts
consider in implied warranty disclaimer/unconscionability cases in-
clude relative bargaining power, extensiveness of negotiations, so-
phistication of the parties, the parties' prior dealings, and trade
CUStOms. 7 9 2 Each case invariably turns on its own set of facts, mak-
ing generalizations difficult.
788 J. WHrrIE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 12-11, at 476.
789 See supra note 764 and accompanying text.
790 Despite the split among the commentators, most courts apply section 2-302 to
warranty disclaimers. See Phillips, supra note 779, at 223-28. Professor Phillips bases his
conclusions on his examination of the 35 or so cases dealing directly with the issue. Id.
at 223 n.181. Phillips found that by and large, the courts simply assume that section 2-
302 applies without analyzing the question in depth. Id at 227. The exceptions to this
generalization include Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., 767 F.2d 296, 299-302, 41 U.C.C.
Rep. 315, 318-23 (6th Cir. 1985); FMC Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 420, 30
U.C.C. Rep. 496, 503-04 (5th Cir. 1980); A&M Produce v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d
473, 483-93, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 119-28, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 1129, 1137-48 (1982). But see
Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Chapman, 129 Ga. App. 830, 201 S.E.2d 686, 13 U.C.C.
Rep. 553 (1973); Avery v. Aladdin Prods., 128 Ga. App. 266, 196 S.E.2d 357, 12 U.C.C.
Rep. 628 (1973); R.D. Lowrance, Inc. v. Peterson, 185 Neb. 679, 178 N.W.2d 277, 7
U.C.C. Rep. 1179 (1970); Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690, 14 U.C.C. Rep.
312 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974). Like the cases that apply section 2-302,
most decisions rejecting section 2-302's application to disclaimers are poorly reasoned.
Of the four cases reaching this conclusion, only Moulton cites the primary source of the
arguments supporting its position.
791 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 4-3, at 151 (emphasis in original).
792 See infra notes 802-07 and accompanying text.
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In U.S. Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 793 for example, the
court concluded that superior bargaining power is irrelevant in de-
ciding whether the contract was unconscionable if both parties real-
ize that the contract's purpose is to allocate risk.794 In comparison,
the court in FMC Finance Corp. v. Murphree,795 a case also involving
commercial parties, considered the absence of grossly dispropor-
tionate bargaining power a significant factor in determining that a
valid warranty disclaimer was not unconscionable. 796 Although
both courts found no unconscionability, they differed on the sig-
nificance of the parties' bargaining power in reaching their
conclusions. 797
Courts may find disclaimer clauses unconscionable if one party
is an unsophisticated businessman. In A&M Produce Co. v. FMC
Corp. 798 the plaintiff, a farmer, was the sole shareholder of his farm-
ing company. The plaintiff had no experience farming tomatoes
when he entered into a contract to buy weight-sizing equipment.799
The sales contract contained an implied warranty disclaimer satisfy-
ing the requirements of section 2-316(2). After concluding that sec-
tion 2-302 applies to an implied warranty disclaimer satisfying
section 2-316,800 the court noted that unconscionability claims by
businessmen generally do not find favor with the courts. Neverthe-
less, in finding the disclaimer unconscionable, the court stated that
"courts have begun to recognize that experienced but legally unso-
phisticated businessmen may be unfairly surprised by unconsciona-
ble contract terms ... and that even large business entities may have
relatively little bargaining power, depending on ... the commercial
circumstances surrounding the agreement."8 0'
In sum, there is no easy way to capsulize these cases.
793 358 F. Supp. 449, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 254 (E.D. Mich. 1972), af'd, 509 F.2d 1043, 16
U.C.C. Rep. 1 (6th Cir. 1975).
794 Id. at 460, 13 U.C.C. Rep. at 268. The buyer of machinery used to make cotton
pads sued the manufacturer. The contract required very precise specifications for the
machine and disclaimed all implied warranties, including the implied warranty of
merchantability. Id., 13 U.C.C. Rep. at 268.
795 632 F.2d 413, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 496 (5th Cir. 1980).
796 Id. at 420, 30 U.C.C. Rep. at 503.
797 Both courts considered the nature of the parties important in finding that the
disclaimer was not unconscionable. See U.S. Fibres, Inc., 358 F. Supp. at 460, 13 U.C.C.
Rep. at 268 ("In the light of the facts and commercial background of this transaction,
the contract is neither oppressive nor unfair."); FMC Fin. Corp., 632 F.2d at 420, 30
U.C.C. Rep. at 504 ("While Illinois courts will readily apply the unconscionability doc-
trine to contracts between consumers and skilled corporate sellers, they are reluctant to
re-write the terms of a negotiated contract between businessmen.").
798 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 1129 (1982).
799 Id. at 478, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 117, 34 U.C.C. Rep. at 1132.
800 Id. at 483-85, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 120-21, 34 U.C.C. Rep. at 1137-39.
801 Id. at 489-90, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124, 34 U.C.C. Rep. at 1144 (emphasis in
original).
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"[G]eneralizations are always subject to exceptions and categoriza-
tion is rarely an adequate substitute for analysis."80 2 While some
courts emphasize bargaining power in determining whether a war-
ranty disclaimer is unconscionable, 03 others focus on the buyer's
ability to seek better terms elsewhere,80 4 and still others look to the
sophistication of the aggrieved party. 80 5 Although the declaration
of White and Summers that "courts have not been solicitous of busi-
nessmen in the name of unconscionability"8 0 6 remains essentially
accurate, 80 7 A&M Produce illustrates an emerging willingness by
courts to engage in a more sophisticated inquiry, rendering the re-
sults of unconscionability cases between commercial entities even
less predictable.
Typically, consumers lack the sophistication, expertise, and bar-
gaining power possessed by business actors. Courts, however, do
not invariably find disclaimers unconscionable in consumer cases.808
Although courts usually find disclaimers in personal injury situa-
tions unconscionable,8 09 in other consumer cases courts generally
uphold disclaimers except in extremely one-sided deals.8 10
802 Id., 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124, 34 U.C.C. Rep. at 1144.
803 See, e.g., Hanson v. Funk Seeds Int'l, 373 N.W.2d 30, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 1244 (S.D.
1985) (farmer is in inferior bargaining position with respect to purchase agreement with
seed manufacturer); Durham v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. 315 N.W.2d 696, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 588
(S.D. 1982) (farmer in inferior position with respect to purchase agreement with herbi-
cide manufacturer).
804 See, e.g., Rozeboom v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 358 N.W.2d 241 (S.D. 1984)
(plaintiff could obtain yellow-pages advertising from only one source and to limit recov-
ery to amount of charges for advertising is unconscionable).
805 See supra text accompanying notes 798-801.
806 J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 4-9, at 170.
807 Some courts make the general "business/commercial" label an express factor in
their decisions. See, e.g., FMC Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 420, 30 U.C.C.
Rep. 496, 504 (5th Cir. 1980) (Illinois courts are reluctant to rewrite the terms of a
negotiated contract between businessmen); Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and
Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 143 Ariz. 368, 374, 694 P.2d 198, 204, 40
U.C.C. Rep 418, 424 (1984) (findings of unconscionability are rare in commercial
settings).
808 See Phillips, supra note 779, at 232 (of 12 cases examined by Professor Phillips
about half found disclaimer unconscionable).
809 See Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 312
(1968) (using U.C.C. section 2-719(3) to invalidate a disclaimer); Walsh v. Ford Motor
Co., 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 56 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (buyer
injured when defective auto went out of control). In Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, 511
S.W.2d 690, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 312 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974), the court
upheld the disclaimer, but only because it held section 2-302 inapplicable to warranty
disclaimers.
810 See, e.g., Jacobs v. Metro Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 125 Ga. App. 462, 466, 188
S.E.2d 250, 253, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 771, 773 (1972) (court stated that if defective 25-cent
nut caused brake failure and collision occurred, it would be reluctant to limit seller's
liability to 25 cents); Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 943, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 1277
(Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (manufacturer's disclaimer was not so one-sided as to be uncon-
scionable as matter of law).
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b. Consequential Damage Exclusions. Section 2-718(3) permits
sellers to exclude consequential damages.811 Unlike section 2-316,
section 2-719(3) expressly states that the limitation is valid unless it is
unconscionable. Thus, consequential damage exclusions may be un-
conscionable, although the Code remains neutral as to their con-
scionability in the commercial context.81 2
Most claims alleging unconscionability in commercial cases fail.
For example, in Kaplan v. RCA Corp.813 a television station brought
an action against the seller of a defective antenna. The buyer ar-
gued that a clause in the sales agreement excluding the seller's lia-
bility for consequential damages was unconscionable.8 14 The court
held that the limitation-of-remedy clause was not unconscionable
for several reasons: the loss was commercial, the buyers were ex-
perienced businesspeople, the buyers did not have to deal with this
particular seller, and the clause was reasonable considering both the
sales price ($12,000) and the risk of consequential damages (possi-
bly millions of dollars).815
Although unconscionability claims involving two business enti-
ties almost invariably fail, some courts have struck down conse-
quential damage exclusions in the commercial setting. In A&M
Produce Co. v. FMC Corp.816 the court found a consequential damages
exclusion unconscionable even though both parties were commer-
cial entities. The court found both "unfair surprise"8 1 7 and "une-
811 Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation
or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for
injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie uncon-
scionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not.
U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
812 Limitations of consequential damages in consumer cases are prima facie uncon-
scionable. See supra note 811.
813 783 F.2d 463, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 1312 (4th Cir. 1986).
814 Id at 464, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 1314.
815 Id. at 467, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 1318; see also Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes, Inc.,
723 F.2d 758, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 1076 (10th Cir. 1983) (limitation-of-damages clause in
agreement for sale of oil well injection packer sealant not unconscionable because loss
was commercial, both parties were business entities, and limitation language was con-
spicuous); M/V Am. Queen v. San Diego Marine Constr., 708 F.2d 1483 (9th Cir. 1983)
(limitation-of-remedy clause in agreement to repair ship was not adhesion contract but
rather commercial transaction between two business entities); Cyclops Corp. v. Home
Ins. Co., 389 F. Supp. 476, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 415 (W.D. Pa.) (limitation on liability for lost
profits in contract to repair an electrical motor was not unconscionable because the loss
was commercial and involved large business entities), af'd, 523 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir.
1975).
816 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 1129 (1982); see also
supra text accompanying notes 798-802.
817 The disclaimer and consequential damages exclusion were located in the middle
of the back page of a long, preprinted form contract and were not pointed out to the
buyer. A&M Produce Co., 135 Cal. App. 3d at 490-91, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25, 34 U.C.C.
Rep. at 1144-45.
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qual bargaining power"8 1 8 and therefore refused to enforce the
limitation clause.819
In Durham v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. 820 the court found unconscionable
a consequential damages exclusion in a sales contract between a
farmer and an herbicide manufacturer. The herbicide sold to the
buyer failed to control the growth of foxtail. The court reasoned
that (1) enforcing the limitation would leave the buyer without any
substantial recourse for his loss, (2) farmers do not have equal bar-
gaining power when dealing with herbicide manufacturers, (3) farm-
ers cannot test pesticides before purchasing them, and (4) allowing
sellers to avoid responsibility for the ineffectiveness of a product
that has only one purpose contravenes public policy.821
Although most commercial cases of unconscionable conse-
quential damage limitations involve parties with unequal bargaining
power,822 courts usually do not rely solely upon unequal bargaining
power to find such limitations unconscionable. 823 While more
courts have found unconscionability in the bargaining process since
1978,824 most claims of unconscionability between commercial par-
ties of equal bargaining power continue to fail.825
818 The buyer was unfamiliar with the product, and the buyer's company was smaller
than the seller's company. In addition, the seller's salesman was not authorized to nego-
tiate terms of the contract. Id. at 491, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125, 34 U.C.C. Rep. at 1145.
819 Id. at 489-91, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25, 34 U.C.C. Rep. at 1143-46.
820 315 N.W.2d 696, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 588 (S.D. 1982).
821 Id. at 700, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 593.
822 See, e.g., Lewis Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable & Cold Storage, 709
F.2d 427, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 170 (6th Cir. 1983);Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp.
264, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 637 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Hanson v. Funk Seeds Int'l, 373 N.W.2d 30,
41 U.C.C. Rep. 1244 (S.D. 1985); Rozeboom v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 358 N.W.2d
241 (S.D. 1984); Durham, 315 N.W.2d 696, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 588.
823 In many cases involving defective farm products, courts have striken down con-
sequential damage exclusions on the ground that the buyer could not discover the de-
fect until after the loss occurred. See, e.g., Majors v. Kalo Laboratories, Inc., 407 F. Supp.
20, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 592 (M.D. Ala. 1975) (sale of defective soybean inoculant); Durham,
315 N.W.2d 696, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 588 (sale of defective herbicide). These cases involved
small farmers and large manufacturers of farm products, where the parties had unequal
bargaining power. A court finding unconscionability based solely on the undiscoverable
nature of the defect would be incorrect because the Code does not distinguish between
discoverable and latent defects, expressly approving the contractual allocation of un-
known risks. See U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 3 (valid clauses which limit or exclude conse-
quential damages are merely allocations of unknown risk).
824 Special Project, supra note 1, at 220.
825 See, e.g., Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 696 F.2d 287, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 91 (4th
Cir. 1982) (limitation of consequential damages clause in contract between experienced
farmer with extensive farming operations and manufacturer of herbicide held not un-
conscionable); AMF, Inc. v. Computer Automation, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 924, 37 U.C.C.
Rep. 1583 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (consequential damages exclusion in agreement for sale of
computer equipment not unconscionable because both parties were large, sophisticated
merchants); Argo Welded Prods., Inc. v. J.T. Ryerson Steel & Sons, Inc., 528 F. Supp.
583, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 1349 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (limitation of liability for consequential dam-
ages provision in contract for purchase and fabrication of stainless steel not unconscion-
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c. Primary Damage Limitations. In commercial transactions, sell-
ers cannot deprive the buyer of all remedies for breach of a
warranty.
[I]t is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum
adequate remedies be available. If the parties intend to conclude
a contract for sale within this Article they must accept the legal
consequence that there be at least a fair quantum of remedy for
breach of the obligations or duties outlined in the contract.8 26
The "fair quantum of remedy" question most often arises where the
express warranty expires after an allotted time but before the buyer
could have discovered the defect. For example, in Trinkle v. Schu-
macher Co. 8 2 7 two commercially experienced companies contracted
for fabric, which the buyer intended to use to manufacture Roman
shades. The agreement contained a clause stating that the buyer
could not initiate a claim after cutting the fabric. While processing
the fabric the buyer discovered that the seller improperly applied
the fabric's vinyl backing. The buyer could not have discovered the
defective condition until processing. The court acknowledged that
unconscionability rarely exists in a commercial setting involving par-
ties of equal bargaining power but nevertheless found the damage
limitation unconscionable because it "provide[d] neither a mini-
mum nor adequate remedy to [buyer].1 8 28 Trinkle represents the
paradigm case for unconscionability because the terms of the con-
tract did not allow the buyer any meaningful recovery for the seller's
breach.8 2 9
In McCullough v. General Motors Corp. 8 30 the buyer recovered on a
similar, but less favorable, set of facts. The buyer became injured
able even though printed in small, inconspicuous type, because buyer had 19 years
experience in steel business); KKO, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 892, 33 U.C.C.
Rep. 1373 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (express clause excluding consequential damages in agree-
ment for sale of parts to be incorporated into electric deep fat fryers manufactured by
buyer not unconscionable because both parties entered into contract with relatively
equal bargaining power); Thermo King Corp. v. Strick Corp., 467 F. Supp. 75, 26
U.C.C. Rep. 50 (W.D. Pa.) (exclusion of consequential damages in contract for sale of
refrigeration units not unconscionable where all parties involved were corporations),
aft'd, 609 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1979).
826 U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1.
827 100 Wis. 2d 13, 301 N.W.2d 255, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 39 (1980).
828 Id. at 20, 301 N.W.2d at 259, 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 44.
829 See also Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d 1205, 7 U.C.C. Rep.
81 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970) (holding that 15-day notice requirement
was manifestly unreasonable and ineffective to relieve seller of its warranty obligations
with respect to oil, sold for manufacture into resins, which contained chemical contami-
nant that could not be detected until complex chemical process took place after 15-day
notice had elapsed); Vandenberg v. Siter, 204 Pa. Super. 392, 204 A.2d 494, 2 U.C.C.
Rep. 383 (1964) (seller of tulip bulbs could not bar claims for defective bulbs by requir-
ing notice before bulbs would normally bloom).
830 577 F. Supp. 41, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 1529 (W.D. Tenn. 1982).
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
when the collapsible steering wheel on his car failed to collapse in
an accident. The vehicle came with an exclusive twelve-month or
12,000-mile warranty, which expired before the accident.8 31 The
court refused to grant the seller's motion for summary judgment,
stating that the defect was not discoverable until an accident oc-
curred.8 32 The court reasoned that enforcing the limitation would
leave the buyer without the minimum adequate remedy required by
comment 1 to section 2-719.833 The argument for unconscionability
was weaker in this case than in Trinkle because the defect was not
necessarily undiscoverable until after the expiration of the warranty
period.
The fact that both parties are commercial entities may influence
a court to find a lack of unconscionability even though a defect
probably could not be found within the warranty period. In Tokio
Marine and Fire Insurance Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.8 34 a sales
agreement for the purchase of a DC-8 commercial aircraft included
an exclusive express warranty to repair or replace any defective
equipment that became apparent within one year or 2,500 flying
hours, whichever came first. The seller disclaimed all other warran-
ties and excluded liability for consequential damages. The seller de-
livered the aircraft with defective spoilers that the buyer did not
discover until the airplane crashed after expiration of the war-
ranty.8 35 The court upheld the contract's validity because the seller
would have corrected the defect had the buyer discovered it prior to
the warranty expiration date. The court found that the buyer had a
"fair quantum of remedy" for the seller's breach of its contractual
obligations.8 36 Although the defect in the spoilers was as undiscov-
erable as the steering wheel defect in McCullough, the Tokio court was
unsympathetic to the commercial buyer's plight.
When the issue of undiscoverability of a defect within the war-
ranty period does not exist, courts likely will find that the buyer had
a "fair quantum of remedy." In Stan D. Bowles Distributing Co. v. Pabst
Brewing Co. ,837 for example, a national brewer entered into a distri-
bution contract with a wholesale distributor. The distributor sued
the brewer over a disagreement as to whether the contract included
the right to distribute malt liquor as well as beer.8 38 The court up-
held the validity of a clause excluding liability for the distributor's
831 Id. at 44, 37 U.C.C. Rep. at 1532.
832 Id. at 46, 37 U.C.C. Rep. at 1536.
833 Id. at 45, 37 U.C.C. Rep. at 1536.
834 617 F.2d 936, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 402 (2d Cir. 1980).
835 Id. at 938-39, 28 U.C.C. Rep. at 403-04.
836 Id. at 940-41, 28 U.C.C. Rep. at 406-07.
837 69 N.C. App. 341, 317 S.E.2d 684, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 500 (1984).
838 Id. at 343-44, 317 S.E.2d at 685-86, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 501-02.
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lost profits despite his claim that the clause left him without "mini-
mum adequate remedies."8 39 The agreement did not exclude all
damages but rather listed the items for which the brewer would not
be liable.8 40 Thus, the court found that the contract provided a "fair
quantum of remedy."
The term "fair quantum of remedy," like unconscionability,8 4 1
escapes precise definition. Contracts leaving the aggrieved party
with no possible means to recover for the other party's breach are
clearly unconscionable.8 42 On the other hand, commercial contracts
that merely exclude consequential damages are not unconsciona-
ble. 43 Contracts in between these extremes may be unconscionable
depending upon their individual facts. In deciding whether a con-
tract provision is unconscionable, courts should consider the pres-
ence or absence of the traditional factors of unconscionability, such
as unequal bargaining power or extreme one-sidedness.8 44
3. Exclusiveness of Remedy-The Language Requirement of Section
2-719(1)(b)
Although the Code provides sellers with ways to limit their lia-
bility through disclaimers and remedy limitations, it also allows sell-
ers to provide more remedies than the Code itself extends.8 45
Often, however, the seller intends his express warranty to serve in
lieu of the Code remedies, not in addition to them. To achieve ex-
clusivity, section 2-719(1)(b)8 46 requires the parties to agree ex-
pressly that the stated remedy will act as the buyer's sole remedy.
In consumer cases, courts usually give the buyer the benefit of
even the slightest doubt as to whether the parties intended the ex-
press remedies to be exclusive. In Williams v. Hyatt Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc.,847 for example, the purchaser of a defective automobile
brought an action to recover damages for breach of warranty. The
sales agreement stated that Chrysler would repair without charge
any defects occurring within the first twelve months or 12,000 miles.
The contract further stated that this limited warranty represented
839 Id. at 351, 317 S.E.2d at 690, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 504.
840 For instance, the brewer was liable to the distributor for the diminution in the
value of the franchise. Id., 317 S.E.2d at 690, 39 U.C.G. Rep. at 504.
841 See supra note 779.
842 See supra note 829 and accompanying text.
843 Section 2-719(3) allows the seller to exclude consequential damages for a com-
mercial loss. See supra note 811.
844 See supra notes 779-825 and accompanying text.
845 U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(a) provides in relevant part that "the agreement may provide
for remedies in addition to or in substitution for those provided in this Article."
846 Id. § 2-719(1)(b) states that "resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless
the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy."
847 48 N.C. App. 308, 269 S.E.2d 184, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 90 (1980).
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the sole warranty made by Chrysler, and went on to exclude liability
for consequential damages.8 48 The court made available to the
buyer all remedies under the Code other than consequential dam-
ages, finding that "[t]here is . . .no language in the warranty ex-
pressly stating that such a remedy is exclusive."8 49
In commercial cases, a court more likely will look to the parties'
true intent, 5 0 but even in these cases the contract must express an
intent to make the remedy exclusive. Polycon Industries, Inc. v. Hercu-
les, Inc.,8 51 for example, involved a contract for the sale of plastic
blowmolding machines. The parties agreed that the buyer could re-
turn the machines within ninety days and receive a full refund if they
did not meet performance requirements.8 52 The court held that de-
spite this agreement, the buyer's failure to return the machines
within ninety days did not bar it from other remedies under the
Code.8 53 Thus, whether the contract is a consumer or a commercial
agreement, the seller should make clear the parties' intent that ex-
press warranty be exclusive to avoid a contrary result.
4. Scope of Remedy Limitations
Sellers must carefully draft remedy limitations to cover all war-
ranty breaches. Use of the term "this warranty," for instance, could
backfire because express warranties may lurk elsewhere in the agree-
ment despite disclaimer language. The seller must disclaim each
and every warranty he wishes to disable, and sloppy draftsmanship
can easily expose the seller to unexpectedly broad liability.
848 Id. at 315, 269 S.E.2d at 188-89, 30 U.C.C. Rep. at 96.
849 Id. at 316, 269 S.E.2d at 189, 30 U.C.C. Rep. at 96; see also Ford Motor Co. v.
Reid, 250 Ark. 176, 184, 465 S.W.2d 80, 85, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 985, 990 (1971) (seller's
promise to repair defects in lieu of other warranties or obligations did not make automo-
bile purchaser's remedy of repair exclusive, permitting him to recover consequential
property damages resulting from fire in his car because "[tihere [was] no language...
.expressly' stating that the remedy of repair or replacement of defective parts [was] to be
the exclusive remedy").
850 InJ.D. Pavlack, Ltd. v. William Davies Co., 40 Ill. App. 3d 1, 351 N.E.2d 243, 20
U.C.C. Rep. 394 (1976), the contract for the sale of meat provided that "seller will allow
for excess fat content at invoice price and buyer will accept such as full settlement." Id
at 3, 351 N.E.2d at 245, 20 U.C.C. Rep. at 396. The court found that the parties' intent
was to treat the allowance as the buyer's exclusive remedy despite their failure to employ
the word "exclusive." Id. at 4, 351 N.E.2d at 246, 20 U.C.C. Rep. at 398.
851 471 F. Supp. 1316, 26 U.C.C. Rep. 917 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
852 Id. at 1319, 26 U.C.C. Rep. at 922.
853 Id at 1325, 26 U.C.C. Rep. at 928; see also, District Concrete Co. v. Bernstein
Concrete Corp., 418 A.2d 1030, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 201 (D.C. 1980) (fact that specifications
for project provided for use of tear-out remedy to repair in-place defective concrete roof
did not mean that supplier was entitled to rely on tear-out remedy as only remedy con-
templated by parties because nowhere in contract did there appear designation of tear-
out as exclusive remedy).
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In Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Industries854 the seller
made four express warranties in "Item 16" of the contract. Immedi-
ately following the warranty, the agreement stated that the
"[seller's] liability for any breach of this warranty shall be limited
solely to job site replacement or repair." 855 The seller's price
quote, however, contained detailed technical specifications, which
the court found to have created a separate express warranty. Be-
cause the lead sentence in the limiting clause spoke only of a breach
of "this" warranty, the court held that the clause applied only to the
"Item 16" warranties. The limiting clause did not shield the seller
from liability for breach of the technical specification warranty.85 6
Careful sellers should therefore use broad, all-encompassing lan-
guage when drafting remedy limitations.
5. Failure of Purpose-Section 2-719(2)
a. When Applicable. Section 2-719(2) provides: "Where cir-
cumstances cause an exclusive remedy or limited remedy to fail of
its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this
Act."8 5 7 Remedies ensure that the buyer receives what the seller
promised. If a limited remedy fails to achieve that end, it has failed
its essential purpose.858 Thus, section 2-719(2) applies whenever an
exclusive remedy, which may have appeared fair and reasonable at
the inception of the contract, operates as a result of later circum-
stances to deprive a party of a substantial benefit of the bargain.859
The test for determining whether a limited warranty fails its essen-
tial purpose is whether the buyer receives, within a reasonable pe-
riod of time, goods conforming to the contract.860 The most
common example of a remedy that can fail its essential purpose is
854 777 F.2d 405, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 1 (8th Cir. 1985).
855 Id. at 410 n.6, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 9 n.6 (emphasis added).
856 Cf Community Television Servs., Inc. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 586 F.2d 637, 640,
24 U.C.C. Rep. 851, 856-57 (8th Cir. 1978) (advertising enlarged warranty created by
technical specifications contained in contract; clauses in contract limiting liability of
seller applied only to limited warranty of materials and workmanship set forth in con-
tract and not to broader warranty created by advertising), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932
(1979); Island Creek Coal Co. v. Lake Shore, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 285, 290, 2 U.C.C. Rep.
2d 59, 64 (W.D. Va. 1986) (seller adequately protected himself by providing that "in no
event" would either party claim consequential or special damages; court rejected buyer's
claim that consequential damages exclusion applied only to incidence involving
delivery).
857 U.C.C. § 2-719(2).
858 See, e.g., Hartzell v. Justus Co., 693 F.2d 770, 774, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 1594, 1597
(8th Cir. 1982) (where repairs did not bring house to the promised condition, the lim-
ited repair remedy failed its essential purpose).
859 See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Waterson, 13 Ark. App. 77, 679 S.W.2d 814,
40 U.C.C. Rep. 1721 (1984) (failure of repair remedy for sale of a bulldozer).
860 Delhomme Indus., Inc. v. Houston Beechcraft, Inc., 669 F.2d 1049, 1063, 33
U.C.C. Rep. 490, 508 (5th Cir. 1982).
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the exclusive remedy of repair or replacement of defective goods.86'
Other exclusive remedies can fail their essential purpose as well. For
example, an exclusive refund-of-the-purchase-price remedy could
fail its purpose if the seller refuses to refund the price.8 62
Some limitations, by definition, cannot fail their essential pur-
pose, and thus section 2-719(2) cannot apply. For example, clauses
that limit damages to the purchase price, or clauses excluding con-
sequential damages, should never fail their essential purpose.8 63
These "allocation of risk" clauses accomplish precisely what the par-
ties intend.
Nevertheless, where a limitation-of-remedy clause operates to
deny the buyer an adequate remedy, courts sometimes improperly
use section 2-719(2) to invalidate an exclusionary clause. For exam-
ple, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co. 864 the court faced a
seller's limitation of remedies that provided unconscionably low
damages. The court concluded that "[t]he essential purpose of any
damage award is to make the injured party whole."8 65 Because the
limitation of remedies prevented this, it failed its essential purpose.
The court applied section 2-719(2) and held that a "'remedy may
be had as provided in [the Code].' -866 Although the court correctly
held for the buyer, it unnecessarily applied section 2-719(2) because
unconscionability alone would have sufficed to render the limitation
invalid.8 67 Only a "fair and reasonable clause" can fail of its pur-
861 Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 696 F.2d 287, 292, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 91, 98 (4th
Cir. 1982) ("failure of essential purchase exception applies most obviously to situations
where the limitation of remedy involves repair or replacement that cannot return the
goods to their warranted condition"). Professor Eddy has argued that the exclusive rem-
edy of repair or replacement was the only remedy limitation the drafters considered
when they wrote section 2-719(2). See Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies:
The Metaphysics of UCC Section 2-719(2), 65 CAL. L. REV. 28, 39 (1977).
862 See, e.g., Devore v. Bostrom, 632 P.2d 832, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 984 (Utah 1981)
(where automobile seller failed for two months to return purchase price to buyer even
though there was no real dispute as to defects in automobile, limited remedy of return of
amount paid failed its essential purpose, allowing resort to additional remedies); cf
Lewis Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable & Cold Storage Co., 709 F.2d 427,
431-32, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 170, 175 (6th Cir. 1983) (seller's refusal to rescind sale of
freezer to buyer did not cause contractual rescission remedy to fail its essential purpose
because court could have enforced rescission provision, and thus essence of remedy
could have been carried out).
863 Nevertheless, refund remedies and damage ceilings occasionally have been held
to fail under section 2-719(2) when defects are undiscoverable before the buyer sustains
large losses. See infra notes 893-95 and accompanying text.
864 131 Wis. 2d 21, 388 N.W.2d 584, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 667 (1986).
865 Id. at 39, 388 N.W.2d at 592, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d at 676 (citation omitted).
866 Id. at 40, 388 N.W.2d at 592, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d at 677 (citation omitted).
867 See Computerized Radiological Servs. v. Syntex Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1495, 1510,
40 U.C.C. Rep. 49, 69 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (very essence of a sales contract requires that at
least minimum adequate remedies be available so limited remedy fails its essential pur-
pose when enforcement of remedy limitation essentially would leave plaintiff with no
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pose. The court should have found this clause unconscionable pur-
suant to section 2-719 because it denied the buyer a fair quantum of
remedy.8 68
b. Failure of an Exclusive Remedy of Repair or Replacement. The
limited remedy of repair or replacement may serve several pur-
poses, but it primarily gives the seller an opportunity to make the
goods conform to the sales contract while limiting exposure by ex-
cluding liability for other possible damages.8 69 From the buyer's
standpoint, the repair remedy ensures that the seller will provide
goods that conform to the contract at an appropriate time. 70 A lim-
ited remedy breaks down when it "fails in its purpose or operates to
deprive either party of the substantial value of the bargain."8 71 Be-
cause the exclusive repair or replacement remedy seeks to give the
buyer conforming goods, the remedy fails its essential purpose
whenever the seller does not perform his obligation.
Fiorito Brothers, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp.8 72 exemplifies a clear case of
failure of essential purpose. In Fiorito Brothers the manufacturer of
dump truck bodies arbitrarily declined to make necessary repairs to
bodies sold, causing the limited repair remedy to fail.8 73 The court
of appeals did not hesitate to affirm the district court's summary
judgment that the repair or replacement remedy failed its essential
purpose. The court reasoned that "[d]enial of responsibility to re-
pair is a failure of a limited remedy in the most basic sense. '"874
Such examples of willful breach are relatively uncommon, how-
ever. In most cases, the seller tries to repair the goods but cannot.
Although some courts have held otherwise,8 75 in most recent deci-
sions regarding whether a repair warranty failed its essential pur-
pose courts have correctly ignored whether the seller made a good
remedy at all), rev'd in part, 786 F.2d 72, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 1656 (2d Cir. 1986); Wilson
Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 685, 297 N.Y.S.2d
108, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 1213 (1968) (refusing to enforce remedy limitation by invoking sec-
tion 2-719(2) when doing so would leave plaintiff with essentially no remedy).
868 "If the parties intend to conclude a contract for sale within this Article they must
accept the legal consequence that there be at least a fair quantum of remedy for breach
... " U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1.
869 See Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1085, 30
U.C.C. Rep. 416,420 (3rd Cir. 1980) (citing Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp.
423, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 105 (D. Del. 1973)).
870 Id., 30 U.C.C. Rep. at 420.
871 U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1.
872 747 F.2d 1309, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 1298 (9th Cir. 1984).
873 Id. at 1313, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 1302-03.
874 Id., 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 1302.
875 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 235-36 (discussing cases holding that a
seller's good faith shields him when a buyer pleads failure of purpose).
1987] 1305
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
faith effort to perform. In Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc. 876 the court
recognized that a limited remedy to repair "reveals an unequivocal
assumption that [the seller] will be able to correct any mechanical
problem . . . but nowhere suggests-much less provides for-the
possibility that repair may be impossible. ' 8 77 Thus, the court cor-
rectly found for the buyer even though the seller "was able to ar-
range for prompt service attention within his own shop, but the
company-trained service personnel were not able to solve the ...
problem."8 78
Courts must apply this bright-line approach to assure the buyer
of a fair quantum of remedy.879 A "best efforts" rule easily could
deprive buyers of any recovery for breach of remedy.880 As one
court has recognized, "The detriment to the buyer is the same
whether the seller diligently but unsuccessfully attempts to honor
his promise or acts negligently or in bad faith."881
A limited repair warranty also fails if the seller takes too much
time to repair the goods. In Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Laird, 8 82 for ex-
ample, the court awarded damages to the buyer of a combine for
breach of warranty to repair or replace when the seller made numer-
ous repairs over an extended time period but failed to repair the
machine to the buyer's reasonable satisfaction. Although the seller
was willing to continue making repairs, the court correctly held:
[T]he seller does not have an unlimited period of time to repair
and/or replace parts under a warranty. Given the numerous at-
tempts at repair over the extended time period, the jury could
properly conclude.., that the combine was not repaired within a
reasonable time and that the limited warranty had failed of its es-
sential purpose.88 3
876 775 F.2d 587, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 1553 (4th Cir. 1985).
877 Id. at 591, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 1558.
878 Id. at 589, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 1554.
879 See Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1085, 30
U.C.C. Rep. 416,420-21 (3d Cir. 1980) (buyer need not show negligence or bad faith on
part of the seller because detriment to buyer is same whether seller diligently but unsuc-
cessfully attempted to honor his promise or acted negligently or in bad faith) (citing
S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363, 1374-75, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 1066,
1081-83 (9th Cir. 1978)); Stutts v. Green Ford, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 503, 267 S.E.2d 919,
29 U.C.C. Rep. 1241 (1980) (warrantor must do more than make good-faith effort to
repair defects when requested to do so).
880 See Eddy, supra note 861, at 72 (failure of purpose should turn upon results ob-
tained rather than character of warrantor's behavior); Anderson, Failure of Essential Pur-
pose and Essential Failure on Purpose: A Look at Section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
31 Sw. L.J. 759, 780 (1977) (cases focusing on seller's fault generally nonsensical).
881 Chatlos Sys., 635 F.2d at 1085, 30 U.C.C. Rep. at 421 (citation omitted).
882 432 So. 2d 1259, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 437 (Ala. 1983).
883 Id. at 1264, 36 U.C.C. Rep. at 444 (citation omitted); see also Volkswagen of Am.,
Inc. v. Harrell, 431 So. 2d 156, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 553 (Ala. 1983) (limited repair warranty
on sale of camper failed its essential purpose where seller, through its authorized dealer-
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Such a rule is critical to ensure that the buyer is made whole. A
contrary rule would allow an obstinent seller to make patch-work
repairs over an extended time period, leaving the aggrieved buyer
without the benefit of his bargain.
c. Effect of Separate Consequential Damage Exclusions After Failure of
Purpose. Most contracts containing an exclusive remedy of repair
and replacement also contain a clause excluding consequential dam-
ages. 88 4 Section 2-719(1) allows the seller to limit the buyer's reme-
dies, and section 2-719(3) explicitly authorizes limitations of
consequential damages. However, section 2-719(2) gives the buyer
remedies "as provided in this Act" when a limited remedy fails its
essential purpose. Thus, the question arises whether section 2-
719(2) voids the consequential damages exclusion clause when an
exclusive remedy fails.
A majority of cases have answered correctly that the failure of
an exclusive remedy voids the consequential damages exclusion
clause, although the ways in which courts have reached this conclu-
sion vary tremendously. In most situations, the consequential dam-
ages exclusion is inexorably linked to the exclusive remedy
provision. The two provisions are interdependent in that the parties
use the contract to allocate risk based on the assumption that the
seller can and will repair or replace the goods within a reasonable
time. If this assumption later proves unfounded, courts should no
longer bar the buyer, who has bargained away his right to conse-
quential damages in reliance on the seller's promise to repair or re-
place, from recovering resultant damages. Several cases explicitly
recognize this,88 5 while others seem to do so implicitly.88 6
ships, was given four opportunities to repair or replace defective parts but failed to fix
defects in vehicle during a four month period); Givan v. Mack Truck Inc., 569 S.W.2d
243, 24 U.C.G. Rep. 1077 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (buyer is not bound to permit warrantor
to tinker with article indefinitely in hope that it may ultimately be made to comply;
rather, limited remedy fails of its purpose whenever warrantor fails to correct the defect
within reasonable period of time).
884 See infra notes 885-92. An exclusive remedy of repair and replacement suffices in
itself to exclude consequential damages. When the remedy fails, however, courts readily
award such damages in the absence of a separate exclusion. See, e.g., Beal v. General
Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 105 (D. Del. 1973) (consequential dam-
ages awarded in breach of contract for sale of tractor).
885 See, e.g., Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 775 F.2d 587, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 1553
(4th Cir. 1985) (under sales contract for tractor, which limited seller's obligation to re-
pair and replacement of parts and excluded seller's liability for consequential damages,
exclusion of consequential damages did not extend to situation where seller failed to
repair tractor as required by warranty because contract indicated that parties contem-
plated certain repair of tractor and thus did not anticipate any need to limit damages
from failure of certain repair); Fiorito Bros., Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309, 39
U.C.C. Rep. 1298 (9th Cir. 1984) (purpose of parties in agreeing to exclusive-remedy
provision was to insure that buyer would not suffer consequential damages from down
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Nevertheless, not all courts have held that the consequential
damage exclusion necessarily fails when an exclusive remedy fails.
Some courts sensibly reduce the inquiry to whether recognizing the
consequential damages exclusion is unconscionable.88 7 In the rare
instance where the buyer does not rely on the seller's promise to
repair in bargaining away his right to recover consequential dam-
ages, the exclusionary clause should stand. If, on the other hand,
the buyer relies on the repair warranty, courts should consider it
unconscionable to allow the seller to avoid all consequential liability
by sheltering himself behind one portion of the warranty while ig-
noring its obligations under another portion.
Most courts that adopt the unconscionability analysis do not,
however, follow this reasoning. Instead, these courts look for the
traditional aspects of unconscionability, such as unequal bargaining
power. For example, in In re Feder Litho-Graphic Services88 s the court
upheld the validity of a consequential damages exclusion in a sales
contract for an offset press even though the limited repair remedy
failed, because the court could find none of the traditional indicia of
unconscionability.88 9 A few courts have held that the failure of a
repair remedy does not invalidate a consequential damages exclu-
sion but have given no reasons for their finding.8 90 Finally, some
time of trucks; therefore seller's failure to repair trucks voided consequential damages
exclusion); see also infra note 892 and accompanying text.
886 See, e.g., R.W. Murray, Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 758 F.2d 266, 40 U.C.C.
Rep. 1283 (8th Cir. 1985) (failure of replacement remedy in sale of glass panels); Matco
Mach. and Tool Co. v. Cincinnati Milacron Co., 727 F.2d 777, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 1577 (8th
Cir. 1984) (failure of repair remedy in sale of machine); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v.
Harrell, 431 So. 2d 156, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 553 (Ala. 1983) (failure of repair remedy in sale
of camper); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Waterson, 13 Ark. App. 77, 679 S.W.2d 814, 40
U.C.C. Rep. 1721 (1984) (failure of repair remedy in sale of bulldozer); Cayuga Har-
vester, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 95 A.D.2d 5, 465 N.Y.S.2d 606, 37 U.C.C. Rep.
1147 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (failure of repair remedy in sale of harvesting machine).
887 See infra note 889.
888 40 Bankr. 486, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 495 (Bankr. D. Mich. 1984).
889 Id. at 489, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 499; see also Frantz Lithographic Servs., Inc. v. Sun
Chem. Corp., 38 U.C.C. Rep. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (consequential damages exclusion not
unconscionable because buyer could still recover the amount paid under the contract,
and therefore was not deprived of all remedies); AMF, Inc. v. Computer Automation,
Inc., 573 F. Supp. 924, 930, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 1583, 1589-90 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (conse-
quential damages exclusion not unconscionable even if exclusive repair remedy failed
because both parties were sophisticated merchants); Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four
Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 857 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (consequential damages
exclusion not unconscionable regardless of failure of repair remedy because both par-
ties were of equal sophistication and bargaining power and there was no evidence of
haste or undue pressure exerted on buyer to compel it to enter into the contract).
890 See, e.g., Stutts v. Green Ford, Inc. 47 N.C. App. 503, 516, 267 S.E.2d 919, 926,
29 U.C.C. Rep. 1241, 1251 (1980); cf Typographical Serv., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 721 F.2d
1317, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 1139 (11 th Cir. 1983) (holding without analysis that consequential
damages are available when limited remedy fails of its essential purpose); John Deere
Co. v. Hand, 211 Neb. 549, 319 N.W.2d 434, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 1369 (1982) (same).
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courts treat the limited remedy of repair and a consequential dam-
ages exclusion as separate, independent attempts by the parties to
allocate risk.89 '
We find highly implausible the notion that parties consciously
allocate the risk that an exclusive repair remedy will fail completely.
A rational buyer would not accept the seller's promise to repair the
goods as his sole remedy, agree not to seek consequential damages
or a refund of the purchase price, and then agree that in the event
seller cannot (or will not) repair the goods the buyer cannot recover
damages resulting from the seller's breach. We find it far more
likely that the parties never contemplate the possibility of a failure
of the repair remedy, and that the buyer agrees to waive his right to
consequential damages in reliance on certain repair. Although each
case must stand on its own facts, under such an analysis courts will
usually void the consequential damages exclusion in cases involving
the failure of a repair warranty.892
d. Failure of Price Repayment Remedies. An exclusive refund rem-
edy typically requires the seller to return the substantial value of
warranted goods while excluding resultant damages. A price repay-
ment remedy would therefore fail its purpose when the seller
wrongfully refuses to refund the price.8 93 Moreover, if the purpose
of the price repayment is to enable the buyer to acquire substitute
goods promptly, even an immediate refund may cause the remedy
to fail; for example, substitute goods might not be readily avail-
able,8 94 or the market price may have risen sharply since the time of
contracting. Absent an explicit understanding to the contrary, how-
ever, courts should not hold that a repayment remedy fails merely
because the buyer cannot obtain a substitute within a reasonable
891 See Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1086, 30
U.C.C. Rep. 416, 422 (3d Cir. 1980); American Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435, 457-58, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1009, 1030-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Ca-
yuga Harvester, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 95 A.D.2d 5, 14-15, 465 N.Y.S.2d 606,
613-14, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 1147, 1155-56 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
892 See RRX Indus. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 547, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 1561, 1565
(9th Cir. 1985) ("Neither bad faith nor procedural unconscionability is necessary under
[section 2-719(2)]. It provides an independent limit when circumstances render a dam-
ages limitation clause oppressive and invalid.").
893 See, e.g., North Am. Steel Corp. v. Siderius, Inc., 75 Mich. App. 391, 254 N.W.2d
899, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 62 (1977) (exclusive remedy of price adjustment for delivery of
nonconforming steel failed of purpose when seller refused to comply); Devore v. Bos-
trom, 632 P.2d 832, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 984 (Utah 1981) (automobile sales contract's lim-
ited remedy of return of amount paid failed its essential purpose when seller did not
return purchase price to buyer for two months even though no real dispute existed as to
defects in automobile).
894 See Earl M.Jorgensen Co. v. Mark Constr., Inc., 56 Hawaii 466, 540 P.2d 978, 17
U.C.C. Rep. 1126 (1975) (buyer could not substitute in time to complete construction
contract). Our research uncovered no recent cases in this area.
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time. The buyer should foresee the problems of substitution, and
unlike the limited repair remedy,8 95 the buyer relies on market con-
dition, not on the seller's performance, in agreeing to an exclusive
remedy. Thus, although the prompt acquisition of substitute goods
may serve as an important secondary purpose of a repayment rem-
edy, the essential purpose is most likely the return of consideration.
No remedy limitation is foolproof, but a seller can increase
greatly the chances that courts will enforce his limitation through
careful drafting. Sellers should take particular care that the limita-
tion covers all warranty breaches8 96 and that the contract leaves the
buyer with a fair quantum of remedy in the event of the seller's
breach.8 97 The agreement also should state explicitly that the par-
ties intend the express warranties as exclusive.898 The seller should
use consequential damage exclusions, but with the knowledge that
courts may not enforce them if the seller fails to honor his express
warranties.8 99
VI
DEFENSES TO WARRANTY ACTIONS
A. Privity-Section 2-318
Privity describes the relationship between the parties to a con-
tract: Those who have entered into a contract with one another are
"in privity." 900 Those who have not contracted directly with one
another are not in privity. Traditionally, manufacturers owed no
duty of care to people not in privity. Consequently, only buyers in
privity with the manufacturer could recover for harm caused by the
manufacturer's defective or unsafe products.901 This traditional
doctrine reflected fears that remote buyers would subject sellers to
unexpected and unrestrained suits. 90 2 Recently, however, the doc-
trine has fallen into decline. 90 3
There are two basic kinds of privity relationships.90 4 "Vertical
895 See supra text accompanying notes 884-92.
896 See supra notes 854-56 and accompanying text.
897 See supra notes 827-45 and accompanying text.
898 See supra notes 845-53 and accompanying text.
899 See supra notes 884-92 and accompanying text.
900 See J. WHrTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 11-2, at 399 (discussing privity and
warranty claims).
901 See Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
902 See id. at 405 ("Unless we confine the operation of [contracts indirectly affecting
third parties] to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous
consequences .. .would ensue.").
903 See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 11-2, at 399 ("[The subject itself is
crumbling away.").
904 A third form of privity relationship, "diagonal privity," is sometimes discussed.
See infra notes 905-06.
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privity" describes the relationship between parties in the marketing
chain, usually the manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer, and ultimate
buyer.90 5 In this chain, only parties who have contracted directly
with one another are in privity. Typically, the manufacturer is only
in privity with the wholesaler and the ultimate buyer only with the
retailer. The wholesaler and retailer are in privity with each other as
well as with the manufacturer and buyer, respectively. "Horizontal
privity" describes the relationship between the retailer and persons
other than the ultimate buyer, who use or consume the goods. 90 6
For example, horizontal privity describes the relationship between
the retailer and a child who uses a lawnmower his grandfather
purchased. 907
Initially, privity protected parties from both tort and warranty
liability. 908 After a period of decline, however, the New York Court
of Appeals effectively ended its application to tort claims in MacPher-
son v. Buick Motor Co.909 In MacPherson the court held that lack of
privity between a manufacturer and a consumer does not shield the
manufacturer from liability for personal injury and property damage
resulting from faulty manufacture of a product where one reason-
ably could expect the defect to cause the damage that in fact en-
sued.910 The demise of privity in contract law has been slower and
less uniform.
Four major social policy grounds support the attacks on privity
in the products liability field. First, manufacturers and suppliers can
best distribute losses caused by unsafe products because they can
include the cost of damages or insurance in the price of the prod-
uct.9 11 Second, strict liability both compensates injured parties and
deters the production of unsafe products.9 12 Third, suppliers im-
pliedly represent that their goods are safe by placing them in the
905 Hawkland also mentioned "diagonal privity," a combination of horizontal and
vertical privity. 2 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 575, § 2-318:01, at 421.
906 Id.; see also Redwine v. Baptist Gen. Convention, 681 P.2d 1121, 1125, 34 U.C.C.
Rep. 883, 887 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982) (Bacon, J., concurring) (need for "diagonal" chain
exception to privity rules where no one in vertical chain would ever use product). But cf
J. WnrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 11-2, at 399 (only two types of" 'non-privity'
plaintiffs"). We do not separately address "diagonal privity," but rather we implicitly
consider it in discussing vertical and horizontal privity.
907 See Chastain v. Fuqua Indus., 156 Ga. App. 719, 725, 275 S.E.2d 679, 684, 31
U.C.C. Rep. 79, 82 (1980) (jury question whether injured grandson was member of
family entitled to protection of section 2-318).
908 See 2 W. HAwELAND, supra note 575, § 2-318:01, at 419-20.
909 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); see 2 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 575, § 2-
318:01, at 420 ("After MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. the application of the privity
doctrine to torts ended in most states ... .
910 217 N.Y. at 391, 111 N.E. at 1053.
911 See 2 W. HAWxLAND, supra note 575, § 2-318:01, at 423; Special Project, supra
note 1, at 256.
912 2 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 575, § 2-318:01, at 423.
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market, and courts should protect the public's reliance on such rep-
resentations. 913 Finally, the purchaser of an unsafe product nor-
mally can recover from the retailer who can then recover from the
supplier or manufacturer. Abolition of privity avoids the waste in-
volved in this circuitous recovery route.914
When section 2-318 was first drafted there was no national con-
sensus on the proper scope of warranty protection.91 5 Professor
Llewellyn initially drafted the section to restrict severely the effect of
both horizontal and vertical privity rules.916 The proposed section,
which appeared as section 43 of the Uniform Revised Sales Act,
provided:
A warranty extends to any natural person whose relationship to
the buyer is such as to make it reasonable to expect that such per-
son may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in person or property by breach of the warranty. A seller
may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.9 17
The first official Uniform Commercial Code, however, con-
tained a substantially narrower version of section 2-318. It
provided:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any nat-
ural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who
is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person
may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured
in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or
limit the operation of this section.918
The official commentary to the section noted that beyond the ex-
pressly included beneficiaries, "the section is neutral and is not in-
tended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the
seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other
persons in the distributive chain." 919
Although the drafters expected some variation in the common
law development of the privity doctrine, they did not expect the
number of amendments to section 2-318 that were enacted. 920 Cali-
913 Id
914 Id.; see, e.g., Old Albany Estates, Ltd. v. Highland Carpet Mills, Inc., 604 P.2d
849, 851-52, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 368, 371-72 (Okla. 1979) (abolishing vertical privity re-
quirement because it "results in perpetuating a needless chain of actions" of buyers
suing sellers until manufacturer is reached).
915 See 2 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 575, § 2-318:01, at 421-22.
916 Id. at 423.
917 UNIF. REv. SALES AcT § 43 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944).
918 U.C.C. § 2-318 (1952).
919 Id. comment 3.
920 See 2 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 575, § 2-318:01, at 425. Utah omitted section 2-
318 from its Code. Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, South Dakota, Virginia,
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fornia, for example, criticized the section as "a step backward" 921
and went so far as to omit the section from its version of the
Code.922 To "prevent further proliferation of separate variations in
state after state," 923 the drafters provided two alternatives, Alterna-
tive B and Alternative C, to the initial version of section 2-318,
which is now Alternative A.924 Alternative B provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
natural person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume
or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by
breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the op-
eration of this section.925
Alternative C provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the war-
ranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this sec-
tion with respect to injury to the person of an individual to whom
the warranty extends.926
According to one commentator, the drafters intended the initial
version of section 2-318 to codify contemporary case law on hori-
zontal privity while remaining neutral regarding further limitations
on the privity doctrines.927 Similarly, the drafters intended the sub-
sequent alternatives to check the trend towards nonuniform statu-
tory rules, not to impede further common law limitations on
privity.928 According to this view, courts may develop their own hor-
izontal and vertical privity doctrines without regard to the legislative
choice of alternatives. 929
and Wyoming all adopted variations of section 2-318. Texas replaced section 2-318
with a statute that was neutral on the question of privity. Id at 425-26.
921 PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Report No.
3, at 13 (1966).
922 Id
923 Id. at 14.
924 Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
NewJersy, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Ten-
nessee, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia have gener-
ally adopted Alternative A. 2 W. HA-,vxLAND, supra note 575, § 2-318, at 407-08.
925 U.C.C. § 2-318 Alternative B. Alabama, Delaware, Kansas, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Vermont, and and the Virgin Islands have adopted this alternative. 2 W.
HAWKLAND, supra note 575, § 2-318, at 408.
926 U.C.C. § 2-318 Alternative C. Hawaii, Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, Utah,
and Wyoming have adopted this alternative. 2 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 575, § 2-318,
at 408.
927 See 2 W. HAwELAND, supra note 575, § 2-318:01, at 424.
928 Id., at 426; see id. § 2-318, at 408-19 (current variations of section 2-318).
929 Id. § 2-318:0 1, at 426. Hawkland nevertheless has conceded that "the legislative
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Under the better view,930 adopted by the majority of courts, the
legislative choice of Alternative A limits further common law ero-
sion of the horizontal privity doctrine93 1 while allowing courts to
develop their own rules on vertical privity.9 32 The official commen-
tary supports this position: Alternative A "is neutral and is not in-
tended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the
seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other
persons in the distributive chain."93 3 Courts that exceed "Alternative
choice of alternatives may be important in deciding the social policy of the state on the
privity question." Id.
930 SeeJ. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 403 n.17 (endorsing this view); Spe-
cial Project, supra note 1, at 257-60 (same).
931 See, e.g., Hemphill v. Sayers, 552 F. Supp. 685, 690-93, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 758, 763-
66 (S.D. Il1. 1982) (legislative choice of Alternative A neutral as to expansion of vertical
privity, but limits horizontal privity; football player using helmet supplied by school
barred from bringing suit against manufacturer for breach of warranty because not fam-
ily member or guest of school); Teel v. American Steel Foundries, 529 F. Supp. 337,
345, 33 U.G.C. Rep. 42, 51 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (adoption of Alternative A shows legislature
did not intend to extend warranty coverage to buyer's employees); Curlee v. Mock En-
ters., 173 Ga. App. 594, 600, 327 S.E.2d 736, 743, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 63, 68 (1985) (choice
of most restrictive alternative shows legislature did not intend to obliterate privity;
therefore, court will not extend guest status to many locations outside house); Lane v.
Barringer, 407 N.E.2d 1173, 1178, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 1273, 1280 (Ind. App. 1980) (Neal,
J., concurring) (injured mother not within family or household of married daughter who
had separate family and residence; although mother possibly covered by Alternative B
or C, court refused to expand scope of horizontal privity established by legislative adop-
tion of Alternative A); Williams v. Fulmer, 695 S.W.2d 411, 414, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 795,
797, 800 (Ky. 1985) (limiting third-party beneficiaries to those expressly mentioned in
section 2-318; thus husband could not recover from helmet manufacturer for death of
wife who used helmet purchased on resale from private individual); Davis v. Siloo, Inc.,
47 N.C. App. 237, 249, 267 S.E.2d 354, 361, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 492, 498 (1980) (section 2-
318 does not contemplate extending implied warranties to purchaser's employees);
Redwine v. Baptist Gen. Convention, 681 P.2d 1121, 1124, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 883, 886
(Okla. Ct. App. 1982) (horizontal privity limited to confines of section 2-318; widow
cannot sue for breach of warranty for defective heart-lung machine that caused hus-
band's death in hospital because charging patient for use of machine not "sale").
932 See, e.g., R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818, 825, 35
U.C.C. Rep. 477, 487 (8th Cir. 1983) (applying Missouri law) (judicial extension of im-
plied warranties to remote purchasers is not improper); Peterson v. North Am. Plant
Breeders, 218 Neb. 258, 265-66, 354 N.W.2d 625, 631-32, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 1637, 1644
(1984) (legislature only addressed horizontal privity in section 2-318; court free to ex-
tend vertical privity to ultimate buyer); Perfetti v. McGhan Medical, 99 N.M. 645, 654,
662 P.2d 646, 655, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 1472, 1480-81 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 644,
662 P.2d 645 (1983) (vertical privity not controlled by section 2-318; manufacturer of
medical equipment liable for breach of implied warranty "without regard to privity of
contract between [manufacturer] and either plaintiff or her surgeon"). But see N. Feld-
man & Son, Ltd. v. Checker Motors Corp., 572 F. Supp. 310, 315, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 730,
733 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (applying Michigan law) (section 2-318 does not extend warranty
coverage to ultimate purchaser; buyer cannot sue manufacturer of diesel engines with
whom he did not contract).
933 U.C.C. § 2-318 comment 3 (emphasis added). Hawkland argues that comment 2
to section 2-313 also admonishes that the section's drafters did not intended to inhibit
case law development that further relaxes privity requirements. 2 W. HAWKLAND, supra
note 575, § 2-318:01, at 426. Comment 2 states that the Code warranty rules are
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A's horizontal limits overstep the judicial role by amending existing
legislation, and frustrate the Code's underlying policy of
uniformity. ' 9 3
4
Two commonly litigated issues involving privity in commercial
settings are (1) whether a buyer's employee may recover from the
manufacturer or supplier for personal injuries sustained by use of
the defective product and (2) whether a buyer may recover for eco-
nomic loss from a remote manufacturer.
1. Recovery for Personal Injury by Buyers' Employees
In jurisdictions embracing Alternatives B and C, buyers' em-
ployees should be entitled to recover from the manufacturer or sup-
plier for personal injuries sustained by the use of defective products.
Alternatives B and C extend sellers' warranties for personal injuries
to buyers' employees because they easily qualify as persons "who
may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by"
goods purchased by their employers. 935
Coverage under Alternative A is more limited. Most courts
read section 2-318 strictly: Because employees are not included in
the express language of section 2-318, they cannot recover for
breach of warranty. 93 6 This strict approach is consistent with the
view that the choice of Alternative A represents a legislative prefer-
not designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth which
have recognized that warranties need not be confined either to sales con-
tracts or to the direct parties to such a contract.... The provisions of
Section 2-318 on third party beneficiaries expressly recognize this case
law development within one particular area. Beyond that, the matter is
left to the case law with the intention that the policies of this Act may
offer useful guidance in dealing with further cases as they arise.
U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 2. Although the language of this comment is more ambiguous
than section 2-318 comment 3, which expressly refers to "other persons in the distribu-
tive chain," the comment, when read in conjunction with section 2-318 comment 3, only
addresses the extension of vertical privity. The "particular area" of case law develop-
ment that section 2-318 expressly recognizes is horizontal privity; vertical privity falls
"beyond that" and is thus left open to case law.
934 Special Project, supra note 1, at 259 (footnotes omitted).
935 See, e.g., Hansen v. F.M.C. Corp., 32 U.C.C. Rep. 828, 830 (D. Kan. 1981) (war-
ranty extends to employee by virtue of Kansas's Alternative B of section 2-318; em-
ployee not required to give notice of breach under section 2-607).
936 See, e.g., Watkins v. Barber-Colman Co., 29 U.C.C. Rep. 1271, 1271-73 (5th Cir.
1980) (applying Georgia law) (employee is not member of family, household, or guest
within section 2-318 and thus cannot recover for breach of warranty); Bailey v. ITT
Grinnel Corp., 536 F. Supp. 84, 89 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (applying Ohio law) (employee has
no privity with and thus no breach of warranty cause of action against remote manufac-
turer); In re Johns-Manville Asbestosis Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1235, 1239-40, 31 U.C.C.
Rep. 478, 480 (N.D. Il1. 1981) (applying Illinois law) (section 2-318 does not extend
breach of warranty coverage to employees); Colvin v. FMC Corp., 43 Or. App. 709, 716-
17, 604 P.2d 157, 160-61, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 375, 380-81 (1979) (employee injured by
insecticide cannot recover from manufacturer for defective product).
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ence about the applicable extent of horizontal privity. In applying
Alternative A, however, Pennsylvania courts extend warranty cover-
age to buyers' employees harmed by defective products. 937
2. Buyer Recovery for Economic Loss from Remote Sellers
Buyer recovery for economic loss from remote sellers involves
both vertical privity considerations and public policy choices regard-
ing the breadth of warranty coverage. Courts should develop their
own positions on these two issues without regard to legislative
choice of alternatives of section 2-318. The official commentary
notes that the choice of Alternative A should not affect the develop-
ment of vertical privity case law. 938 Courts adhere to this comment
and determine vertical privity policy without regard to legislative
choice of section 2-318. 93 9
Although Alternatives A and B provide warranty coverage only
to those who suffer personal injury while Alternative C extends cov-
erage to any injury caused by a breach of warranty, courts should
not and do not consider legislative choice of section 2-318 to be a
937 See, e.g., Williams v. West Penn Power Co., 502 Pa. 557, 570, 467 A.2d 811, 818,
37 U.C.C. Rep. 720, 729 (1983) (employee injured by defective ladder may sue remote
manufacturer for personal injury).
938 U.C.C. § 2-318 comment 3; see supra note 933 and accompanying text.
939 See, e.g., R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818, 825, 35
U.C.C. Rep. 477, 487 (8th Cir. 1983) (comment 3 clearly indicates that judicial exten-
sion of implied warranties to remote purchasers is consistent with section 2-318); Flory
v. Sivercrest Indus., 29 U.C.C. Rep. 832, 833-34 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (section 2-318
does not address question of privity in breach of warranty action for economic loss;
better rule allows recovery for economic loss despite lack of privity); Pack & Process,
Inc. v. Celotex Corp., 503 A.2d 646, 659-60, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 462, 473-74 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1985) (section 2-318 neutral regarding vertical privity; remote purchaser can recover
under implied warranty for purely economic loss); Spiegel v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 125 Ill.
App. 3d 897, 899-900, 466 N.E.2d 1040, 1043, 38 U.C.C. Rep. 1624, 1626-27 (1984)
(section 2-318 neutral regarding vertical privity; Illinois requires privity to recover for
purely economic loss); Candlelight Homes, Inc. v. Zornes, 414 N.E.2d 980, 981, 30
U.C.C. Rep. 919, 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (Indiana's version of the Code does not
address whether vertical privity required; courts find privity required to recover for
purely economic harm); Groppel Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49, 58,
32 U.C.C. Rep. 35, 43-44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (section 2-318 does not address vertical
privity; sound policy supports extension of implied warranty to remote purchasers for
purely economic loss); Spring Motors Distribs. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 587-88,
489 A.2d 660, 677, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 1184, 1207 (1985) (Code leaves courts to determine
whether vertical privity required in action between seller and remote purchaser; New
Jersey abolished vertical privity requirement in action by buyer against remote seller for
purely economic loss); Old Albany Estates, Ltd. v. Highland Carpet Mills, Inc., 604 P.2d
849, 851-52, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 368, 371-72 (Okla. 1979) (Alternative A neutral as to verti-
cal privity in implied warranty action; abolished by judicial decision); Dravo Equip. Co.
v. German, 73 Or. App. 165, 168-69, 698 P.2d 63, 65-66, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 1240, 1242-43
(1985) (section 2-318 not meant to limit extension of warranties; Oregon courts require
privity for recovery of purely economic loss in breach of implied warranty but not in
breach of express warranty).
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legislative statement on the proper breadth of warranty coverage. 940
Courts should consider the relevant public policy concerns and se-
lect a rule regarding the proper breadth of warranty coverage based
on their evaluations of these concerns.
In abolishing the vertical privity requirement for recovery for
solely economic loss, the court in Industrial Graphics, Inc. v. Asahi
Corp.941 advanced the primary public policy considerations for ex-
tending warranty coverage to economic loss. First, to permit recov-
ery for personal injury but not economic loss is unfair and
inconsistent. Second, economic loss can be as devastating as per-
sonal injury. Third, and most important, fears about unforeseen and
unlimited liability-the primary reason given for limitation of liabil-
ity-are illusory given the Code's protections. 942
Not all courts reach the same result as the Industrial Graphics
court. For example, in Professional Lens Plan, Inc. v. Polaris Leasing
Corp. 943 the court found personal injury and property damage differ-
ent interests deserving different treatment.944 The court declined to
extend warranty coverage to economic loss.
B. Notice
Section 2-607(3)(a) provides that "[w]here a tender has been
accepted ... the buyer must within a reasonable time after he dis-
covers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of
breach or be barred from any remedy." 945 Thus, notice of breach is
a condition precedent to recovery for breach of warranty, even ab-
sent prejudice to the seller.9 46
The notification requirement promotes good faith in commer-
940 See supra note 939. But see Nebraska Innkeepers, Inc. v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines
Corp. 345 N.W.2d 124, 129, 38 U.C.C. Rep. 1177 (Iowa 1984) (section 2-318 does not
extend warranty protection to economic loss); Hole v. General Motors Corp., 83 A.D.2d
715, 716, 442 N.Y.S.2d 638, 640, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 1285, 1287 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981)
(interpreting statute to provide that plaintiff not in privity with manufacturer may only
recover for personal injury).
941 485 F. Supp. 793, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 647 (D. Minn. 1980).
942 Id at 804, 28 U.CC. Rep. at 662-63.
943 234 Kan. 742, 675 P.2d 887, 38 U.C.C. Rep. 69 (1984).
944 Id at 754-55, 675 P.2d at 898, 38 U.C.C. Rep. at 77; see also Hole, 83 A.D.2d at
716, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 640, 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 1287.
945 U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a).
946 See Armco Steel Corp. v. Isaacson Structural Steel Co., 611 P.2d 507, 511, 28
U.C.C. Rep. 1249, 1256 (Alaska 1980) (section 2-607(3)(a) "provides for no excuse from
notice such as lack of prejudice"). A buyer's failure to meet the Code's notification re-
quirements bars any remedy otherwise available for breach. See, e.g., Klockner, Inc. v.
Federal Wire Mill Corp., 663 F.2d 1370, 1378-79, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 1097, 1105-06 (7th
Cir. 1981) (failure to notify seller of defects in steel rods barred buyer's suit); Point
Adams Packing Co. v. Astoria Marine Constr. Co., 594 F.2d 763, 765-66, 26 U.C.C. Rep.
391, 394 (9th Cir. 1979) (buyer's failure to notify barred recovery of damages resulting
from seller's failure to supply safety devices on fishing vessel).
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cial transactions. 947 Section 2-607(3)(a) affords the seller an oppor-
tunity to inspect and to repair or supply conforming goods.9 48 It
also provides the parties an opportunity to negotiate a settlement or
to prepare for litigation.949 Finally, the notice requirement protects
the seller from stale claims and permits the seller to close its books
on past accounts. 950
Notification to the immediate seller generally satisfies section 2-
607(3)(a).951 In consumer transactions, the buyer is not likely to
know who the manufacturer is or which party is legally responsible
for the breach.952 Jurisdictions that permit consumers to satisfy
947 See Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 777 F.2d 405, 409, 42
U.C.C. Rep. 1, 8 (8th Cir. 1985) ("the notice requirement [is] 'designed to defeat com-
mercial bad faith' ") (quoting U.C.C. § 2-607 comment 4 (1965)).
948 See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 777 F.2d 405, 409, 42
U.C.C. Rep. 1, 7 (8th Cir. 1985) (one policy of notice requirement is "to enable the
seller to make adjustments or replacements or to suggest opportunities for cure");
Parker v. Bell Ford, Inc., 425 So. 2d 1101, 1103, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 1171, 1173 (Ala. 1983)
(one policy objective of notification requirement is "to enable the seller to make adjust-
ments or replacements, or to suggest opportunities for cure, to the end of minimizing
the buyer's loss and reducing the seller's own liability to the buyer"); General Matters,
Inc. v. Paramount Canning Co., 382 So. 2d 1262, 1264, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 1031, 1034 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (notice requirement "protects the seller's right to inspect the
goods").
949 See, e.g., Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 826, 25
U.C.C. Rep. 65, 85 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979) ("express notice
opens the way for settlement through negotiation between the parties"); Armco Steel
Corp. v. Isaacson Structural Steel Co., 611 P.2d 507, 512, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 1249, 1258
(Alaska 1980) ("The overriding purpose of the notice requirement is to encourage con-
sistent business practices and early settlement of disputes."); White v. Mississippi Order
Buyers, 648 P.2d 682, 684, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 1303, 1305 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (notice
requirement "provides the seller with an opportunity to correct any defect, to prepare
for negotiation and litigation, and to protect itself against stale claims asserted after it is
too late for the seller to investigate them").
950 See, e.g., Courtesy Enters. v. Richards Laboratories, 457 N.E.2d 572, 577, 37
U.C.C. Rep. 765, 770 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) ("The final policy consideration involved is
that notice is required to discourage the assertion of stale claims in the same way as, and
for the same reasons as, do statutes of limitation."); Petro-Chem, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg.
Co., 686 P.2d 589, 591, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 139, 141 (Wyo. 1984) (one policy consideration
"is to enable the seller to make adjustments, to afford the seller an opportunity to arm
himself for litigation, and to allow the seller to close the book on goods which have been
sold in the past").
951 Owens v. Glendale Optical Co., 590 F. Supp. 32, 36, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 903, 907
(S.D. Ill. 1984) (notification to immediate seller sufficient); Prutch v. Ford Motor Co.,
618 P.2d 657, 661, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 1507, 1512 (Colo. 1980) (same); Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Cannon, 53 Md. App. 106, 118, 452 A.2d 192, 198, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 1564,
1574 (1982) (same), aff'd, 295 Md. 528, 456 A.2d 930 (1983); Vintage Homes, Inc. v.
Coldiron, 585 S.W.2d 886, 888-89, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 403, 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)
(same).
952 Professors Prosser and Keeton addressed this concern:
Both the Sales Act and the Commercial Code contain provisions which
prevent the buyer from recovering on a warranty unless he gives notice to
the seller within a reasonable time after he knows or should know of the
breach. As between the immediate parties to the sale, this is a sound
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section 2-607(3)(a) by notifying the immediate seller presume that
the immediate seller will in turn notify the legally responsible
party.953 Some courts, however, construe the section as requiring
direct notice to the ultimate manufacturer, 954 in part out of concern
that the immediate seller will not adequately apprise the manufac-
turer of the alleged defect in time for it to inspect and cure the de-
fect.955 Rather than follow either of these approaches, courts
should resolve the question of whom the buyer must notify on a
case-by-case basis by examining whether the buyer reasonably be-
lieved that the notice provided would reach the responsible parties
and whether the manufacturer justifiably believed that the immedi-
ate seller would relay any notice of breach. Moreover, a buyer who
works closely with the other parties to the manufacture, distribution,
and sale of a product should provide notice directly to the manufac-
commercial rule, designed to protect the seller against unduly delayed
claims for damages. As applied to personal injuries, and notice to a re-
mote seller, it becomes a booby-trap for the unwary. The injured con-
sumer is seldom "steeped in the business practice which justifies the
rule," and at least until he has legal advice it will not occur to him to give
notice to one with whom he has had no dealings."
W. KEETON, supra note 182, § 97, at 691 (footnotes omitted); cf Moore v. Puget Sound
Plywood, Inc., 214 Neb. 14, 332 N.W.2d 212, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 82 (1983) (notice to
seller's former agent sufficient because buyer never received notice of termination of
former principal-agent relationship and former agent had apparent authority).
953 See Goldstein v. G.D. Searle & Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 344, 378 N.E.2d 1083, 24
U.C.C. Rep. 888 (1978).
[W]hether one or more of those upstream of the consumer in the distrib-
utive chain is ultimately sued for breach of implied warranty by the con-
sumer, the Code envisions that when the consumer's notice of breach is
given to his immediate seller, such person to preserve any right of action
he may have for breach of implied warranty will give notice to his imme-
diate seller, and so on upstream until the seminal point of the distributive
chain is reached.
Id. at 348, 378 N.E.2d 1083, 1087, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 888, 892-93; see also Palmer v. A.H.
Robbins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 206, 38 U.C.C. Rep. 1150, 1158 (Colo. 1984) ("This se-
quential notice requirement is thus calculated to provide the remote manufacturer with
notice and an opportunity to correct the defect, where possible, and to investigate claims
that might eventuate in litigation.").
954 Wilcox v. Hillcrest Memorial Park, 696 S.W.2d 423, 424, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 169,
171 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (section 2-607(3)(a) requires buyer to "notify any seller, in-
cluding a remote seller such as the manufacturer, of the product's alleged defect"), writ
ref'd n.r.e., 701 S.W.2d 842, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 1303 (Tex. 1986); see also Spring Motors
Distribs. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 1184 (1985)
(holding that buyer cannot sue remote seller in common law negligence or strict liabil-
ity-reserving determination of whether buyer must notify remote seller).
955 See Wilcox, 696 S.W.2d at 424, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 171 ("It would be untenable to
allow a buyer.., to recover damages for breach of warranty from a remote seller or
manufacturer who was never even made aware that the product in question was defec-
tive and who, consequently, never had an opportunity to remedy the defect to the
buyer's satisfaction before litigation was commenced or even to inspect the product to
ascertain if indeed a defect existed.")
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turer.956 In such a situation, the dealer can reasonably assume that
the buyer will also inform the manufacturer of the defect. Thus, the
reasons for limiting the notification requirement to the immediate
seller do not apply. 957
A buyer who notifies the proper party must also establish that
the content of the notice was sufficient and that notice was provided
within a reasonable time.
1. Content
Section 2-607(3) (a) does not require a particular form of notice:
written notice, oral notice, or in some situations, action may suf-
fice.958 The parties can set general notice requirements by con-
tract. 959 Where the contract is silent, however, courts split as to
whether the buyer must merely inform the seller that "the transac-
tion is still troublesome and must be watched," 960 or whether the
956 See Carson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 6 Kan. App. 2d 776, 785, 635 P.2d 1248,
1256, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 834, 844 (1981) ("where the buyer and the other parties to the
manufacture, distribution and sale of the product are closely related, or where the other
parties actively participate in the consummation of the actual sale of the product, the
reasons for the exclusion of such other parties from the ... notice provision cease to
exist").
957 See id., 635 P.2d at 1256, 32 U.C.C. Rep. at 844.
958 Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 37 U.C.C.
Rep. 429 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (oral complaint sufficient to establish that transaction was
troublesome and had to be watched); TJ. Stevenson & Co. v. 81,193 Bags of Flour, 629
F.2d 338, 359, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 865, 893 (5th Cir. 1980) (notice need not be written);
Wilson v. Marquette Elecs., Inc., 630 F.2d 575, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 399 (8th Cir. 1980)
(consistent and repeated notices of dissatisfaction over two year period adequate notice
of breach); Speakman Co. v. Harper Buffing Mach. Co., 583 F. Supp. 273, 38 U.C.C.
Rep. 469 (D. Del. 1984) (buyer's oral complaint within month after acceptance of goods,
coupled with seller's unsuccessful attempts to repair defect over six to eight month pe-
riod and written demand for refund six to twelve months later sufficient notice); Palmer
v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 38 U.C.C. Rep. 1150 (Colo. 1984) (patient-buyer
presenting herself to physician-seller ofintra-uterine device in life-threatening condition
resulting from device constitutes sufficient notice); Stelco Indus. v. Cohen, 182 Conn.
561, 438 A.2d 759, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 86 (1980) (buyer and worker's oral complaints to
seller sufficient); Delano Growers' Coop. Winery v. Supreme Wine Co., 393 Mass. 666,
473 N.E.2d 1066, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 93 (1985) (oral complaints followed by halt in buying
and negotiations with seller sufficient notice).
959 See U.C.C. § 1-204(1) ("Whenever this Act requires any action to be taken within
a reasonable time, any time which is not manifestly unreasonable may be fixed by
agreement.").
960 The analysis on the loose/strict content standard relies heavily on Note, Notifica-
tion of Breach Under Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-607(3)(a): A Conflict, a Resolution, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 525 (1985). Courts adopting the looser standard rely on the language
of comment 4, which states that "[tihe content of the notification need merely be suffi-
cient to let the seller know that the transaction is still troublesome and must be
watched." U.C.C. § 2-607 comment 4. See, e.g., Royal Typewriter Co., 719 F.2d at 1102, 37
U.C.C. Rep. at 441-42 (complaint sufficient if reasonable jury could infer that it was both
sufficient and timely enough to notify seller transaction was troublesome); Continental
Forest Prods. v. V.S. & Bros., 34 U.C.C. Rep. 1578, 1579 (9th Cir. 1982) (request that
seller "fulfill[] ... all orders" sufficient notification that transaction was troublesome);
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buyer must expressly notify the seller that the buyer intends to hold
the seller liable for damages for breach.961
Some courts that apply the lenient "troublesome nature" stan-
dard have held that the buyer need not notify the seller of the late
delivery of goods because a reasonable seller should realize that fail-
ure timely to deliver goods will be "troublesome" to the buyer. 962
Similarly, in continuing-use cases, a buyer who initially notifies the
seller of the troublesome nature of the transaction, but subse-
quently continues to deal with the seller without further mention of
the breach, may nevertheless satisfy this notice standard.9 63
On the other hand, courts applying the stricter standard have
held that the buyer must notify the seller of the late delivery of
goods.964 In Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp. 9 65 the Sixth Cir-
cuit noted that the seller may believe that the ,buyer will accept a
tender that does not strictly comply with the contract. Moreover,
Wilson v. Marquette Elecs., Inc., 630 F.2d 575, 584, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 399, 412-13 (8th
Cir. 1980) (complaints of malfunctioning computer); AES Technology Sys. v. Coherent
Radiation, 583 F.2d 933, 937-38, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 861, 866 (7th Cir. 1978) (phone call
from buyer expressing unhappiness with laser's performance); Kirby v. Chrysler Corp.,
554 F. Supp. 743, 752, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 497, 508 (D. Md. 1982) (complaints that manu-
facturer was delivering vehicles in violation of the contract); Horizons, Inc. v. Avco
Corp., 551 F. Supp. 771, 780, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 102, 114-15 (D.S.D. 1982) (complaint that
aircraft engine was not working properly), rev'd on other grounds, 714 F.2d 862, 36 U.C.C.
Rep. 1207 (8th Cir. 1983); Paulson v. Olson Implement Co., 107 Wis. 2d 510, 522-23,
319 N.W.2d 855, 860, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 146, 156 (1982) (notice that grain drying equip-
ment was not performing as expected).
961 Not all courts adopting the strict standard require the seller to notify the buyer
of an intention to seek legal action; all agree, however, that mere communication that
the transaction is "troublesome" does not satisfy section 2-607(3)(a). See Note, supra
note 960, at 534-37; see also, e.g., Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134,
153, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 1435, 1462 (6th Cir. 1983) (rejecting "troublesome and must be
watched" standard); K & M Joint Venture v. Smith Int'l, Inc.,* 669 F.2d 1106, 1112-13,
33 U.C.C. Rep. 1, 10 (6th Cir. 1982) (same); TJ. Stevenson & Co. v. 81,193 Bags of
Flour, 629 F.2d 338, 359-60, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 865, 894-95 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); Eastern
Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 970-73, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 353, 362-
66 (5th Cir. 1976); United Cal. Bank v. Eastern Mountain Sports, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 945,
957-58, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 806, 823-25 (D. Mass. 1982), aff'd mem., 705 F.2d 439 (1st Cir.
1983).
962 See Chemetron Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 381 F. Supp. 245, 254, 15 U.C.C.
Rep. 832, 841-42 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (notification not required where seller did not deliver
adequate quantities of liquid oxygen in timely manner), aff'd on other grounds, 522 F.2d
469 (7th Cir. 1975); Jay V. Zimmerman Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 1198, 9
U.C.C. Rep. 680 (E.D. Mo. 1971) (notification not necessary where seller makes late
delivery of goods under contract specifying that time was of essence); see also Note, supra
note 960, at 533.
963 See Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500, 509, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 625, 638-39 (8th
Cir. 1971) (buyer's complaints to seller that oil was improper for use in machine consti-
tuted sufficient notice despite buyer's continued purchase of oil following seller's assur-
ances that it was fit).
964 See Roth Steel Prods., 705 F.2d at 152, 35 U.C.C. Rep. at 1461; Eastern Air Lines, 532
F.2d at 971-73, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at 373.
965 705 F.2d 134, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 1435.
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The statute, by its terms, requires notice with regards to "any
breach" and the same policies which support a rule requiring no-
tice of breach when a latent defect is discovered also support a
rule requiring notice of breach when performance does not con-
form to time or price terms of the contract.966
A seller who delivers goods late may realize, without the benefit of
separate notice, that the transaction is "troublesome." Neverthe-
less, the seller may not know whether its tardiness caused the buyer
any reliance damages or whether the buyer considers the late deliv-
ery sufficiently serious to seek damages for breach.
Similarly, courts applying the stricter approach in continuing-
use cases emphasize the seller's reliance interests. In K & MJoint
Venture v. Smith International, Inc. 967 the buyer continued to use a*tun-
nel-boring machine after informing the seller of the machine's
problems.968 The court held that the buyer failed to meet the notifi-
cation requirement because it had continued to order repair and re-
placement parts for the machinery without protest.969
Several factors favor application of the strict standard. First,
section 2-607(3)(a) requires the buyer to notify the seller of
"breach."970 Second, under the strict standard, the buyer must
threaten legal action, which may encourage the seller to make
greater efforts to conform or to enter into settlement negotia-
tions.9 71 Finally, the strict standard reduces the potential for mis-
leading behavior because the buyer must allege breach in
unambiguous terms.97 2 These observations, however, have yet to
be confirmed by empirical evidence, and it is equally possible that
the strict standard discourages settlement because it may lead par-
ties to take inflexible bargaining positions.
Rather than adopt a lenient or strict approach for all transac-
tions, courts should tailor the standard to different classes of cases.
In late delivery cases, for example, courts should hold buyers to a
strict notification standard because a lenient standard that excuses a
buyer's failure to notify the seller of breach is inconsistent with sec-
966 Id. at 152, 35 U.C.C. Rep. at 1462; see also Eastern Air Lines, 532 F.2d at 973, 19
U.C.C. Rep. at 365 (purposes of section 2-607 compel application of notice requirement
to late delivery cases).
967 669 F.2d 1106, 33 U.G.C. Rep. 1 (6th Cir. 1982).
968 Id. at 1114-16, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 11-14.
969 Id., 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 11-14.
970 U.G.C. § 2-607(3)(a).
971 A credible threat may increase the chances of settlement. On the other hand, it
may cause the other party to take an inflexible position. The evidence is inconclusive on
this point. The strict standard may be superior, however, at providing the seller an
incentive to cure the breach because it makes a lawsuit more imminent. See Note, supra
note 960, at 547.
972 See id. at 545.
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tion 2-607(3)(a)'s policies. 973 The seller may not know that the
goods arrived late, that "time is of the essence," or that the buyer
suffered harm. In continuing-use cases, on the other hand, initial
notice that the transaction is troublesome should suffice. Such no-
tice would provide the seller with the opportunity to inspect the
goods, to enter into settlement negotiations, or to supply con-
forming goods.
2. Reasonable Time
The timeliness of notice depends upon the commercial context
of the transaction, the past conduct of the parties, and the discover-
ability of the defect.974 Although the reasonable time requirement
turns upon the facts of each case, the policies behind the Code's
notification requirement provide some indication of the require-
ment's boundaries.
Comment 4 takes the position that consumers should have
more time than commercial buyers because "the rule of requiring
notification is designed to defeat commercial bad faith, not to de-
prive a good faith consumer of his remedy." 975 Thus, the Code's
"reasonable time" requirement turns initially not upon the conduct
and circumstances of the case, but upon the status of the parties.
Beyond this initial distinction, the Code provides few guidelines
other than those derived from the policies behind the notice re-
quirement. For example, where the goods are perishable, the buyer
must often provide notice in time to allow the seller an opportunity
to inspect.976 Additionally, good faith and the policy of encouraging
the parties to cure defective goods suggest that the buyer should
have more time to notify the seller of breach where the parties have
attempted to remedy the defect. 977 Furthermore, although some
courts have allowed consumers to satisfy the notice requirement by
filing a complaint, 978 the majority apparently reject such a view.979
973 See supra notes 947-50 and accompanying text for discussion of the policies un-
derlying the notification requirement.
974 See U.C.C. § 2-607 comment 4.
975 Id.
976 Cf Willmar Cookie Co. v. Pippin Pecan Co., 357 N.W.2d 111, 39 U.C.C. Rep.
1249 (Minn. 1984) (notice within four or eight days of discovery of moldy pecans
sufficient).
977 See Speakman Co. v, Harper Buffing Mach. Co., 583 F. Supp. 273, 277-78, 38
U.C.C. Rep. 469, 473-75 (D. Del. 1984) (notice of six to eight months subsequent to
installation of defective buffing machine sufficient if delay in notice resulted from efforts
by both parties to find solution to the machine's defects).
978 See Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 55 (Alaska 1983).
We... are of the opinion that a complaint filed by a retail consumer
within a reasonable period after goods are accepted satisfies the statutory
notice requirement. The filing of a complaint is certainly not a bar to the
negotiation and settlement of claims. To the contrary, the prospect of
1987] 1323
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Allowing a party to satisfy the notice requirement by filing a com-
plaint removes the seller's incentive to inspect the allegedly dam-
aged goods and discourages negotiated settlement.
Beyond these general observations, the timeliness of notifica-
tion will turn upon the facts of the case. The Code's notice provi-
sion is in general enough terms to adapt to a variety of
circumstances. Given the open-endedness of section 2-607(3)(a),
the parties may wish to specify in the sales contract whom the buyer
must notify, what the notice must contain, and when the notice must
be provided.980
C. The Statute of Limitations-Section 2-725
Section 2-725 of the Code governs the period of limitations for
commercial warranties. 981 Application of this section typically
going to trial is often a powerful incentive to a defendant to investigate
the claims against it and to arrive at a reasonable agreement. A defendant
may more easily and effectively prepare for either settlement or trial
when it may compel discovery and so determine for itself the basis for a
plaintiff's claims of liability. Allowing a consumer's complaint to serve as
notice will not prevent a defendant manufacturer from raising the issue of
timeliness if it has been prejudiced by an unreasonable delay.
Id. at 462, 37 U.C.C. Rep. at 59-60. Whatever the merits of this argument, the court
failed to address the policy of providing the seller an opportunity for cure prior to litiga-
tion. See also Pace v. Sagebrush Sales Co., 560 P.2d 789, 792, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 490, 493-
94 (Ariz. 1977) (filing of complaint can but does not always satisfy notice requirement).
979 See, e.g., Voboril v. Namco Leisure World, Inc., 24 U.C.C. Rep. 614 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1978) (filing of complaint does not satisfy section 2-607(3)(a)); Armco Steel
Corp. v. Isaacson Structural Steel Co., 611 P.2d 507, 512-13, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 1249,
1258-59 (Alaska 1980) (same); see also 3 A. SQUILLANTE & J. FONSECA, WILLISTON ON
SALES § 22-11, at 308-10 (4th ed. 1974) ("The notice of the breach of warranty that is
contemplated by § 2-607(3) does not contemplate the buyer delivering a summons and
complaint to the seller as constituting notice. Section 2-607(3) provides no remedy for a
breach of warranty until the buyer has given notice, therefore, summons and complaint
cannot constitute notice."); cf Shooshonian, 672 P.2d at 462, 37 U.C.C. Rep. at 59 (view
that pleadings satisfy notice requirement is minority view).
980 Cf T.J. Stevenson & Co. v. 81,193 Bags of Flour, 629 F.2d 338, 364-66, 30
U.C.C. Rep. 865, 902-05 (5th Cir. 1980) (contract provision requiring notice of breach
to be sent within ten days by registered mail and requiring sample of the nonconforming
goods to be sent within twenty days reasonable under section 1-102(3)). The parties
may agree to a stricter notice requirement than that imposed by the Code, provided
such a requirement is not unreasonable. See Prompt Elec. Supply Co. v. Allen-Bradley
Co., 492 F. Supp. 344, 347-48, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 1287, 1289-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (notice
insufficient as matter of law where buyer failed to provide written notice upon discovery
of defect as required by contract).
981 (1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced
within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original
agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than
one year but may not extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of
the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of war-
ranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a war-
ranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery
1324 [Vol. 72:1159
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poses few problems: it simply bars a buyer from bringing an action
for breach of warranty more than four years after tender of delivery.
This straight-forward rule forces buyers to sue when evidence is
most readily available and allows sellers to continue with their busi-
nesses without fear of suit after a reasonable definite period. 982
Nevertheless, two complications to the rule's application sometimes
develop: determination of the timing of accrual and modification of
the limitations period.
1. Timing of Accrual
Subsection 2-725(2) provides that the "cause of action accrues
when the breach occurs." Breach usually occurs upon tender of de-
livery, "presumably because the condition of the goods at the time
of delivery is central." 98 3 Where products obviously breach a war-
ranty at the time of delivery, section 2-725 applies in a straightfor-
ward manner.9 84
Unfortunately, not all breaches are apparent, or even discover-
able, at the time of delivery. 985 In such cases, buyers have argued
for application of the "discovery rule, '986 under which the limita-
tions period does not begin to run until a buyer could discover the
of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action
accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.
(3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsec-
tion (1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action
for the same breach such other action may be commenced after the expi-
ration of the time limited and within six months after the termination of
the first action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discontinu-
ance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.
(4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of
limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued
before this Act becomes effective.
U.C.C. § 2-725.
982 The drafters' comment states that section 2-725 provides needed uiformity and
declares the four-year period "the most appropriate to modem business practice" be-
cause it "is within the normal commercial record keeping period." U.C.C. § 2-725 com-
ment. But see Kleiderfabrik v. Peters Sportswear Co., 483 F. Supp. 1228, 1235, 29
U.C.C. Rep. 534, 543-44 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (does not permit destruction of records after
four years in all cases, and particularly not in case of ongoing dispute involving goods
owned by third parties).
983 Special Project, supra note 1, at 270.
984 See, e.g., Anderson v. Deere & Co., 622 F. Supp. 290, 293, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 460,
461 (D. Colo. 1985) (warranty claims of parties not involved in initial sale barred be-
cause limitations period accrued at time of initial tender of equipment).
985 Cf Spring Mills, Inc. v. Carolina Underwear Co., 87 A.D.2d 524, 525, 448
N.Y.S.2d 10, 11, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 597, 598 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (statute of limitations
for claim involving fabric treated with banned chemical began to run when fabric deliv-
ered, not when treatment banned).
986 See, e.g., H. Hirschfield Sons, Co. v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 107 Mich. App.
720, 723-24, 309 N.W.2d 714, 715, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 140, 142 (1981) (rejecting argument
for discovery rule absent specific warranty of future performance); Coody v. A.H. Robins
Co., 696 S.W.2d 154, 156, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 1735, 1737 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (discovery
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breach. Although section 2-725(2) expressly rejects this interpreta-
tion, some courts have nevertheless circumvented the section's lan-
guage by delaying accrual under subsection (4)'s tolling
provision. 987
Subsection (2) excludes from the general rule any warranty that
"explicitly extends to future performance of the goods [where] dis-
covery of the breach must await the time of such performance.
'
"
988
In such a case, the limitations period begins to run not at tender of
delivery, but rather "when the breach is or should have been discov-
ered." 989 This exception applies only to an explicit future perform-
ance extension, 990 and the "basic tension between the words
'implied' and 'explicit' "991 usually leads courts to bar causes of ac-
tion for "future" implied warranties. 992 "An implied warranty, by
rule inapplicable because it "speaks only of discovery of the injury" by IUD not of plain-
tiff's discovery that IUD was a defectively designed Dalkon Shield).
The discovery rule commonly refers to the point at which the breach was reasonably
discoverable, not necessarily the time at which the plaintiff actually discovered it. Id., 41
U.C.C. Rep. at 1735.
987 See Richardson v. Car Lot Co., 10 Ohio Misc. 2d 32, 462 N.E.2d 459 (Mun. Ct.
1983) (limitations period tolled while seller kept automobile for repair for unreasonable
period of time; warranty only runs while buyer had use of vehicle). Some states have
changed subsection (2). See U.C.C. § 2-725(2), 14 U.L.A. 525-26 (1976) (in Alabama
and Maine, cause of action accrues at time of injury; in South Carolina, cause of action
accrues when breach is or should have been discovered); see also Knox v. North Am. Car
Corp., 80 Ill. App. 3d 683, 692-93, 399 N.E.2d 1355, 1362, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 336, 347
(1980) (Simon, J., concurring) ("In determining whether to apply the discovery doctrine
to a statute of limitation, competing interests must be balanced: the increased difficul-
ties of proof which accompany the passage of time against the hardship to the injured
plaintiff who neither knows nor should have known of the right to sue. Because we are
dealing with the Uniform Commercial Code, we should also consider the important in-
terests of uniformity of result and commercial certainty.") (citations omitted).
988 U.C.C. § 2-725(2).
989 Id. Cf Knox, 80 Ill. App. 3d at 692, 399 N.E.2d at 1361, 28 U.C.C. Rep. at 346
(Simon, J., concurring) (in implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose case, stat-
ute of limitations not tolled to time of discovery or repair because "[t]he covenant to
repair was not an explicit guarantee of future performance").
990 See, e.g., O'Brien v. Eli Lilly & Co., 668 F.2d 704, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 1502 (3rd Cir.
1981) (DES-induced cancer claim barred by four year statute of limitations because no
showing of warranty explicitly extending to future performance); Standard Alliance In-
dus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 821, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 65, 77-78 (6th Cir. 1978)
(seller's express warranty of machine explicitly extended to future performance so limi-
tations period did not begin to run until defect was or should have been discovered;
nevertheless, suit barred because brought after limitations period ended), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 923 (1979); Rochester Welding Supply Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 78 A.D.2d
983, 433 N.Y.S.2d 888, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 1014 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (contract for com-
puter sale subject to buyer's final approval of programming extended to future perform-
ance to the extent that the contract was not performed until plaintiff approved
programming).
991 City of Carlisle v. Fetzer, 381 N.W.2d 627, 629,42 U.C.C. Rep. 1676, 1678 (Iowa
1986).
992 See Stoltzner v. American Motors Jeep Corp., 127 Ill. App. 3d 816, 469 N.E.2d
443, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 907 (1984) (future performance warranties require explicit exten-
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its very nature, cannot explicitly extend to future performance. ' 993
Because the timing of accrual turns on tender of delivery, the
determination of when tender occurs is critical. For example, when
the seller agrees to install a good, tender of delivery usually occurs
when the seller completes installation.994 Similarly, when the seller
agrees to replace goods or parts, the cause may accrue upon tender
of delivery of the replacement. 995 Additionally, complete tender of
delivery goods when the seller delivers in multiple shipments must
often await the final delivery.996
2. Period of Limitation
A buyer normally has four years from the time the cause of ac-
tion accrues to commence litigation. 997 Section 2-725(1) permits
the parties to shorten the statutory period in their original agree-
ment, but not to extend the period.998
sion and implied warranties by definition not explicit); Safeway Stores, Inc. v.
Certainteed Corp., 687 S.W.2d 22, 24, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 46, 47 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
(cannot explicitly extend to future performance warranty limited from roofing supplier's
advertisement of product as "bondable up to 20 years"), rev'd on other grounds, 710
S.W.2d 544, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 1237 (rex. 1986); see also Knox, 80 Ill. App. 3d at 692, 399
N.E.2d at 1362, 28 U.C.C. Rep. at 347 (Simon, J., concurring) ("the interests of equity
do not favor the application of the discovery rule to breaches of implied warranties").
993 Safeway, 687 S.W.2d at 24, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 47 (emphasis in original).
994 See Dowling v. Southwestern Porcelain, Inc., 237 Kan. 536, 544, 701 P.2d 954,
960, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 127, 132 (1985) (under contract for sale of completed silo, tender
of delivery not complete until silo installed); Unitron Graphics, Inc. v. Mergenthaler
Linotype Co., 75 A.D.2d 783, 428 N.Y.S.2d 243, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 129 (N.Y. App. Div.
1980) (tender of delivery of equipment occurred when installation was complete); Jan-
dreau v. Sheesley Plumbing & Heating Co., 324 N.W.2d 266, 271, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 785,
790 (S.D. 1982) (under contract for sale and installation of irrigation system, tender of
delivery for section 2-725 purposes occurred when installation complete).
995 See Coakley & Williams, Inc. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 706 F.2d 456, 36
U.C.C. Rep. 87 (4th Cir. 1983) (glass originally installed in 1974 replaced by seller in
1977, but replacement also discolored; buyer's breach of implied warranty claim accrued
when replacement glass tendered). But see Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Mallard Mfg. Corp., 707
F.2d 351, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 860 (8th Cir. 1983) (action barred even though final replace-
ment, which took place three years after original tender, occurred two years before suit).
996 See Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Sys., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1261, 1266, 36 U.C.C. Rep.
1222, 1227 (D. Del. 1983) (where 40 expansion joints ordered, statute of limitations
began to run upon delivery of last of them to job site); cf. U.C.C. § 2-307 ("Delivery in
Single Lot or Several Lots"); Id. § 2-612 (" 'Installment Contract'; Breach").
997 Mississippi and Wisconsin use a six year period of limitations; Oklahoma substi-
tutes a five year period. U.C.C. § 2-725, IA U.L.A. 525-26 (1976).
998 See, e.g., Snyder v. Gallagher Truck Center, 89 A.D.2d 705, 453 N.Y.S.2d 826, 34
U.C.C. Rep. 185 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (parties could limit period of limitation to one
year); Jandreau v. Sheesley Plumbing & Heating Co., 324 N.W.2d 266, 267, 34 U.C.C.
Rep. 785, 786 (S.D. 1982) (limited by parties to one year period). But see Commissioners
of Fire Dist. No. 9 v. American La France, 176 N.J. Super. 566, 424 A.2d 441, 31 U.C.C.
Rep. 583 (1980) (section 2-725 prohibits extending limitations period beyond four years
in original agreement, but not in subsequent agreements between the parties); Suntogs
of Miami, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 433 So. 2d 581, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
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In addition to enforcing express agreements, several courts ap-
ply a "repair estoppel" doctrine to alter the statutory period. 999
The doctrine tolls the period when the defendant offers to repair
the breach. For example, a court would apply the doctrine if the
buyer of an item could prove that the seller had represented that
repairs would cure its defect.1000 However, "mere attempts to re-
pair are not sufficient. There must be representations made by de-
fendant as to the curing effect of the repairs." 1001
Other courts reject the repair estoppel doctrine. 0 02 For exam-
ple, in Kemp v. Bell-View, Inc. 1003 a Georgia court rejected the argu-
ment that the seller's repeated promises to repair or replace certain
windows tolled the statute of limitations for the buyer's claim for
property damage allegedly caused by the defective windows. The
court reasoned that, regardless of the promises of the seller to rem-
edy the situation, "[t]he windows were part of the initial construc-
tion of the home. Therefore, the cause of action would have
accrued at the time of the allegedly defective construction."' 10 0 4
Section 2-725 and its exceptions may dramatically affect indi-
vidual warranty lawsuits. Nevertheless, they do not affect the war-
App. 1983) (Florida law prohibits shortening section 2-725 limitations period by con-
tract), quashed, 472 So. 2d 1166, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 498 (Fla. 1985).
Several states have altered the modification rule. See U.C.C. § 2-725, IA U.L.A.
525-26 (1976 & Supp. 1987) (Colorado, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota,
and Wisconsin).
999 See, e.g., Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n, Inc. v. Envirotech Corp., 524 F. Supp. 1152,
33 U.C.C. Rep. 965 (D. Colo. 1981) (cause of action for breach respecting emission
control equipment tolled due to promises and efforts to repair); Little Rock School Dist.
v. Celotex Corp., 264 Ark. 757, 574 S.W.2d 669, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 666 (1978) (statute
tolled so long as vendor insists defect is reparable and attempts to repair), reh'g granted
sub nom. Little Rock School Dist. v. Matson, Inc., 264 Ark. 768, 576 S.W.2d 709 (1979);
see also Rochester Welding Supply Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 78 A.D.2d 983, 433
N.Y.S.2d 888, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 1014 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (contract required repair by
defendant, hence cause of action did not accrue until defendant admitted he could not
repair).
1000 See Laurita v. International Harvester, 32 Pa. D. & C.3d 563,41 U.C.C. Rep. 133
(Ct. C.P. 1983).
1001 Id. at 565, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 134. The Laurita court embraced the repair estop-
pel doctrine after first noting that the Pennsylvania appellate courts had yet to rule on it.
Id. at 564, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 134. Since Laurita, one appellate court has rejected the
doctrine without citing the lower court decision. See Ranker v. Skyline Corp., 342 Pa.
Super. 510, 517,493 A.2d 706, 709-10,41 U.C.C. Rep. 476, 480 (1985) ("The statute of
limitations will not be tolled or extended by good faith efforts made by a seller to correct
alleged defects in his product. Any other rule would discourage attempts to correct
defects in products sold pursuant to warranty.") (citations omitted).
1002 See, e.g., Kemp v. Bell-View, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 577, 346 S.E.2d 923, 2 U.C.C.
Rep. 2d 178 (1986) (claim for window damage barred despite repeated promises of re-
pair); Poppenheimer v. Bluff City Motor Homes, 658 S.W.2d 106, 38 U.C.C. Rep. 167
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (dealer's attempts to repair motor home did not toll statute of
limitations).
1003 179 Ga. App. 577, 346 S.E.2d 923, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 178 (1986).
1004 Id. at 578, 346 S.E.2d at 925, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 2d at 179.
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ranties themselves because a statute of limitations affects only the
timing of suits and not their substance. Consequently, in the major-
ity of situations, applying section 2-725 to commercial warranty ac-
tions remains a relatively straightforward matter.
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